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ABSTRACT

Toward a Posthuman Ecology: Evolutionary Aesthetics in Transatlantic Romanticism
by
Kaitlin Mondello
Advisor: Dr. Alexander Schlutz
My dissertation traces the vibrant interchange between Romantic literature and science in the
nineteenth century that necessitated new forms of aesthetics. I argue that Romantic writers and
scientists co-created a new way of understanding nature that moved away from hierarchical
anthropocentrism toward what I call “posthuman ecology.” This work explores shared scientific,
literary, and philosophical sources for Erasmus and Charles Darwin, Mary and Percy Shelley,
Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Emily Dickinson. I connect aesthetic innovation to ethics to ask
more broadly how literature can provide an affective and effective space to represent and engage
scientific discourse. I conclude that understanding the historical shift in both literature and
science toward the development of ecology in the nineteenth century is vital to our ability to
respond to our own contemporary environmental crises.
Keywords: ecology, materialism, evolution, science, animal studies, aesthetics
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Toward a Posthuman Ecology: Evolutionary Aesthetics in Transatlantic Romanticism
Introduction
“All Science is reason acting / systematizing / on principles, which even animals practically
know ((art precedes science—art is experience & observation))”
(Charles Darwin, Notebooks 73).
In the nineteenth century, the conceptualization of the relationship between humans and
the material world shifted from a rigid hierarchy to an interconnected web. My work traces the
corresponding decentering of the idea of the “human” into this ecological web that began with
scientific writings in the late 1790s, particularly in the developing fields of geology, botany,
comparative anatomy, and paleontology, and culminated in the publication of Charles Darwin’s
groundbreaking work The Origin of Species in 1859. I explore how four literary figures—Percy
Shelley, Mary Shelley, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Emily Dickinson (spanning work from 1811
to 1884)—incorporated this developing science into their unique literary aesthetics. All four of
the literary writers surveyed here studied science extensively and incorporated new scientific
information not only in thematic ways, but through formal shifts in language. As the Classical
and Medieval tradition of the “Great Chain of Being” gave way to Darwin’s more capacious
“tree of life” and “web of relations,” so too did literary language become unmoored from
traditional hierarchies and forms. This is evident in the revolutionary poetics of Percy Bysshe
Shelley and Emily Dickinson, the speculative/science fiction of Mary Shelley, and the
philosophical essays of Ralph Waldo Emerson. Each of these writers has been credited with a
unique aesthetic that I read in direct dialogue with the emergence of ecology and evolution in the
nineteenth century.
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Charles Darwin’s theories in the mid-nineteenth century fundamentally altered ideas of
the “human,” immersing them in an ecological web of infinite scale. Darwin’s work emerged
from the profusion of scientific discoveries beginning in the seventeenth century that revealed
worlds outside of human sensory perception and scale: from the microscopic to the telescopic,
and from layers of geologic strata to the nuclei of cells. As geologist Charles Lyell explained of
his own reaction to Isaac Newton’s cosmology, “Such views of the immensity of past time …
were too vast to awaken ideas of sublimity unmixed with a painful sense of our incapacity to
conceive a plan of such infinite extent. Worlds are seen beyond worlds immeasurably distant”
(91). Lyell’s own revolutionary work in geology led Darwin to the terrifying, wondrous abyss of
geologic time, which provided the necessary timescale for speciation to occur.
My dissertation examines the ways that Romantic writers directly respond to these
scientific shifts to articulate the decentering of humans from a supposedly unique place in the
universe in their literary work. More explicitly than most of their contemporaries, these four
writers grappled with scientific discourse to reimagine human relations with nature as part of the
new model of nature as an organic, interconnected web. In doing so, each employs what I call
evolutionary aesthetics: poetic language and rhetoric in prose that emphasizes the material
interconnections between all forms of life in their shared origins, descent, and characteristics,
and characterizes nature as dynamic and agential. Such aesthetics employ scientific ideas both
literally and metaphorically, and focus attention on non-human life, including animals of all
kinds, insects, and plants. This aesthetics helped create a new paradigm for understanding nature,
what I call posthuman ecology, a version of scientific ecology that deconstructs
anthropocentrism and acknowledges humans as materially enmeshed as one of many species in
the vast sensorium of the natural world. Ernst Haeckel (a prolific German writer, scientist,
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philosopher, and artist who was a major proponent of Darwin’s theory of evolution in Europe)
defined “ecology” in 1866 as “the whole science of the relations of the organisms to the
environment including, in the broad sense, all the conditions of existence” (8). Haeckel's
expansive definition of ecology came out of Darwin's emphasis on interrelational process in The
Origin of Species, in which Darwin offers that “plants and animals, most remote in the scale of
nature, are bound together by a web of complex relations” (80). Thus, the model for nature
shifted from vertical to horizontal. Jane Bennett, whose work in political ecology is an important
touchstone in current environmentalist thought, reiterates the importance of this shift in
ecological thinking: “to begin to experience the relationship between persons and other
materialities more horizontally, is to take a step toward a more ecological sensibility” (10). In his
foundational study of natural history, The Order of Things, Michel Foucault theorizes this
transition from a linear to radial model of nature, borrowing the language of Georges Cuvier: “it
is necessary to substitute for the image of the continuous scale which has been traditional in the
eighteenth century, from Bonnet to Lamarck, that of a radiation, or rather a group of centres from
which there spreads outward a multiplicity of beams; thus, each being could be placed ‘in this
vast network, which constitutes organized nature … but ten or twenty beams would not suffice to
express these innumerable relations.’ Whereupon, it is the entire Classical experience of
difference that topples and falls, and with it the relation between being and nature” (272).
Romanticism falls historically just at the crux of this collapse, in part begun by Cuvier, and
continued later by Darwin.
In theorizing both posthuman ecology and evolutionary aesthetics, my project seeks to
address several lacunae in the intersections of science studies, animal studies, posthumanism,
and literary criticism. First, while much critical work has been done to establish the relationship
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between Darwinian science and Victorian fiction, most notably Gillian Beer's Darwin’s Plots
(1983) and George Levine's Darwin and the Novelists (1988), there remains the need to explore
aesthetic representations of evolution outside of narrative, and to turn to a previous historical
period to examine the evolution of the theory itself in the Romantic era as the intellectual milieu
from which it emerged. Evolution as an idea itself evolved over time (previously referred to as
“transmutation,” “transformism” and “developism”), and flourished at the turn of the nineteenth
century with Erasmus Darwin’s poetry and scientific treatises (beginning in 1789) and JeanBaptiste Lamarck’s theories of inheritance (beginning in 1800).1 These works were vital source
materials for Charles Darwin, as well as significant influences on the Romantic writers discussed
in this project. Several recent works in British Romanticism have begun to advance discussions
of pre-Darwinian theories of evolution in the Romantic era, particularly Onno Oerlemans's work
on animals and the material sublime (2004) and Peter Heymans’s study of the aesthetics of
species and the ecological sublime (2012). While sublimity is central in both Romantic science
and literature, my study moves away from the discourse of the sublime toward a concept of
aesthetics that develops from posthumanism and new materialism centered around
interconnection and interdependence (as opposed to the separation implied in the sublime
between the viewer and the natural world).
Similar to Oerlemans's and Heymans's work, recent studies of animals in British
Romanticism, such as Christine Kenyon-Jones's Kindred Brutes (2001) and David Perkins's
Romanticism and Animal Rights (2007), have shown that concepts of animal rights developed
alongside early evolutionary debates about the origins of humans in relation to other primates.
1

I am using the term “evolution” throughout this dissertation for the sake of consistency to link
these various traditions. This is not meant to represent the modern sense of “evolution” drawn
most directly from Charles Darwin, but rather to call attention to the long history of thought from
which this idea emerged.
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Kenyon-Jones notes that the “perception of human/animal kinship in the Romantic period
foreshadows what Darwinism demonstrated half a century later through biological means” (206).
My dissertation traces this continuum between Romanticism and early evolutionary science more
closely than previous scholarship through science studies and extends this area of inquiry into
American Studies, where there are, as yet, few major studies on this subject. By linking British
and American literary traditions, I highlight the exchange of ideas in the nineteenth century that
led to the permeation of ecological thinking across continents. In particular, I trace the influence
of British and European Romantic literature, science, and philosophy, on the American traditions
of Emerson’s Transcendentalism and Dickinson’s gothic themes.
Ecology essentially is the study of interconnection in nature, but such loaded terms
warrant further inquiry for the purposes of my project. In The Ecological Thought, Timothy
Morton extends the sense of “ecology” as interconnection beyond what we as humans are likely
to define as “nature” (animals, trees, clouds, etc.) toward unseen levels of bacteria, slime mold,
viruses, DNA, etc. This builds on his previous work, Ecology without Nature, which, as the title
indicates, insists that we must abandon our limited, preconceived definitions of “Nature” in order
to have any real sense of ecology (3).2 Morton describes our idea/l of “Nature” as a mirror, a
projection of our own desires (5). In a similar vein, in What is Nature?, philosopher Kate Soper
defines “Nature” as “the concept through which humanity thinks its difference and specificity”
(156). She, like Jacques Derrida, calls attention to what lies at the borders or margins of
categorization: "the humanity-nature distinction” is “a site of equivocation wherein we can read a
narrative of human self-doubts, not only about our use of nature conceived as a clearly delineated

2

In a similar vein, Alan Bewell argues in his most recent work Natures in Translation that
“nature” needs to be made plural in order to account for its immense diversity. Derrida makes a
similar case for the term “animal” in which the singular reduces all complexity.
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'other,' but also about where to draw the line between ourselves and this 'other' to ourselves in the
first place" (Soper 72). Soper traces the many contradictory impulses that we project onto this
idea of “nature”:
Nature is both machine and organism, passive matter and vitalist agency. It is represented
as both savage and noble, polluted and wholesome, lewd and innocent, carnal and pure,
chaotic and ordered. Conceived as a feminine principle, nature is equally lover, mother
and virago: a source of sensual delight, a nurturing bosom, a site of treacherous and
vindictive forces bent on retribution for her human violation. Sublime and pastoral,
indifferent to human purposes and willing servant of them, nature awes as she consoles,
strikes terror as she pacifies, presents herself as both the best of friends and the worst of
foes. (71)
All of these ideas about nature can be found in Romantic writing, but this study focuses on
particular moments of tension between these kinds of binary oppositions, particularly when they
tip toward the “darker” side of nature to include disease, contagion, death, decay, and extinction
as natural processes. In this way, my project builds on what Morton calls “dark ecology,” or the
“dark side” of ecological interconnection. In The Ecological Thought, Morton focuses on the
“strangeness” of nature (15) with its incessant mutation (61) that we struggle to acknowledge as
part of ourselves. For Morton, “dark ecology” is deeply rooted in Darwin’s conception of
evolution (18) in which “the more you know, the more entangled you realize you are, and the
more open and ambiguous everything becomes” (17). Morton thus identifies “the uncanny and
uncertainty [as] basic to the ecological thought” (81). In this emphasis on strangeness, he returns
to the idea of the monstrous throughout the chapter “Dark Thoughts.” He notes Darwin’s
categorizations of “species, variants, and monsters” (64) in which “[e]volution jumbles bodies
like a dream jumbles words and images. ... All organisms are monsters insofar as they are
chimeras, made from pieces of other creatures.” (65-6). He concludes that “the inhuman is the
strangely strange core of the human” (91). It is this “dark” core, and our human resistance to it,
that defines “dark ecology.” Darwin himself was haunted by the “war of nature” and the
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literature of my four writers provides an environment in which to work through affective
responses to the shifting conceptions of nature in the nineteenth century away from beneficence
and order toward chance and extinction.
My project builds on Morton’s by centering around the role of death in particular in
forming “dark ecology.” Morton acknowledges that “Death is the fact that ecological thought
must encounter” and that “We refuse to allow for death” (Dark Ecology 138, 51), but he never
expands on these claims. I turn to Darwin to help theorize how death is an essential part of
ecology, particularly in our own era in which our species faces possible extinction in the wake of
imminent climate change. Each of the four literary writers in my dissertation was traumatized by
the losses of close family members and young children in ways that led them to reconsider the
“R/romantic” idea of a beneficent nature. Likewise, Darwin suffered the devastating loss of his
ten-year old daughter Annie. These intimate experiences with death became part of these writers’
own “dark ecologies” as they transformed biographical experiences into dramatic confrontations
with material nature in their work.

Part I. Darwin and the Scientists; or, Evolution before Darwin
This section considers the history of scientific classification from which Darwin’s work
emerged and serves dual purposes: first, to establish the scientific traditions that the writers in
this project were most familiar with, and second, to demonstrate the ways that ideas of nature,
species, human, and animal were constructed. In the contemporary field of Critical Animal
Studies, Charles Darwin is considered the original catalyst in dismantling human exceptionalism.
Jacques Derrida, Timothy Morton, and Matthew Calarco all call attention to Darwin’s pivotal
role in their works on animals and ecology. My study examines the foundations from which
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Darwin’s work emerged in order to demonstrate how he engages and revises previous
conceptions of species and evolution with which the literary writers in my study were most
familiar. Though Charles Darwin’s work is pivotal in reconceptualizing the relationship between
humans and animals, the long, gradual process of understanding the connections between species
necessarily preceded him. It is this pre-Darwinian scientific worldview that Romantic writers
like the Shelleys, Emerson and Dickinson knew intimately; hence, in an examination of their
attitudes toward animals and nature, we see the same movement as in Darwin toward “ecological
thinking” through the course of the nineteenth century. As Levine and Knoepflmacher claim for
pre-Victorian science, “Despite erroneous classifications, mythologizing, and misidentifications,
the earlier naturalists had acknowledged what pious Victorians would desperately try to deny:
kinship with the monstrous anthropoids” (319). The classification of humans and animals
reached its zenith in Enlightenment science, which is characterized by an obsession with
“taxonomizing the natural world into different categories of being” (Kenyon-Jones 151). Carl
Linnaeus first classified human as animals (1707-1788) in Systema Natura (1735). Though he
did not believe originally in the transmutation of species, later in his life, based on his
experiments with plants, he became open to the possibility. His classification system (still used
today) has a dual effect of both uniting and separating the natural world. Linnaeus was the first
formally to label “humans” as a fixed species, focusing on anatomical similarities. While this
classification project created hierarchies within “kingdoms,” it also attempted to show
relationships across the natural world. Linnaeus originally labeled humans using two categories:
viviparous quadrupeds (live-birthing four-legs) and anthropomorpha (which includes monkeys).
In 1758, in the tenth edition, he abandoned this Aristotelian terminology for the Latinate
binomial nomenclature that is still in use: class – Mammalia, order – Primates. There was
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substantial resistance to this categorization of humans as primates, with many other scientific
works locating humans in a separate classification altogether until as late as 1863 (Kenyon-Jones
35). Linnaeus’s original category of anthropomorpha (animals resembling humans) included
Homo Caudatus, or ape-like men. This was a “chimerical classification” among pre-nineteenth
century naturalists “who had not yet recognized the distinguishing characteristics of
‘Chimpanzee, Gibbon, and Orang’” (Levine and Knoepflmacher 319). Literary scholars George
Levine and U.C. Knoepflmacher, among others, argue that these classifications influenced Mary
Shelley’s description of the Creature in Frankenstein. Similar to Linnaeus, Lord Monboddo
(1714-1799) claimed that humans were descended from orangutans and other monkeys, which
was satirized by Percy Shelley’s close friend Thomas Love Peacock in the novel Melincourt
(1817). Such satires represent the immense resistance to the idea that humans were biologically
related to any other animal.
Linnaeus’s classification system built on the tradition of the “Great Chain of Being” that
ranked all forms of life and added man at the top of the hierarchy (Kenyon-Jones 138-9). Pierre
Belon's Oyseaux (1555) contains the famous picture of the skeletons of a human and bird next to
each other “with the corresponding bones of both labelled to show that, despite the outward
differences of birds and humans, their skeletons were built according to the same basic plan; they
were made of the same parts, differently modified. This idea, known as homology, can be traced
back to Aristotle, but it had never been so clearly and definitively presented” (Huxley 70).
Homology would become a significant influence on later evolutionary ideas in the nineteenth
century and Charles Darwin recognized a lineage from Aristotle to Linnaeus to Cuvier to
himself. When Darwin received a gift from his friend who had translated Aristotle's De Partibus
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Animalium,3 he responded in a letter: “I had a high notion of Aristotle's merits, but I had not the
most remote notion what a wonderful man he was. Linnaeus and Cuvier have been my two gods,
though in very different ways, but they were mere school-boys to Aristotle” (26). Darwin
recognized in these thinkers the same project of trying to understand and organize the natural
world. Georges Cuvier (1769-1832), who first proved extinction and established the field of
paleontology, refined Linnaeus’s taxonomy into sub-kingdoms (phyla) and laid the foundations
of paleontology with his work on fossils and geologic strata, which further paved the way for
Darwin’s theory of evolution (Huxley 70). Linnaeus's classification of plants by their sexual
parts inspired the evolutionary theories of Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802) both in his scientific
treatises, such as Zoonomia, and his epic poetry, particularly The Botanic Garden (which
included “The Loves of the Plants” which was satirized as “The Loves of Triangles” to again
attempt to dismiss radical claims about the shared nature of all forms of life). Erasmus Darwin
“proposed that embryos were formed from 'molecules' from both parents, and made the
connection between variation and sexual reproduction” (Huxley 83), leading toward Charles
Darwin’s work on sexual selection. Both Erasmus Darwin and Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (17441829) theorized evolution as a change in species over time, even if they were unable to identify
the mechanism by which speciation would unfold (196). Charles Darwin loosened the rigidity of
the Linnaean classification system, noting in his journal that phylogenetic trees were not an
accurate representation of evolutionary interrelationships. Rather, Darwin imagined possible
alternatives (seaweed, coral) that move away from more linear hierarchies. Darwin drew his
ideas of evolution as a repeating cycle rather than a teleology in part from the work of his
grandfather, Erasmus, but one of the main differences between the Darwins is that Charles did
3

Aristotle’s On the Parts of Animals, The History of Animals, and On the Generation of Animals
were translated into Latin as Liber Animalium in the late medieval period.
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not believe in the constant improvement or “perfectibility” of evolution that came out of his
grandfather’s Enlightenment thinking.
The importance of Linnaeus's work in defining humans as both included and excluded
from other animals is evident in both Jacques Derrida’s and Giorgio Agamben’s contemporary
philosophical treatises in Critical Animal Studies. Derrida imagines his project as what he calls
“a sort of classification after Linnaeus, a taxonomy of the point of view of animals” (13). His
work seeks to undo the binary division between human and animal that “species” has been used
to reinforce. Likewise, Agamben studies Linnaeus closely, noting that Linnaeus’s final
classification for humans, “Homo Sapiens,” essentially means a creature that can know itself.
Agamben interprets this to mean a creature that names itself, thereby exposing our species
designation as in part a subjective understanding of ourselves rather than only an “objective”
scientific fact. Agamben labels this binarizing impulse as the “Anthropological Machine,” which
he defines as “which—in its two variants, ancient and modern—is at work in our culture. Insofar
as the production of man through the opposition man/animal, human/inhuman, is at stake here,
the machine necessarily functions by means of an exclusion (which is also always already a
capturing) and an inclusion (which is also always already an exclusion)” (37). Agamben
demonstrates that binary logic operates on a principle in which exclusion and inclusion turn out
to be two sides of the same coin. To say that the human is separate from but related to the animal
is already to exclude and include both categories. Morton takes up Agamben’s critique of species
classification:
Darwinism asserts that humans are ‘evolved apes,’ while pre-Darwinist thinking labeled
apes ‘degenerate humans.’ Linnaeus thought that organ-utans should be classified as a
species of Homo, and there is movement to reclassify bonobos this way--yet note in
passing that there is no movement to reclassify humans as a species of Pan (chimpanzee),
even though, technically, we are the third chimp, having more in common with them than
gorillas do. (89)
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Morton’s and Agamben’s questioning of the very terms of classification reveals the continued
anthropocentric nature of our species categorizations. Indeed, Darwin believed that it would be
difficult to mark an exact moment for the transition from ape to man (Morton 89). Morton
comments on this paradox: “Denying that humans are continuous with nonhumans has had
disastrous effects. Yet declaring that humans are animals risks evening out all beings the better to
treat them as instruments” (62). Here we see how the categories “human” and “animal” collapse
onto themselves. Morton further demonstrates the specious nature of “species” as begun by
Linnaeus: “Humans maintain the human-animal boundary by erecting rigid walls made of quasihumans, humanoids, hominids,” etc. particularly in our species classification system that
includes Homo habilis and Neanderthals (88), who are considered not-quite human. Recent DNA
and fossil discoveries, however, have shown that Neanderthals had many human characteristics
and that Homo Sapiens were able to mate with other hominids (Kolbert; Mooallem). These
distinctions reflect our subjective desires about whom we choose to include in our own
definitions of self and species.
For Foucault, of course, scientific classification was as much a linguistic project as a
biological one (139). He argues that the designation of species was dependent on both “a theory
of the mark and a theory of the organism” (145): “An animal or plant is not what is indicated - or
betrayed- by the stigma that is to be found imprinted upon it; it is what the others are not; it
exists in itself only so far as it is bounded by what is distinguishable from it” (144-45). Thus, for
Foucault, “The theory of natural history cannot be disassociated from that of language” (157), “it
concerns a fundamental arrangement of knowledge, which orders the knowledge of beings, so as
to make it possible to represent them in a system of names” (157) and “If natural history reworks
language and attempts to perfect it, this is because it also delves down into the origin of
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language” (161). Thus, from the beginning, the classification of species and their relations was
necessarily linguistic. Foucault notes how Linnaeus wanted to bring biology and language as
close together as he could in his classification system, imagining “botanical calligrams” in which
the presentation of information would mirror the form of the creature. Foucault describes
Linnaeus’ desire:
His wish was that the order of the description, its division into paragraphs, and even its
typographical modules, should reproduce the form of the plant itself. That the printed
text, in its variables of form, arrangement, and quantity, should have a vegetable
structure. … The plant is thus engraved in the material of the language into which it has
been transposed, and recomposes its pure form before the reader's very eyes. The book
becomes the herbarium of living structures. (135)
This desire to return something to its “pure” form, a revivification through both the visual and
the linguistic, speaks to Linnaeus's recognition that classification systems were necessarily
artificial even as they attempted to represent material reality.
The writers surveyed in this project are deeply engaged this discourse of species,
particularly at the linguistic level, to redefine “human” “animal” and “nature” as far more
interconnected categories than had previously been thought possible in the Western tradition.
Foucault reads Cuvier (more than Lamarck) as moving toward this more modern conception of
nature that would be central to Darwin’s theory of evolution (275). Foucault, reading through
Cuvier, recognizes that this new understanding of nature reveals it to be a place of violence and
death. Foucault applies this idea directly to concept of “the animal”:
the animal maintains its existence of the frontiers of life and death. Death besieges
it on all sides; furthermore, it threatens it also from within, for only the organism
can die, and it is from the depth of their lives that death overtakes living beings.
Hence, no doubt, the ambiguous values assumed by animality toward the end of
the eighteenth century: the animal appears as the bearer of that death to which it
is, at the same time, subjected: it contains a perpetual devouring of life by life …
The same movement that dooms it to death reveals it as murderous. It kills
because it lives. Nature can no longer be good. (277-78)
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In this passage, Foucault connects the biological state of all animals to the perception of
animality as both vulnerable and violent as life and death become inseparable categories in
consumption for survival. This is more than “survival of the fittest;” rather it is an
acknowledgment of the interdependent nature of life and death for all organisms.

Part II. Posthumanism and Our Ecological Selves
In this section, I survey the contemporary field of posthumanism as it relates to my
conception of posthuman ecology and consider a mode of posthuman identity practiced by the
writers in this project that at once acknowledges a sense of self, but one that becomes enmeshed
and pluralized, what I call ecological selves. Following from the Darwinian revolution, twentyfirst century posthumanism continues to challenge the ways that we perceive and categorize
ourselves as “human” in relation to the world in which we find ourselves. In its most rigorous
and responsible modes, posthumanism is essentially a recognition of the subjectivity of the term
“human” rather than a wholesale abandonment of it. In attempting to define posthumanism (a
recent theoretical field very much still in flux), Cary Wolfe rejects any form of posthumanism
that relies on either utopian and dystopian visions of human disembodiment through technology
as escapist fantasies that deny humans’ shared embodiment in the world. Pramod K. Nayar’s
study Posthumanism (2014) reiterates Wolfe’s connections between posthumanism and animal
studies, designating “critical posthumanism” as “the radical decentering of the traditional
sovereign, coherent and autonomous human in order to demonstrate how the human is always
already evolving with, constituted by and constitutive of multiple forms of life and machines”
(2). Such a definition draws from ecology in its focus on “a network of connections, exchanges,
linkages, and crossings” that constitutes the human (5). This concept of interconnection often
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serves as the primary basis for the ethical imperative toward sustainability and equality; the
awareness of our material interconnection in the world impels us to consider how we as a
species affect our shared environment. Ideas of our own multiplicity and entanglement then cut
across posthumanist theory. This is evident in the influence of network theory on Wolfe, as well
as in Deleuze and Guattari’s notions of the pack, the swarm, the rhizome, the assemblage, etc.
which demonstrate that multiplicity is fundamental to ecology. For Deleuze and Guattari, “An
assemblage is precisely this increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity that necessarily changes
in nature as it expands its connections. … We do not have units (unités) of measure, only
multiplicities or varieties” (8). Following Delueze and Guattari, in Zoontologies: The Question
of the Animal (2003) (edited by Wolfe), Alphonso Lingis writes poetically of the science of
human entanglement in a broader world:
What is fascinated in the pack, the gangs of the savannah and the night, the swarming, is
the multiplicity in us—the human form and the nonhuman, vertebrate and invertebrate,
animal and vegetable, conscious and unconscious movements and intensities in us …
What is mesmerized in us are the inhuman movements and intensities in us, the pulses of
solar energy momentarily held and refracted in our crystalline cells, the microorganic
movements and intensities in the currents of our inner rivulets and cascades. (166-167)
This is the materiality of posthumanism: awe-inspiring as it exceeds our sense of individual self
on an infinite scale of interconnections.
Morton makes a similar case in The Ecological Thought, in which he defines ecology in
relation to our difficulty in grasping the vastness of space and time as the current ecological
crisis drives us to examine the “interdependence” of our world (30). Interconnection is
interdependence: “Thinking interdependence involves dissolving the barrier between ‘over here’
and ‘over there’ and more fundamentally, the metaphysical illusion of rigid, narrow boundaries
between inside and outside” (29). Ecology, then, is at its core a breakdown of barriers. Morton
focuses his study of ecology on Darwin, whose work shows us a kind of “time-lapse” that
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reveals the strangeness and even monstrosity of nature (43-44). For Morton, “environmental
thinking is thinking big … bigger than we can conceive” (28). In order to imagine this vastness,
he defines the world of matter, living and nonliving, as “mesh”: “the holes in a network and the
threading between them” (28) in which we are all “entangled” (28); there is no center, no
beginning or end, no “definite ‘within’ or ‘outside’” (38-39). This idea undoes traditional notions
of the self, which become “slippery” (77), “[s]ince there is no (solid, lasting, independent, single)
self (87). We are not caught inside this “mesh,”; rather we are its insides.
Inherent in these kinds of shifts in ecological thinking from human to posthuman is the
loss of human exceptionalism and the acceptance of our mutable, permeable bodies. Yet, from
this shift in perspective, we can derive a deeper sense of identity—what I call our ecological
selves—which are always already plural and inextricably enmeshed in the matter that persists
both inside and outside of us. This concept draws from Stacy Alaimo’s ideas of “transcorporeality” and the “material self” in which “conceptions of the human self are profoundly
altered by the recognition that ‘the environment’ is not located somewhere out there, but is
always the very substance of ourselves” (4). This shift in perception is one of the defining
struggles of the nineteenth century, fueled by new scientific discoveries. Oerlemans explores
what he calls the “material sublime,” which are “moments of perception” “when the material is
not transcended, but confronted” (4). For Oerlemans, this Romantic practice is a precursor to
environmentalism because it entails placing ourselves inside of nature (13). In Anxious Anatomy:
The Conception of the Human Form in Literary and Naturalist Discourse (2009) Stefani
Engelstein phrases it similarly: as the need to understand “self as nature … a recognition of
oneself not as an integral totality, but as a system” (217). It is only through this practice of
understanding ourselves as constituted by nature, as nature, that we can begin to experience our
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ecological selves, something each of the writers surveyed here explores. This concept is rooted in
a scientific understanding of ourselves: from the lineage of our species, to the microbiome of
bacteria and parasites that cohabitate in our bodies daily, to Carl Sagan’s famous quote that we
are made of “star stuff,” we are a plurality of the material world. This project traces how
Romantic writers came to this kind of insight in the nineteenth century as science began to force
the question of human origins and illuminate a vast material world in which humans were no
longer assured of a central position.
In material existence, humans are far more like siphonophores--organisms that appear to
be individuals, but are made up of colonies--than is easy or comfortable to acknowledge (think
here of our microbiomes with millions of bacteria living inside our bodies). We are afraid to
reconceptualize individuality as a kind of multiplicity because it seems to necessitate a loss of
agency. Thus, the posthuman dismantling of the individual subject is resisted because it is deeply
threatening to our inherited ontologies and their consequent epistemologies and systems. In this
way, posthumanism seems to put traditional systems of ethics based on subjects with agency at
risk. Diana Coole and Samantha Frost state it boldly in their introduction to New Materialisms,
“What is at stake here is nothing less than a challenge to some of the most basic assumptions that
have underpinned the modern world, including its normative sense of the human and its beliefs
about human agency, but also regarding its material practices such as the way we labor on,
exploit, and interact with nature” (4) As Calarco notes, the fundamentals of most ethical theories
are “moral agency and patiency, universalability, self and other, reciprocity,” but “most of these
categories originate in discourses that are fundamentally anthropocentric” (126-7). Nayar makes
this same point: “Morality, ethics, responsibility in the modern era […] all emerge from this
view of the autonomous, self-conscious coherent and self-determining human […] Change and
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improvement therefore are deemed to be possible only through this power of the rational mind”
(6). But what a dismantling of the subject as autonomous in favor of interconnection makes
possible is an alternative form of ethics. As both Agamben and Calarco suggest, there are forms
of ethics available through an awareness of our interconnections that do not foreclose morality,
but rather expand beyond self/other, zoe/bios, etc. in an undoing of all the false binaries that
separate “us” from everything else. These binaries are dangerous to morality rather than the
pillars upon which it is vaulted. As Wolfe states, “the discourse of animality has historically
served as a crucial strategy in the oppression of humans by other humans—a strategy whose
legitimacy and the force depend, however, on the prior taking for granted of the traditional
ontological distinction, and consequent ethical divide, between human and nonhuman animals”
(xx). Darwin himself recognized this impulse to dehumanize/animalize the other in order to
justify mistreatment (Beer 55). To dismantle the categories “human” and “animal” would be to
find a greater form of equality that connects all forms of life. While such an idea clearly
represents immense practical, social, legal, and logistical challenges, undoing the reification of
definitional terms like “human” and “animal” is a critical first step in moving toward the a more
radical idea of quality based on ecological interconnection and interdependence.
As posthumanism demands a new conceptualization of the categories by which we define
ourselves and others, so too does it necessitate new forms of linguistic expressions that can
transform the traditional building blocks of syntax (subject, verb, object). Calarco’s study of
Agamben’s The Open posits a dismantling of the anthropocentric “I” in which Agamben
employs Émile Benveniste’s work in linguistics. For Benveniste, there is no “material referent”
for the “I,” but instead it exists only as rhetorical utterance (83). Nayar reiterates this
poststructuralist position claiming that the “subject” as an idea emerges in language, rather than
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precedes it (17). The intensity and rootedness of separating ourselves from each other and the
world is reflected in the structure of English as a language; thus, if we want to truly acknowledge
our ecological selves, we are tasked with finding new systems that are more inclusive and
capacious. For example, indigenous scientist and writer Robin Kimmerer in her article “Speaking
of Nature” has suggested the new pronouns ki and kin to replace it and them “inspired by the
grammar of animacy in Potawatomi.” She asks, “Can we make a new world with new words?” In
a similar vein, Bruno Latour proposes various new terms such as “actant” to try to undo the
anthropocentrism encoded in language (75). These are in fact similar questions to those that
Percy Shelley explores in his essay, “On Life,”
The words, I, you, they are not signs of any actual difference subsisting between the
assemblages of thoughts thus indicated, but are merely marks employed to denote the
different modifications of the one mind. … The words I, and you, and they are
grammatical devices invented simply for arrangement and totally devoid of the intense
and exclusive sense usually attached to them. (Reiman and Fraistat 508)
Shelley’s radical redefinition of such terms of human identity correspond to his expansive sense
of ecology and the interconnections between all life. While any individual work will never
achieve the herculean task of remaking language to account for the posthuman, we must work
with and become the writers, scientists, and thinkers who push further toward these goals. There
is significant resistance to posthumanism, though, because it seems to take away or deny all that
we hold to be unique or important about ourselves as humans, especially in literature and ethics.
But we cannot hold on to the old humanist categories as they are; they are our chimeras, our own
“supreme fictions” (following Wallace Stevens). While we cannot go so far as to jettison them
completely, we must expand their meanings (of self, subject, etc.) to include animals and the
nonhuman world as we look to writers and scientists, past and the present, who attempt these
new forms of language and ethics. With this goal in mind, my study turns to four literary writers
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in dialogue with Charles Darwin and/or his influential predecessors to trace the beginnings of
posthuman ecology in the nineteenth century.

Part III. Four Literary Case Studies
This introduction lays out some of the theoretical and scientific framework for the
proceeding four main chapters of literary study, in which I follow adaptations of early ecological
thought as they develop along a continuum in both science and literature. The first chapter, “'The
reptile equal to the God': Percy Shelley's Poetic Ecology” focuses on Shelley’s poetry and
philosophical essays (1792-1822). Shelley was an influence on all the other writers surveyed in
this project, including Charles Darwin. Shelley's bold speculations on the mind, body, and
animals in the early nineteenth century bear a resemblance to those explored later by a young
Darwin in his mid-century M and N notebooks, where Darwin comes to conclusions that he
names as materialist (16). Shelley's early materialism is evident in his vegetarian treatise “A
Vindication of Natural Diet” (1813) in which he makes a proto-evolutionary argument drawn
from comparative anatomy that connects human and animal bodies. Shelley takes this argument
further in “On the Vegetable System of Diet" (1815) from biological commonalities to shared
emotions between humans and animals, recognizing humans’ resemblances to the “organgoutang” (12-13). Shelley draws from multiple branches of science in his work, particularly in the
Defence of Poetry (1821); for Shelley, as for Emerson, it is the work of the poet to show the
inherent interconnections between science and poetry. Shelley takes up this task in what I call
poetic ecology in which he attempts to link all forms of life into an ecosystem through the
structure and style of his poetics, especially in “The Sensitive Plant,” “Alastor,” and “Mont
Blanc.”
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The next two chapters turn the novels of Mary Shelley (1797-1851), which serve as an
important anchor to the project as Mary Shelley adapts Percy Shelley’s and the Enlightenment’s
earlier sense of progressive evolution and moves further toward Charles Darwin’s nondirectional evolution through a focus on ideas of species and extinction. The second chapter,
“'Lost in darkness and distance’: Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein and the ‘Question of the Animal”
turns to Shelley’s famous novel Frankenstein (1818, 1831). In her novels, Shelley complicates
the possibility of equality and harmony between humanity and the rest of the material world,
something that Percy Shelley struggled with throughout his short life and shifting philosophical
positions. This is evident in her most famous work, generally acknowledged as the origin of
science fiction, which critiques both scientific practice and an exclusionary humanism that
animalizes other humans and refuses to acknowledge the suffering of other animals. I use
Jacques Derrida’s groundbreaking work The Animal That Therefore I am (2009) to offer a new
reading of the Creature as a victim of this kind of animalization. Derrida’s work, like Mary
Shelley's, is an indictment of Western philosophy’s refusal to examine the constructed nature of
identity, reifying “human” and “animal” as separate and essentialist categories. Shelley’s novel
exposes the tragic consequences of this rigid categorizing found in the science of her time and
illuminates the ethical questions that posthumanism raises today.
The third chapter, titled “The ‘grim Unreality’: Extinction Narratives in Mary Shelley’s
The Last Man,” continues my study of Mary Shelley with a focus on her lesser-known novel The
Last Man (1826) in relation to Thomas Robert Malthus’s theories of population checks and
Charles Darwin’s later theory of extinction. Building on Frankenstein’s deconstruction of the
human/animal divide, the novel unfolds as a stripping away of everything that had come to
define the human, but leaves the rest of nature intact. Though Shelley's work predates Darwin,
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there are striking similarities to Darwin's Origin as both writers draw on radical shifts in scale
from geologic science to conceive of a world where humanity is not central to existence. While
Darwin’s contemporary, fellow scientist Alfred Russel Wallace, goes so far as to acknowledge in
1885 that humans as we define them may cease to exist, noting “whatever race of intelligent
beings may then have succeeded us” (“Law” 195), Mary Shelley imagines such a biological
reality almost thirty years earlier.
The next section of my dissertation turns to the distinct, but parallel ways that American
writers grappled aesthetically with the rapid acceleration toward a viable theory of evolution in
the mid-nineteenth century. In particular, I examine the shared sources between British and
American writers and the overlaps in their ecological thinking which I claim is a continuation of
Romantic ideas about nature, society, and the self. In the American section, I examine the direct
influence of Charles Darwin’s 1859 Origin on both Ralph Waldo Emerson and Emily Dickinson,
who are writing later than the Shelleys. I demonstrate how these American writers adapted
British (and with Emerson, German) science, philosophy, and literature into a uniquely
American context.
The fourth chapter, “'Perpetual analogies' and 'occult harmonies': Emerson's Naturalized
Typology” focuses on the philosophical essays of Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882). Emerson
most directly theorized “nature” as a concept in his essays, beginning with his anonymously
published Nature in 1836. For Emerson, the flourishing of scientific work in his time period,
including Darwin's The Voyage of the Beagle (1839) and developments in comparative anatomy
and geology, led to larger questions about the relationship between humans, nature, and divinity.
These radical scientific shifts inspired Emerson's reconceptualization of the divine to offer it as a
powerful force that emanates from the interconnection between humanity and material nature.
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Emerson drew from the tradition of natural theology, but soon recognized that science was now
the key to philosophy. Emerson’s project was manifold—spiritual, political, aesthetic—
demanding new forms of expression that paralleled Darwin's own struggle to describe the
process of evolution. Emerson’s uses of typology, drawn from both his religious training and
morphology in comparative anatomy, forge unexpected connections between seemingly
disparate categories and ideas. What Emerson calls “perpetual analogies” and “occult
harmonies” link the world together.
The fifth and final chapter, “‘Of Toads and Men’: Emily Dickinson's Materialist Poetics,”
turns to the poetry of Emily Dickinson (1830-1866). Dickinson's early study of botany, evident
in her herbarium and general education in the sciences, influenced her unique style and form.
Dickinson, like Mary Shelley, offers a feminist critique of scientific discourse, yet through a
radically different aesthetic than Shelley. Dickinson's skepticism in relation to science leads to
her subtle rejection of human exceptionalism altogether, which in turn shifts her focus to animals
and insects in her poems. I trace Dickinson’s dialogue about nature with Emerson’s writings and
the work of naturalist, writer, and Dickinson’s editor, Thomas Wentworth Higginson. I read
Dickinson's famous poems about death as a form of the “ecogothic” in relation to Mary Shelley's
Creature and plague, with death as the ultimate confrontation of materiality and denial of human
agency through the radical shifts in time and scale in poems like “Because I could not stop for
death” and “I felt a Funeral, in my Brain.”
When taken together, these four very different writers each deconstruct human
exceptionalism through aesthetic innovations based on evolutionary science in their genres and
develop a new sense of identity that grounds ideas of the “human” in the broader ecological
world. In the “Conclusion,” I argue that we would be wise to listen to these voices from the past
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as we consider our own present environmental crises and attempt to imagine an alternative future
in which environmental justice extends to all members of our own species, as well as to other life
forms and the planet we all share.
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Chapter 1. “The reptile equal to the god”: Percy Shelley’s Poetic Ecology
“Things and words are very strictly interwoven: nature is posited only through the grid of
denominations, and - though without such names it would remain mute and invisible - it
glimmers far off beyond them, continuously present on the far side of this grid, which
nevertheless presents it to our knowledge and renders it visible only when wholly spanned by
language” (Foucault, The Order of Things 160).
Introduction: A Web of Relations
In the second edition (1845) of his account of his time on the H.M.S. Beagle,4 Charles
Darwin cites the following lines from Percy Shelley’s poem “Mont Blanc” to describe his own
experience of the wilderness of Patagonia:
All was stillness and desolation. Yet in passing over these scenes, without one bright
object near, an ill-defined but strong sense of pleasure is vividly excited. One asked how
many ages the plain had thus lasted, and how many more it was doomed thus to continue.
None can reply—all seems eternal now.
The wilderness has a mysterious tongue,
Which teaches awful doubt. (196)
Darwin’s prefacing lines before the quote reveal his Romantic sense of the sublime in the
landscape. His choice of these lines in particular suggests that he found in Shelley’s poetry the
same kinds of questions about nature and its relationship to humanity that he was contemplating.
The choice of “Mont Blanc” in particular may have resonated with Darwin because of the shared
materialist and skeptical philosophy that underlie both men’s work. In this passage, as elsewhere
in Voyage, we find hints of Darwin’s reckoning with the darker aspects of nature (here about
desolation and the cycle of time). Just prior to his quotation of Shelley, Darwin describes his
examination of fossils, an experience which may lend itself to the somber mood of the quotation:

4

This work is often referred to as The Voyage of the Beagle. The full title is Journal of
researches into the natural history and geology of the countries visited during the voyage of
H.M.S. Beagle round the world.
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“On one such spot I counted between ten and twenty heads. I particularly examined the bones;
they did not appear, as some scattered ones which I had seen, gnawed or broken, as if dragged
together by beasts of prey. The animals in most cases must have crawled, before dying, beneath
and amongst the bushes” (169). Shelley’s lines are preceded by a similarly macabre moment
rendered in poetic rhetoric: “A desart peopled by the storms alone, / Save when the eagle brings
some hunter’s bone, / And the wolf tracks her there--how hideously/ Its shapes are heaped
around! rude, bare, and high, / Ghastly, and scarred, and riven” (lines 67-71). The association of
nature here with predation, death, and emptiness is palpable in both men’s writings. Their
consideration of these darker aspects of nature required both new systems of belief and
aesthetics. Building from this example, this chapter will examine Shelley’s work in a broader
history of science that includes the ways in which Shelley’s thinking, reading, writing, and
feeling runs parallel to the scientists of his time. I will argue that Darwin found in Shelley
embodied concepts of voice and language (tongue) across the human and nonhuman worlds.
Further, I will demonstrate the ways in which materialist and skeptical philosophy freed both
poets and scientists alike from past dogma, but also created an ongoing struggle in their work to
accept suffering, violence, and death as necessary parts of nature.
Both Darwin and Shelley are deeply interested in theorizing the relations between all the
elements of nature, and the implications of such study on our understanding of ourselves as a
species. In a Dec. 11, 1817 letter to William Godwin, Percy Shelley identified himself as a poet
who attended to nature through a sense of feeling that extended beyond the human toward the
world as an ecological whole:
I long believed that my power consists in sympathy—and that part of imagination which
relates to sentiment and contemplation. I am formed, if for anything not in common with
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the herd of mankind, to apprehend minute and remote distinctions of feeling, whether
relative to external nature or the living beings which surround us and to communicate the
conceptions which result from considering either the moral or the material universe as a
whole. (Letters I 574)
Shelley’s language here encapsulates what sets apart the Romantic poet as he extends his
sympathy, imagination, sentiment, and contemplation to both the human and nonhuman worlds,
using the more open term “living beings” in consideration of both the moral and the material “as
a whole.” Shelley likely has in mind William Wordsworth’s claim in his Preface to Lyrical
Ballads (1800) that the poet is “a man, [...] possessed of more than usual organic sensibility” (83)
and in this way distinguishes himself from the more common “herd of mankind,” an analogy for
the supposed lack of feeling among some humans and animals dating back at least as far as 1756
in Edmund Burke’s A Vindication of Natural Society.5 But for Shelley, comparing mankind to a
“herd” simultaneously has deeper resonances with his understanding of humans as an animal
species and his deep care for the plight of both humans and other animals. Indeed, Mary Shelley,
in her edition of Shelley’s poems, includes his full letter with the passage above in the section on
The Revolt of Islam. Just prior to the letter, she explains in an editorial note that they had been in
Marlow (where the letter was written) attending to the poor plagued by war, unjust laws, and
blighted crops, which she offers as evidence of Shelley’s “minute and active sympathy with his
fellow-creatures” (“Note” 96) in which she echoes his language in a preemptive interpretation of

5

Burke claims, “For the gross of the people, they are considered as a mere herd of cattle; and
really in a little time become no better; all principle of honest pride, all sense of the dignity of
their nature, is lost in their slavery” (33) and later, “There are few with whom I can communicate
so freely as with Pope. But Pope cannot bear every truth. He has a timidity which hinders the full
exertion of his faculties, almost as effectually as bigotry cramps those of the general herd of
mankind” (47).
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this tension in his work. The use of “fellow-creatures” is an important term for both of the
Shelleys, and frequently extends to include humans and other animals.
Shelley’s developing sense of ecology was both material and poetic: this passage
demonstrates his attention to “minute and remote” moments of interconnection with the natural
world.6 This focus on micro-level scale within the broader framework of the vast “material
universe” bears resemblance to Charles Darwin’s image of an evolutionary web in which “plants
and animals, most remote in the scale of nature, are bound together by a web of complex
relations” (80) which would become the basis for Ernst Haeckel’s theory of ecology in 1866.
This reconceptualization of nature as an interwoven, organic whole, rather than a linear
hierarchy, begins in the Romantic era and serves as the basis for much of Charles Darwin’s
subsequent work.7 This chapter traces a network of influences and intersections in order to
contextualize Percy Shelley’s poetry in a parallel cultural and intellectual episteme with the
scientists Erasmus Darwin and William Lawrence as Shelley adapted radical science into his
own aesthetics and politics in ways that anticipate Charles Darwin’s work to decenter humans
within nature and to grapple with the universal biological realities of disease and death. These
views led Shelley to reject an anthropocentric worldview for both God and nature. This chapter
explores Shelley’s early sense of progressive evolution (including the possible evolutionary
relationship between humans and other species, and the evolution of both species and language)
that he derived from philosophical materialism and its grounding of the human and such

6

Shelley may have in mind here the language of David Hume’s claim in An Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding in Section VIII that “almost in every part of nature, there is contained a
vast variety of springs and principles, which are hid, by reason of their minuteness or
remoteness,” (88). I will discuss Hume’s influence on Shelley and Charles Darwin further in this
chapter.
7
See A.O. Lovejoy’s The Great Chain of Being for further study of this shift from nature as
hierarchy to web during the nineteenth century.
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concepts of soul and mind in matter. For Shelley, a belief in the shared nature of all organic life
necessitated a more capacious system of ethics for both humans and the nonhuman world. In this
chapter, I focus on the interwoven histories of ideas between four key figures (Erasmus Darwin,
William Lawrence, Percy Shelley, and Charles Darwin) as each developed a new understanding
of the relationships between humans and the natural world. This includes relationships with both
humans’ closest relatives, the other primates, and creatures far more distant on the evolutionary
tree, such as phyla outside of our own branch of Animalia such as worms (Annelida), insects
(Arthropoda), and oysters (Molusca), as well as across kingdoms to plants (Plantae). Shelley,
through the practice of poetry, along with the scientists surrounding him, extended the basis on
which all life could be considered related. The goal of this chapter is to bring Shelley into the
history of science focused on evolutionary thought (roughly between 1789 and 1880) in a
network of connections that itself does not progress teleologically, but rather represents nodes of
connection in a much larger network of the developing knowledge about organic life in the long
nineteenth century. While the struggle to accept evolutionary theory (called in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries transmutation, transformism, or developism) reached its zenith with Charles
Darwin in the later half of the nineteenth century, the vitalist debate earlier in the century was a
precursor to the coming conflict between materialist and religious worldviews. The vitalist
debate itself came out of an earlier controversy over French and German materialism at the end
of the eighteenth century. At the centers of these two debates respectively, Erasmus Darwin and
William Lawrence were primary sources for Shelley and Charles Darwin about the nature of
species and the possibilities of transmutation. From these sources, they each drew a deep sense
of ecological interdependence--and its broader implications for human society.
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Shelley’s contributions to what Timothy Morton calls “ecological thinking” have
generally been excluded from the broader study of ecology because of its focus on the history of
science; yet, Shelley’s transformation of scientific facts and debates into poetry generated new
ways of understanding the complex networks of an ecosystem well before the scientific theory of
ecology was fully developed. I read Shelley’s poetry as an ecosystem comprised of poetic
language and devices—what I call “poetic ecology.” In her study of Erasmus Darwin, Janelle
Schwartz frames Darwin’s poetic project as “the challenge and necessity of representing the
natural world as an aesthetic work” (28). In this chapter, I am interested in Shelley’s engagement
with the inverse: how to represent an aesthetic work as the natural world. In other words, for
Shelley, a poem is both representative of a natural ecosystem and itself a corresponding
ecosystem of language. Because of this, Shelley is interested in the relationship of language to
both materialist and vitalist theories of life. In her study Shelley and Vitality, Sharon Ruston
claims that for Shelley “[t]he poem becomes substituted for the vital principle itself” (7). She
further sees Shelley’s intertextuality as a “kind of transmutive process in which the words of
other writers are grafted onto his own” (9). I want to extend this argument beyond intertextuality
to language itself, and poetic language in particular, as themselves transmutational processes.
Like Charles Darwin, Shelley recognized an inherent relationship between the mutability and
evolution of both language and species. This recognition stems in part from Shelley’s deep study
of Plato in which he found the philosophical concepts of species and genre applied to ideas;
coupled with his close study of natural philosophy, Shelley could trace the transmutation of these
concepts into the language of biological classification. Shelley’s study of science included not
only reading major scientific works, as well as the general intellectual periodicals that covered
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new scientific developments and controversies,8 but also his own scientific experiments
conducted while at Oxford and his (albeit brief) pursuit of a medical career.9
The biologist and biographer Desmond King-Hele claims that “[I]f we judge by the effect
on his poems the author who meant most to Shelley was Erasmus Darwin” (Shelley 162). One of
the clearest influences of Darwin on Shelley is notably similar to how Charles Darwin began his
transmutation notebook with Erasmus Darwin’s title Zoonomia; Shelley modeled the subtitle and
form of Queen Mab (written 1812-3) on Darwin’s The Temple of Nature; or, The Origin of
Society: “A POEM. WITH PHILOSOPHICAL NOTES.” In his notes to Queen Mab, Shelley
provides long, discursive explanations of radical scientific and philosophical ideas.10 Shelley
found in Darwin a model of representing nature, science, and philosophy in poetic form (even as
Shelley rejected Darwin’s poetic style). King-Hele argues, “it was Darwin who showed him
[Shelley] how to describe clouds, winds, and storms scientifically in verse” (164). King-Hele,
however, argues that Shelley fails to grasp or ascribe to Erasmus Darwin’s ideas about
transmutation (Erasmus 222). In particular, he argues that Shelley rejects the Malthusian side of
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Like Emily Dickinson, Percy Shelley had wide access to scientific knowledge from popular
intellectual periodicals, including the Quarterly Review, the Edinburgh Review, Gentleman's
Magazine, Annual Register (Ruston 75-6)
9
Shelley seems to have been influenced to take up a career in medicine by his time at St
Bartholomew’s Hospital in 1811 with his cousin Charles Grove, who was studying alongside
William Lawrence. Shelley expresses his intent to pursue a medical career in several letters
during that year (Letters I 121, 144).
In a letter from Nov. 1812, Shelley asked his mother to send him his galvanic machine and solar
microscope for his scientific pursuits (Letters I 328).
10
Both Percy and Mary Shelley express that Queen Mab was a youthful composition too zealous
in its positions, but it would be a mistake to regard Shelley as completely abandoning his earlier
positions (M. Shelley “Editor’s Note” 37). Shelley’s anxiety about the reception and potential
backlash to the controversial subjects in Queen Mab are clear in his letter to the editor of the
Examiner (Leigh Hunt) in 1821 upon its unauthorized publication (22 June 1821 at Pisa) (Letters
II 304-5 ). Both Sharon Ruston and Paul Hamilton make broader claims for Shelley’s
materialism beyond his early life and work.

32
Erasmus Darwin’s theory of evolution in which suffering and extinction are necessary (Erasmus
207). In contrast, I will argue that Shelley was deeply influenced by Erasmus Darwin’s
evolutionary ideas and employed them in both his poetics and prose. Further, I will demonstrate
that both Percy and Mary Shelley had a nuanced understanding of Malthus, which led to their
rejection of his political and moral conclusions, but not of the totality of his theory. The
influence of Malthus on Romantic writers and on Charles Darwin is one of the strongest cases to
connect Romanticism and Darwin Studies more closely. Malthus was central to Charles
Darwin’s theory of natural selection (as will be discussed further in the next three chapters) and
his influence on both the Shelleys (via his debates with William Godwin) is fundamental to their
formulations of a “dark” side to nature that they often figure in the Gothic tradition. Shelley’s
evolutionary model most nearly follows Erasmus Darwin’s in acknowledging the roles of
suffering, decay, and death as part of nature, but often subordinating these facts under a
progressive model that will lead to greater forms of perfection, as in Lamarck’s theory of
evolution. Shelley, like Erasmus Darwin, supported the French Revolution and revolution itself
as part of a progressive evolution of all life toward harmony and equality. Both Erasmus Darwin
and Shelley imagine a violent struggle for life that is then overcome by the powers of love in the
final cantos of their major respective works. Prometheus Unbound shares in common Darwin’s
vision to unite science and poetry, myth and history in The Temple of Nature; or, The Origin of
Society. Shelley’s later fourth act about the romance of the moon and earth is particularly
reminiscent of Darwin’s desire to dramatize the scientific process of reproduction in plants in
verse. As King-Hele notes of the fourth act, “Shelley is describing the mechanisms of Nature
with a precision and wealth of detail unparalleled in English poetry” (Shelley 187) in which
gravity is figured metaphorically as love (194). While both Queen Mab and Prometheus
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Unbound represent different phases in Shelley’s thought and work, each implies scientific
theories of progression to imagine a future evolutionary state for not only humans, but the entire
natural world.
Charles Darwin struggled with the concepts of progress and perfection in his theory of
evolution throughout the 1830-40s as he began to move away from Lamarck’s ideas and any
sense of teleology.11 Shelley then serves as an important intermediary between the two Darwins’
theories of evolution, along with his contemporary, the scientist and surgeon William Lawrence.
While Shelley’s earlier works posit a progressive model of evolution leading toward natural and
social harmony, as his belief in the possibilities of reform diminished, so too did his sense of
evolutionary progress and direction. Lawrence, Shelley’s friend and physician, while not a
professed transmutationist, championed materialist science, particularly in comparative anatomy
between humans and other primates. Lawrence’s radical science shaped Shelley’s thinking about
the relations between humans and animals, most evident in Shelley’s treatises on vegetarianism.
While both Marilyn Butler and Sharon Ruston have studied William Lawrence in relation to the
Shelleys, I aim to deepen the study of Lawrence in relation to Shelley within a history of science
that includes Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace in their later work on natural and sexual
selection for which Lawrence was an important precursor.

Part I. The Evolution of Species and Language
In Erasmus Darwin, both Charles Darwin and Shelley found a sustained argument on the
fundamental concept of a long, gradual evolution of life from microscopic organisms in the sea
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For a detailed study of the changes in Darwin’s thinking about evolution over time, see Dov
Ospovat’s The Development of Darwin's Theory: Natural History, Natural Theology, and
Natural Selection, 1838-1859.
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fueled by minute changes due to sexual reproduction. Erasmus Darwin summarized his general
view of evolution in “Of Generation” in Zoonomia as
that all warm-blooded animals have arisen from one living filament, which the great first
cause endued with animality, with the power of acquiring new parts, attended with new
propensities, directed by irritations, sensations, volitions, and associations; and thus
possessing the faculty of continuing to improve by its own inherent activity, and of
delivering down those improvements by generation to its posterity, world without end!
(XXXIX.IV.8)
Charles Darwin eventually would reject the Lamarckian claims of the heritability of acquired
traits, though he would struggle to dismiss the idea of improvement, even as he argued that
mutations in natural selection were not teleological. But the building blocks of a theory in which
all life is evolving in an ecosystem is immediately present in Erasmus Darwin’s work at the turn
of the nineteenth century. Indeed, Charles Darwin likely borrows his classic image of the “web”
of life from Erasmus Darwin’s evolutionary “living web”:
In branching cones the living web expands,
Lymphatic ducts, and convoluted glands;
Aortal tubes propel the nascent blood,
And lengthening veins absorb the refluent flood;
Leaves, lungs, and gills, the vital ether breathe
On earth's green surface, or the waves beneath. (Temple I.259-64)
While Erasmus Darwin is describing the “living web” of bodily tissues, the later lines show the
ways in which this connective tissue literally and figuratively relates all organisms. Charles
Darwin also uses a branching tree as his primary metaphor for evolution and Georges Cuvier,
though against transmutation, used branching to classify the animal kingdom into four
embranchements.12 Charles Darwin indicated in his notebook that perhaps seaweed or coral
dividing were better metaphors for life than the tree, which beyond the biological basis of their
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See J. David Archibald, Aristotle's Ladder, Darwin's Tree: The Evolution of Visual Metaphors
for Biological Order. I will discuss Cuvier’s theories in more depth in Chapter 3 on Mary
Shelley’s The Last Man and Chapter 4 on Ralph Waldo Emerson’s typology.
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growth suggests not only an attention to the origins of life in the sea, but also to the strangeness
of nature, as something less familiar and accessible than a tree to humans.13 While Erasmus
Darwin’s language seems to indicate the erroneous theory of the “ether” as an invisible substance
that linked forces, he more likely means the term as in Zoonomia, in which he refers to “vital air”
as “oxygene” in reference to Joseph Priestly’s experiments (XXIII.IV, XXXVII.I) in his section
on circulation and in the formation of animal life in “Of Generation” (XXXIX.IV.7) (which is
just before he lays out his full theory of evolution quoted above). Darwin may be playing with
both meanings of “ether” here as the formation of the circulatory and respiratory organs (from
the “vital air” of oxygen) becomes the generation of all life (“vital ether”) in the poem.14 In this
way, Erasmus Darwin moves closer to Charles Darwin’s later conception of the “web of infinite
relations,” in which he will attempt to make visible the otherwise invisible biological similarities
(leaves, lungs, gills) between disparate life forms.
Erasmus Darwin continues to theorize directly about the transmutation of species
beginning with the microscopic in this same section of The Temple of Nature:
First forms minute, unseen by spheric glass,
Move on the mud, or pierce the watery mass;
These, as successive generations bloom,
New powers acquire, and larger limbs assume;
Whence countless groups of vegetation spring;
And breathing realms of fin, and feet, and wing.
[...]
“Cold gills aquatic form respiring lungs,
13

Both corals and seaweed have complicated classification histories, placed liminally between
distinct categories. Corals had long been misclassified as plants or as zoophytes (a mythical
category between plant and animal). Similarly, seaweed was thought to be a type of plant, but is
in fact a type of algae. Darwin may have considered these organisms as metaphors more accurate
than the tree again because of their distance from human understanding.
14
In Zoonomia Darwin qualifies the idea of the ether with the term “supposed”: “supposed
ethereal fluids of magnetism, electricity, heat, and light” (Zoonomia I). Further, he is skeptical of
the electrical experiments by Galvani and Volta (Zoonomia XII.I.1) that would inform
Abernethy’s later defense of vitalism and in part inspired Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein.
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And sounds aerial flow from slimy tongues. (I.297-302, 333-4)
Through his poetic use of both rhyme and alliteration, Darwin demonstrates the biological
interconnections that result from a long history of transmutation as words transpose like limbs
and organs in his own form of poetic ecology. The verbs used all suggest various methods of
growth: bloom, spring, form, flow, as do the pairings of locomotion (fin, feet, wing) that merge
with respiration (breathing, gills, lungs) and finally expression (sounds, tongues). The passage
thus progresses from the body to language, understanding the linguistic as an expression of the
biological where “tongue” carries the double meaning of both muscular organ and specific
language.
Shelley develops his own sense of poetic ecology in response to Erasmus Darwin’s,
highlighting the relationship between the material world, its own nonhuman communication, and
the abstract expression of it in human language, especially that of the poet. In “Mont Blanc,” as
we saw, Shelley describes the “awful tongue” of the wilderness. Throughout that poem he
defines life through the progression of motion, respiration, and sound: “All things that move and
breathe with toil and sound / Are born and die; revolve, subside and swell” (lines 94-95).
Shelley’s use of “revolve” here suggests the possibility of transmutation and reflects an
awareness of the dynamic process by which species and populations adapt, perish or thrive
(revolve, subside, swell). Likewise, in his long tragic poem “Alastor; or, The Spirit of Solitude,”
Shelley makes similar claims for the interconnection of all life through these fundamental
processes, which he relates to poetic language. The second stanza to the poem concludes, “I wait
thy breath, Great Parent, that my strain / May modulate the murmurs of the air, / And motions of
the forests and the sea, / And voice of living beings, and woven hymns / Of night and day, and
the deep heart of man” (lines 45-49). Here, Shelley seeks to link his poetry to the vital processes
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of life. As in Darwin’s poem, Shelley’s sense of interconnection builds from the interrelation of
respiration (breath, air), locomotion (motions), and expression (voice, murmurs). His use of
“living beings” is unlikely to mean humans alone (“man” is named in the next line) and is a term
that recurs in his work. For Shelley, all of nature shares in “voice” rather than delimiting it to the
human alone.15 For Shelley, this sense of what Dominic Pettman calls the “vox mundi” (after
Plato’s “anima mundi”) is more than a metaphor; it connects human language to the rest of the
natural world in a shared harmony of call and response, a concept that Shelley theorizes in the
Defence and to which Charles Darwin was likely drawn in reading “Mont Blanc.”
Like both of the Darwins, Shelley suggests a relationship between humans and nature in
which they are not only metaphorically linked, but also literally kin. “Alastor” begins with an
invocation to the elements as the poet’s “beloved brotherhood” and concludes with “bright bird,
insect, and gentle beast” as his “kindred” and “beloved brethren.” These lines are not only poetic
or Romantic rhetoric, but rather reflect a deep belief in the shared origins of all life. Our reading
of Shelley’s work changes if we take his metaphors more literally, what he calls “vitally
metaphorical” in A Defence of Poetry (Poetry and Prose 512). Indeed, Charles Darwin
conceived of his evolutionary theory as a literalizing of metaphors (Origin 517).16 To Shelley,
the “spirit” of nature, like his conception of god, is not human; therefore, “Mother” and “Parent”
here are not limited to the human species. While “brethren” is an archaic plural for “brother,”
Shelley uses the sound of “breath” in the word to link all life through respiration to serve as an
echo to his use of “breathes” to describe the spring in line 11 (an analogy he will again employ in
15

See Tobias Menley’s The Animal Claim: Sentiment and The Creaturely Voice and Dominic
Pettman’s Sonic Intimacy: Voice, Species, Technics for more on “voice” as a principle beyond
the human.
16
Contemporary cognitive science and cognitive linguistics have delved into the concept of
metaphors and the interaction between the literal and abstract in their formation. For more on
this, see Max Black’s Models and Metaphors, and Johnson and Lakoff’s Metaphors We Live By.

38
“The Sensitive Plant”). Darwin uses this same rhetoric of life as breath in his conclusion to
Origin: “There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally
breathed into a few forms or into one” (490).17
What makes “Alastor” a poem of particular interest in reading Shelley between the
Darwins is that the poem gradually darkens from its opening harmony with nature, reminiscent
of Erasmus Darwin’s work, as the poet figure pursues abstraction rather than lived experience, to
the point that he dies (not unlike Victor Frankenstein in his pursuit in making the ideal creature).
The poem then revolves around despair and death as it concludes with a nature that is indifferent
to the suffering of all its creatures: “Heartless things / are done and said in the world, and many
worms / And beast and men live on, and mighty Earth / From sea and mountain, city and
wilderness,/ In vesper low or joyous orison, lifts its solemn voice” (lines 690-5). Again, Shelley
uses voice to link all of life beyond the human even as the human relationship to nature is now
transformed into one seemingly opposite from the poem’s beginnings. Yet one of the poem’s key
ecological insights derives from the decentering of the human in both the opening sense of
familial kinship and the closing alienation from nature. The poem’s penultimate line describes it
thus: “Nature’s vast frame, the web of human things,” (line 719), seeing both as networks of
connections. As in both of the Darwins’ webs, only the collective continues. All three men
recognize that humans are but one part of a broader system of nature in which all life takes part.
Charles Darwin was deeply interested in the origins of human language, and like Shelley,
understands the concept of voice to apply beyond the human, a metaphor that he grounds in his
study of animal behavior and cognition. Darwin in fact used the development of languages as a
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This metaphor of life as breath has a clear basis in biology and a long history that can be traced
in both the Judeo-Christian religion and in Aristotle’s work On Breath.
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model for the evolution of species. He makes this point several times explicitly, as in Origin
when he prefaces,
It may be worthwhile to illustrate this view of classification, by taking the case of
languages. [...] The various degrees of difference in the languages from the same stock,
would have to be expressed by groups subordinate to groups; but the proper or even only
possible arrangement would still be genealogical; and this would be strictly natural, it
would connect together all languages, extinct and modern, by the closest affinities, and
would give the filiation and origin of each tongue. (367-8)
He seems to have first encountered this idea through John Herschel, noting in a letter in 1837
that “everyone has yet thought that the six thousand odd years has been the right period but Sir J.
thinks that a far greater number must have passed since the Chinese [and] the Caucasian
languages separated from one stock” (Correspondence, Letter No. 346). The idea of “one stock”
from which all other forms branched was central to the development of Darwin’s theory. Darwin
expands on this idea much later in The Descent of Man (1871) where he specifically names
poetic language and devices in the origins of language:
The formation of different languages and of distinct species, and the proofs that both
have been developed through a gradual process, are curiously the same. But we can trace
the origin of many words further back than in the case of species, for we can perceive that
they have arisen from the imitation of various sounds, as in alliterative poetry. We find in
distinct languages striking homologies due to community of descent, and analogies due to
a similar process of formation. The manner in which certain letters or sounds change
when others change is very like correlated growth. We have in both cases the
reduplication of parts, the effects of long-continued use, and so forth. (59-60)
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Here, Darwin uses multiple terms (“same” “similar” “correlated” and “both”) to illustrate the
relationship between the transmutation of language and species. In particular, he describes
languages using the heavily debated terms “homology” and “analogy” from comparative
anatomy used prominently by William Owen in his theory of biotic types based on Platonic
ideals.18 Owen was likewise an influence on Ralph Waldo Emerson, who would, like Darwin,
theorize about the material origins of language and what he calls the “occult harmonies” and
“perpetual analogies” between nature and language that I will discuss in Chapter four. Homology
refers to the similarity of biological structures (morphology) regardless of function, whereas
analogy signals a similar function, but not a shared descent. Darwin was well versed in Owen’s
work, which likely influenced his own theory of descent, though he would ultimately dismiss
Owen’s commitment to natural theology and typology. Darwin’s use of both terms here signals
just how deeply he sees language as similar to species in both structure and function. In The Nick
of Time, Elizabeth Grosz devotes a full chapter to Darwin’s study of language in Origin and
Descent, noting that for Darwin, “The development of language is not just like evolution, it is
evolution” (29). To this work, I want to add Darwin’s earlier speculations in his notebooks about
the origins of language, which are of particular interest in relation to Shelley’s philosophy of
poetry. Darwin theorizes, “at earliest times there must have been intimate connection between
sounds & language” (N notebook 76) and “Understanding language seems simplest case of
Association—Elephant often given food & [when] word[s] open your mouths said, recognizes
that sound as perfectly as a man.--Probably, language commenced in some necessary connexion
between things & voice, as roaring for lion, etc. etc. (in same way alphabet arose from letters,
18

For more on Owen’s theory of archetypes, see Adrian Desmond’s The Politics of Evolution:
Morphology, Medicine and Reform in Radical London. Owen was in part responding to the
famous debate in 1830 in Paris between Georges Cuvier and Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire
about function versus form respectively in comparative anatomy (Huxley 275).
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symbol of word beginning with the sound of the letter)--crying yawning laughing being
necessary sounds … not produced by will but by corporeal structure” (74). In this ambitious and
associative passage, Darwin draws an analogy between verbal and written language formation to
trace the relationship of sound (voice) to symbol (letter) to system (alphabet). Here, as in both
the poems by Erasmus Darwin and Percy Shelley, expression arises from the body, from the
need to connect “things & voice.” For Darwin, animals share in the origins of language as
corporeal expression. Darwin summarizes this idea more directly in the “Language” section of
Chapter II. of Descent “Comparison of the Mental Powers of Man and the Lower Animals”:
“Articulate language is, however, peculiar to man; but he uses in common with the lower
animals inarticulate cries to express his meaning, aided by gestures and the movements of the
muscles of the face” (54), a subject to which Darwin later devotes a full book, The Expression of
Emotions in Man and Animals (1871).
Shelley’s poetry enacts this same sense of the sonic, embodied nature of language that
extends beyond the human. Shelley directly theorizes about the origins of language at the
beginning of the Defence. Shelley speculates, “But there is a principle within the human being,
and perhaps within all sentient beings, which acts otherwise than the in the lyre, and produces
not melody alone, but harmony, by an internal adjustment of the sounds or motions thus excited
to the impressions which excite them” (emphasis added Poetry and Prose 511). As before,
Shelley does not limit his concept of the voice to the human, but distinguishes between the
animate and inanimate, engaging Aristotle’s claim in Book II Section 8 of On the Soul that
“Voice is the sound produced by a creature possessing a soul; for inanimate things never have a
voice; they can only metaphorically be said to give voice, e.g., a flute or a lyre” (115-117).
Shelley then rejects the analogy of man as an Aeolian Harp over which “a series of internal and
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external impressions are driven” (Poetry and Prose 511) to instead allow for a more dynamic
and responsive process. For Shelley, language begins with sounds and motions. This experience
can become communal, both in the sense of shared language with others, but also through a
shared “harmony” between the object of impression and the sounds used in response. Shelley
then goes on to describe the child and the “savage” developing language in response to objects.
For Shelley, the first language is that of poetry: “Their language is vitally metaphorical: that is,
marks the before unapprehended relations of things, and perpetuates their apprehension, until the
words which represent them, become through time signs” (512); thus, “In the infancy of society
every author is necessarily a poet, because language itself is poetry” (512). Both Shelley and
Charles Darwin recognize language as arising from sensory experience not limited to the human
and progressing toward a system of signs.19 Among Shelley’s “vitally metaphorical” language to
describe poetry in the Defence, scientific, musical, botanical, and bodily metaphors predominate.
In particular, Shelley finds in language a kind of “electric life” (535) that is likewise present in
the limbs, a seed, an acorn, and the blossom and fruit of plants (511 “seed;” 514 “plant” “seed”
“flower”; “food” “limb” 517; “food” 521; “acorn” 528.). These metaphors for a natural language
culminate in an extended passage toward the end of the Defence: “It [Poetry] is at the same time
the root and the blossom of all other systems of thought; it is that from which all spring, and
which adorns all; and that which, if blighted, denies the fruit and the seed, and withholds from
the barren world the nourishment and succession of the scions of the tree of life” (531). Here,
Shelley links poetry to the vital principle of life that endows all motion and creativity (as
Emerson will do in “The Poet” and the “Language” section of Nature). Further, he frames poetic
language within an ecosystem in which blight leads to a lack of nutrients which terminates
19
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offspring, presaging Darwin’s “tree of life” and its branches of descent. Shelley expands the
poetry-plant metaphor in “The Sensitive Plant” in which the ecosystem is all but extinguished in
the blight of winter. But Shelley does not simply use metaphors as melody; he harmonizes them;
thus, plant and poetry are not arbitrary connections here, but rather correspond, as for Charles
Darwin, through the same evolutionary processes for species and language.

Part II. Materialist Science: Of Apes and Oysters
Shelley’s sense of “poetic ecology” (the deep connection between expression and
ecosystem discussed above) derives from his study of materialist philosophy and science. Early
on in his career, Shelley was following both Erasmus Darwin and William Lawrence, among
others, in a tradition of Enlightenment materialist radicalism which included a rejection of
religious authority and the corresponding need to describe and define life in material terms.
Erasmus and Charles Darwin, like Shelley, were deeply influenced by empiricist philosophy,
particularly the works of Newton, Locke, Bacon, d’Alembert, Diderot, la Mettrie, and d’Holbach
who laid out a mechanistic natural system. These thinkers in turn had been influenced by
Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura: “a significant classical influence on [Erasmus] Darwin’s
systematized thinking, the doctrine of atomism was the foundation for the Enlightenment’s
diffuse scientific belief that life provided its own evidentiary existence” (Schwartz 43). Shelley’s
physician William Lawrence devoted his career to the study of life on solely material grounds
and is best known for his debates with Abernethy over vitalism. Shelley found in Lawrence a
young radical like himself with whom to discuss current scientific controversies and their
implications for social change. Shelley likely knew of William Lawrence through his cousin,
Charles Grove, during their overlapping time at St Bartholomew’s Hospital in 1811. He also
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would have known Lawrence through William Godwin who introduced Shelley to the vegetarian
Bracknell circle in 1812 in which Lawrence was a close friend of the Newtons (Ruston 87, 90).20
Shelley became Lawrence’s patient in August 1815 and consulted him again in 1817 (91). The
Shelleys were following the vitalist debate between Abernethy and Lawrence around the time
that Mary Shelley was writing Frankenstein. This association has been made famous in Percy
Shelley’s “Preface” to Frankenstein in which the opening lines refer to “Dr. Darwin and some of
the physiological writers of Germany” (Preface). This reference likely alludes in part to “the
idéologues – a group of rationalist thinkers historians, scientists, politicians, and educational
reformers writing in the turbulent years before and after the 1789 Revolution ... (the most
extreme of whom was the atheist Baron d'Holbach) [who] accepted that matter contained the
potential for sensation, which was realized in animal life, and on this assumption they went on to
interpret morality and behavior in terms of natural law” (Desmond 43-44). The idéologue PierreJean Cabanis subscribed to transformism and argued “for the animality of man and the
qualitative similarity of human and animal minds. In about 1800, too, Lamarck had begun
extending this kind of approach to the entire organic realm” (Desmond 45). There were close ties
between the French and German materialist philosophers and scientists: d’Holbach was
originally from Germany but worked in Paris, and Cabanis (despite his materialism) was a
proponent of the German vitalist chemist Georg Ernst Stahl, for example. William Lawrence
used his fluency in both French and German to read materialist philosophy and science that he
then marshalled to refute Abernethy’s vitalism.
Percy Shelley’s radical ideas--most fully expressed in Queen Mab where he quotes from
both Cabanis and d’Holbach--derived from these materialist sources. Religious authorities
20
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objected to the seeds of the theory of evolution in materialism (then called transformism) well
before Charles Darwin. Materialist beliefs were clearly in conflict with the Biblical account of
creation in Genesis and linked to atheism as they placed humans with the animals rather than the
divine, thereby undoing social, political, economic, and moral codes. Erasmus Darwin makes
this point explicit in The Temple of Nature as he attempts to ground humanity as a species in the
animal and material worlds:
Imperious man, who rules the bestial crowd,
Of language, reason, and reflection proud,
With brow erect who scorns this earthy sod,
And styles himself the image of his God;
Arose from rudiments of form and sense,
An embryon point, or microscopic ens! (I.309–14).
Darwin directly takes on the Genesis account, refusing the concept of “dominion” to man over
the rest of nature. Instead, Darwin insists on the microscopic origins of life. Abandoning an
anthropocentric model of God and/or Nature then was critical for Erasmus Darwin to develop his
theory of evolution. Consequently, accusations of atheism abounded against him in the Monthly
Magazine, Gentleman’s Magazine, the British Critic, Critical Review, and the Anti-Jacobin
(Schwartz 39). Shelley’s own exploration of atheism gave rise to one of his key ecological
insights: the rejection of an anthropocentric god. Shelley vehemently disputes the idea of an
anthropomorphic/anthropopathic God, as well as the belief that humans are made in God’s image
(Imago Dei). This rejection of Christian belief is important to his sense of ecology because he
simultaneously refuses an anthropocentric model of nature, following Spinoza in seeing god as
nature. In Queen Mab, this leads Shelley directly toward a kind of atheism that draws from
d’Holbach: “But if the principle of the universe be not an organic being, the model and prototype
of man, the relation between it and human beings is absolutely none” (Note 12, VI.198 lines 108-
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10) (Complete 261).21 This claim is part of Shelley’s larger discussion of Necessity in Note 12
that leads into his discussion of atheism in Note 13 where in addition to d’Holbach, Shelley
borrows heavily from Hume’s Enquiry, as well as works by John Locke, William Godwin,
William Drummond, Lord Bacon, and Baruch Spinoza. In Queen Mab Shelley states directly,
“There is no God” (263),22 which he then qualifies immediately to mean “This negation must be
understood solely to affect a creative Deity. The hypothesis of a pervading Spirit co-eternal with
the universe remains unshaken” (263). Shelley makes a similar claim in a letter from 1811: “In
this sense I acknowledge a God, but merely as a synonyime [sic] for the existing power of
existence” (Letters I 100-1, 11 June 1811).23 Likewise, in A Vindication of Natural Diet, Shelley
recognizes the constructed nature of the idea of God: “Every man forms as it were his god from
his own character” (Prose 87). Shelley’s sense of a “pervading Spirit co-eternal with the
universe” stems from a long history of philosophy and Romantic thinking that likewise
influenced Emerson’s transcendentalism and concept of the “over-soul.”
This same line of thinking led Charles Darwin to question even further the concept of
God in the development of his theory. Darwin postulated “May not idea of God arise from our
confused idea of 'ought,' joined with necessary notion of 'causation'” (Notebooks 35). Shelley,
following d’Holbach,24 makes very similar claims: “It is probably that the word God was
originally only an expression denoting the unknown cause of the known events which men
21

In The System of Nature, d’Holbach claims that “the idea of perfection … has no model, or
archetype, external to ourselves … The theological God is an insulated being, who in truth
cannot have any relation with any of the beings of which we have knowledge” (Vol. II 217).
Shelley quotes directly and attributes The System of Nature in Note 13.
22
“[W]e find many very rational men have said, THERE IS NO GOD” (d’Holbach Vol. II 203).
23
For more on Shelley’s changing relationship to atheism, see Colin Jaeger’s “Shelley after
Atheism.”
24
See d’Holbach, System of Nature, Vol. II, especially Chapter I “Of the confused and
contradictory ideas of theology” (191-205). Holbach argues that “God” and “create” “are
abstract words, invented by ignorance” (242).
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perceived in the universe. By a vulgar mistake of a metaphor for a real being, of a word for a
thing, it became man” (Queen Mab Note 12, VI.198.114-17) (Complete 262, 622). Here Shelley
shows the dangerous side of “vitally metaphorical” language. Shelley’s primary contribution to
the materialist philosophy from which he draws is in his attention to the origins of an
anthropocentric God in language itself, and particularly in the poetic language of metaphor.
Consequently, he changes the pronoun for God from the anthropocentric “H/he” to “it” in clever
reversal of the Biblical idea of Christ as God’s “Word became flesh” (John 1:14 RSV).
Charles Darwin goes on to link the idea of God to animal instincts from which he also
attributes the rise of language, as we saw earlier: “Animals have necessary notions. Which of
them? & curiosity […] very necessary to explain origin of deity” (Notebooks 72). Further, in a
short passage in his journal, Charles Darwin notes, “Arguing from man to animals is
philosophical, viz. (man is not a cause like a deity, as M. Cousin says), because if so orangoutang,--oyster & zoophyte” (79).25 Darwin seems to be claiming that he recognizes the
philosophical element in his work to define human life in terms of its origins in the animal
kingdom. This refutes the divinity of humans; if man is divine, then so too are all his ancestors
from the closest (“orang-outang”) to the furthest (“oyster & zoophyte”). In this way, Darwin’s
dash seems to function like Lawrence’s “Numberless gradations” between humans and the
earlier forms of life that arose in the sea. Shelley, along with Lawrence and the Darwins, then,
recognizes that an anthropocentric God is a human fantasy of mastery over nature; rather, the
origins of humanity (and our idea of God) are in nature itself. This is likewise d’Holbach’s thesis
in The System of Nature (1770): “Man having placed himself in the first rank of the universe, has

25

Darwin references the work of philosopher Victor Cousin who theorized God as the absolute
cause and two limited forces, the self and the “not me.” Cousin’s work was influential on
Emerson’s philosophy, especially in Nature.
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been desirous to judge of every thing after what he saw in himself, because he has pretended that
in order to be perfect, it was necessary to be like himself … which he considers as a manifest
proof of his superiority” (Vol II. 214-5). The materialist shift in perspective away from the
Imago Dei allowed for the scientific study of questions previously delimited to religion and
opened up the possibilities for humans to be part of an ecological system rather than above or
outside of it.
The idea that humans should be studied as part of the animal kingdom and subject to the
same processes as all matter was central to William Lawrence’s work. The biologist C.D.
Darlington claims Lawrence directly as precursor to Charles Darwin in his controversial book
Darwin’s Place in History (1969), which revived debates from the 1890s about Lawrence’s place
in history in relation to Charles Darwin’s (Wells 319-20). Two other biologists, however,
criticized Darlington for overstating Lawrence’s contributions to Darwin’s theories (Kentwood
Wells in 1971 and Peter Mumford in 1968). This controversy among biologists demonstrates
how intertwined all of the ideas about transmutation were in the nineteenth century (the original
argument of Darlington’s book) and how difficult it can be to untangle the nuances. George
Levine notes this same struggle in his own study of Charles Darwin: “it is inevitably difficult to
disentangle his ideas from the already strong traditions in science, political economy, and
philosophy, to which they are akin” (10). Regardless of how direct Lawrence’s influence is on
Charles Darwin, Lawrence’s work relates to theories of transmutation in ways that influenced
Shelley’s understanding of materialist science in relation to the brain and the body for both
humans and other animals. Lawrence is credited with coining the term “biology” in English in
1819 as the scientific study of life, likely drawn from his readings in both French and German in
which the term appears at the turn of the nineteenth century (“biology”). Lawrence rejected
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Biblical authority, redefined “life” in material terms, and developed an advanced understanding
of heredity through his idea of “spontaneous variation.” Lawrence laid out these ideas in his
major work, Lectures on Physiology, Zoology, and The Natural History of Man, a compilation
from his earlier lectures and work with five major sections: a refutation of vitalism, a study of
physiology and anatomy, sections on the idea of “life” and the brain, and finally the “Natural
History of Man” on inheritance and variation. Lawrence believed that all races of humans were
of the same species (known as “monogenism”). While his argument frequently devolves into
claims of European and white superiority (as does Charles Darwin’s), Lawrence argued against
the more pernicious pseudo-scientific claims that certain races (the “negro” and “indian”) were
not of the human species and instead were more closely related to monkeys. Lawrence
specifically denounces Charles White’s “monkey hypothesis” laid out in White’s Account of the
Regular Gradation in Man and in Different Animals and Vegetables (1799) (Lectures 110). This
idea then was already steeped in racists implications by the time Charles Darwin would seek to
prove descent for all humans from other primates.26
Several reviews of Lectures recognized that Lawrence’s idea of “spontaneous variation”
fit with the “development hypothesis” of Lamarck and the other “progressive developists,”
(Wells 324) even though Lawrence argued against Lamarck’s claims about inherited
characteristics (Lawrence 89). Despite his disclaimer, Lawrence was labeled a transmutationist:
“Many reviewers felt that Lawrence's notion that the human brain functioned on principles
identical to those of animal brains was dangerously close to asserting that man was in fact no
26

Darwin’s discourse in the Descent nonetheless maintains a racist ideology in equating race
with species: “it is almost a matter of indifference whether the so-called races of man are thus
designated, or are ranked as species or sub-species; but the latter term appears the most
appropriate. Finally, we may conclude that when the principles of evolution are generally
accepted, as they surely will be before long, the dispute between the monogenists and the
polygenists will die a silent and unobserved death” (Vol. I 235).
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more than an animal” (Wells 331). Lawrence’s work invited this kind of criticism: His “Natural
History of Man” begins “I design, on the present occasion, to consider man as a subject of
zoology; -- to consider him as a subject of the animal kingdom” (119). Likewise, in the Rees’
Cyclopaedia article on “Cranium” (which spans 43 double-columned pages), Lawrence argues
for the homologous structure of primate skulls: “Animals of the monkey kind approach more
nearly to the human structure in the position and direction of the occipital foramen than any
others” (Vol. X). Because of claims such as this, “[o]ne reviewer of Lawrence’s work expressed
surprise that Lawrence had rejected the man-as-orangutang theories of Monboddo and Rousseau,
since Lawrence implied that in intellectual qualities ‘man is nothing more than an orang-outang
or ape with more 'ample cerebral hemi- spheres’” (D'Oyly 14; qtd. in Wells 331). One work in
particular epitomizes the deep resistance to relating humans to animals, even if only by analogy:
Recent writers imagine they have done much for the honor of the race, by placing [man]
in an Order by himself,-thus separating him from the debasing association of monkeys,
lemurs, and bats. It amounts, however, only to a nominal honor; a promotion without
advantage; a distinction without a separation. They have, nevertheless, kept man so
closely associated, not only with the anthropoid animals . . . but with the whole of organic
nature . . . that everything having life is regarded as his analogue, his associate, in the
highest and noblest properties of his nature.
Progressive developists could ask for no more. They gained the fruits of victory, if they
lost the battle. Horses and asses, oxen and sheep, dogs and hogs, rabbits and poultry, &c.
constitute the basis of all theories, of all arguments, of all conclusions, in relation to the
highest and noblest attributes of Man. (Amringe 26-27; qtd in Wells 335).
The review then refutes “all theories founded upon accidental, unnatural, or monstrous births
being the progenitors of any permanently distinct race of men or animals” (Amringe 524; qtd. in
Wells 335). Charles Darwin knew he would have to contend with these kinds of objections to his
own theory. The vitriol of the reviews suggests the extent and depth of popular and religious
resistance to considering humans in relation to other animal species. In contrast, in William
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Lawrence and Percy Shelley one finds a profound openness to the relations Charles Darwin
would later seek to prove definitively.
One of the strongest cases for reading Lawrence in relation to theories of transmutation is
his influence on both Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace. To Charles Darwin, Lawrence
may have been primarily a warning about publishing a controversial work that almost cost a
scientist his career, since Lawrence was forced to recant his claims in Lectures in order to
maintain his professional position, though he lost his copyright to his work (Darlington 18).
Darwin became interested in Lawrence’s work around 1838, noting Lawrence in his “C”
Transmutation notebook,27 which is the same time at which he marks the need to conceal his
materialism (Desmond 113).28 As George Levine claims, “What Darwin said was part of a much
broader sweep of historical change and was implicated in major nonscientific developments …
in fact the developments that seem to issue from Darwinism had begun at least twenty to thirty
years before … however distinct Darwin’s arguments were, they were part of a whole movement
of which Darwin can be taken as the most powerful codifier” (Levine 9). Some of the best
evidence that we have that Darwin was not alone in the trajectory of his thinking toward the
discovery of natural selection is the formulation of a nearly identical theory by Alfred Russel
Wallace--a fact often lost to history. Indeed, Darwin only published his own work when Wallace
mailed his “Ternate Essay” to Darwin in the spring of 1858 and the two theories were presented
together at the July meeting of the Linnaean Society that year. Wallace, though, like Darwin’s
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It is not known if Darwin read Lawrence definitively until 1847 (Wells 337). Darwin cites
Lawrence’s Lectures several times on heredity in Vol. II of The Descent of Man on sexual
selection (318, 338, 349, 352, 357).
28
Darwin writes “To avoid stating how far, I believe, in Materialism, say only that emotions,
instincts degrees of talent, which are hereditary are so because brain of child resembles parent
stock.- (& phrenologists state that brain alters)” (Notebooks 10).
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most vocal proponent in America, Asa Gray, was unable to accept Darwin’s theory as purely
based on chance rather than guided by some supernatural intelligence. Wallace wrote extensively
about how he came to his theory and his source materials are the same as both Charles Darwin’s
and the Romantic writers’ surveyed in this project. Like Darwin, Wallace claims passages in
Malthus’ Essay on Population as central to his theory (“Note” 111-18). What is most notable is
that Wallace, more than Charles Darwin, notes the influence of William Lawrence on his theory.
In Lawrence, Wallace seemed to recognize a case for transmutation. Wallace comments on both
Lawrence and Robert Chambers’ Vestiges of Natural Creation favorably in a letter to Henry
Walter Bates on December 28, 1845: “I would observe that many eminent writers give great
support to the theory of the progressive development of species in animals and plants. There is a
very interesting and philosophical work bearing directly on the subject ‘Lawrence's Lectures on
Man’ delivered before the Royal College of Surgeons and which are now published in a cheap
form” (Letters 91). Lawrence’s material views on life as a principle of organization were formed
at least in part from his appointment at the Hunterian Museum at the Royal College of Surgeons
in London (a position he received through the influence of Joseph Banks) to work with the
comparative anatomy collection. In the opening argument of Lectures about the materiality of
thought in the brain, Lawrence walks the reader through a Hunterian organization of all life that
begins “at the one end is man; at the other is an animated microscopic point, of which thousands
are found in a drop of fluid. Numberless gradations are placed between these; so that, though the
two ends of the chain are remote, there is close approximation between any two links” (100).
Here, Lawrence takes the vertical hierarchy of the “Great Chain of Being” and begins to
interweave biological links between each species, beginning, like Erasmus Darwin’s poem, with
microscopic life. While this chain is not either of the Darwins’ webs, in which even distant links
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are related, Lawrence moves toward an image of biological descent fueled by variation in his
work.
Lawrence was deeply interested in the same set of questions that led Charles Darwin to
his conclusions about the shared nature of species and the animating principle of life. Lawrence
opens section three of his Lectures “On Life” (likely the model for Shelley’s own essay of this
same title even as Shelley moves away from materialism in his version) with “I shall inquire
first, what we are to understand by ‘an animal,’ and what idea we are to attach to life” (117). For
Lawrence, “life” is result of the structure and organization of an animal: “A living body …
derives its character from the whole mass, from the assemblage of all the parts” (124). In the
long entry on “Life” in Rees’ Cyclopaedia (over 50 double-columned pages) Lawrence devotes
17 pages to the skeptic’s motto “no knowledge except through the senses” as applied to the
human brain (Vol. XX). Abernethy had labeled Lawrence and anyone in his circle the “modern
skeptics,” a position which Lawrence embraced (Ruston 19). Lawrence claims “sensation,
perception, memory, judgment, reasoning, thought, in a word, all the manifestations called
mental or intellectual, are the animal functions of their appropriate organic apparatus, the central
organ of the nervous system” (104). Lawrence dismisses any other speculations on “life” as
outside the realm of science in a barely-disguised reference to Abernethy’s vitalism: “It seems to
me that this hypothesis or fiction of a subtle invisible matter, animating the visible textures of
animal bodies, and directing their motions is only an example of that propensity in the human
mind which has led men at all times to account for those phenomena which the causes are not
obvious, by the mysterious aid of higher and imaginary beings” (174). Here, Lawrence attempts
to expel theology from natural science, resulting in an explosive debate that Charles Darwin will
find himself in after Lawrence.
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Notably, Shelley, Lawrence, Erasmus and Charles Darwin all take up the figure of the
oyster in their materialist claims. A survey of the reviews of Lawrence’s Lectures reveals the
extent of the objections to transmutation at the time that Shelley held his most radical beliefs.
Anti-materialist reviewers latched onto the idea of the oyster in particular as representative of the
extremes of materialism in extending the differences between humans and animals as only
functions of their biological structures. “The Quarterly Review for July 1819 complained that the
materialists, including Lawrence, believed ‘there is no other difference between a man and an
oyster, than that the one possesses bodily organs more fully developed than the other’” (Wells
331). The reviewer then connects such claims to Erasmus Darwin: “Dr. Darwin, indeed, carried
the hypothesis still farther-for it was a favorite part of his creed that man, when he first sprang by
chance into being, was an oyster, and nothing more" (331). Yet another review leveled a similar
claim: Lawrence implied that “a man had no more soul than an oyster, or any other fish or
insect” (“Law Report” 3c; qtd. in Ruston 80). The oyster in particular became representative of
the lowest form of life included in the taxonomy of the animal kingdom. Erasmus Darwin had
drawn attention to this, reportedly adopting the motto “E Conchis Omnia” which translates to
“all from oysters” or “all from shellfish” and adding it publicly to his family crest, carriage and
letters in 1770. It is possible that the oyster in particular became symbolic in this way because of
Plato’s Philebus in which he articulates a theory of the anima mundi (“world soul”) in which the
body and the world are thought to function in similar ways as interconnected systems. In this
dialogue, Plato allows for the possibility of panpsychism and identifies the life of an oyster as the
paramount example of bare life (Philebus 255).
Shelley is thinking through similar questions to Lawrence about the nature of life,
materialism, and theology while at St. Bartholomew’s in 1811. Writing to Hogg, Shelley
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theorizes, “if the principle of life, (that of reason put out of the question as in the cases of dogs,
horses & oysters) be soul, then Gravitation is as much the Soul of a Clock, as animation is that of
an oyster. I think we may not inaptly define Soul as the most supreme superior and distinguished
abstract appendage to the Nature of any thing” (6 Jan 1811) (Letters I 39).29 Shelley’s reference
to both gravity and the clock suggest a critique of deism, which he will then expand on shortly in
“A Refutation of Deism” (likely written 1812-3). Here, Shelley attempts to bracket out reason
and debates about its presence in a range of animals often referenced in philosophical and
scientific debates. This move alone suggests a less anthropocentric model for defining “life” and
moves away from Descartes’ denial of rationality and feeling to animals. Shelley redefines the
concept of “soul” as a natural force like gravity or animation, weakening its associations with
past religious and philosophical doctrines by applying it to both animal life and an inanimate
object, as in his expanded sense of voice. Through the use of the phrase “abstract appendage,”
Shelley mixes the idioms of philosophy and biology to enact his claims that these two realms are
in fact one and the same.
In a similar vein, Shelley postulates in a long note to Queen Mab on the doctrine of
Necessity, “Motive is to voluntary action in the human mind what cause is to effect in the
material universe. The word liberty, as applied to mind, is analogous to the word chance as
applied to matter” (Note 12, VI. 198, lines 10-14) (258). As with soul, Shelley redefines the
concept of liberty (or free will) in relation to matter. In this note, Shelley is working through
Hume’s compatibilist position on Liberty and Necessity in Enquiry in which he attempts to draw
29

Ruston reads this passage from Shelley as evidence of the influence of Abernethy’s vitalism
(79), but I read it here as part of Shelley’s transition toward materialism in redefining soul or
spirit in more material terms. This tension is likewise present in Emerson’s work: “The
physicians say, they are not materialists; but they are:--Spirit is matter reduced to an extreme
thinness: O so thin!--But the definition of spiritual should be, that which is its own evidence”
(Emerson “Experience” 201).
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parallels between the world of matter and that of mind. 30 Charles Darwin contemplates this same
question in similar terms, also referencing an oyster, “Now free will of oyster, one can fancy to
be direct effect of organization, by the capacities its senses give it of pain or pleasure. If so free
will is to mind, what chance is to matter” (M Notebook 72). Darwin, like Shelley, is likely
referencing Plato’s Philebus on the life of the oyster as an experience of pleasure. In equating
knowledge with the senses, Darwin, like Lawrence, is following the doctrine of skepticism that
leads him to the same phrasing of the analogy between mind and matter as in Shelley since both
men are paraphrasing Hume.31 Darwin will take this argument further to its materialist
conclusions, locating mind in matter and free will as synonymous with chance, which, as in
Shelley’s earlier redefinition of “soul,” weakens the associations of “free will” with religion and
philosophy and instead links it to biology. In his notebooks, Darwin states directly several times
“free will is to mind what chance is to matter” (18) and “I verily believe free will & chance are
synonymous” (11). Though Hume did not allow for the possibility of chance, Charles Darwin
recognized in his work the argument that the metaphysical/metaphorical and physical/literal
realms were directly related.
Shelley, Lawrence and the Darwins are interested in the range of connections on the scale
of nature, in which other primates have the most immediate relation to humans. Shelley often
30

In “Shelley and Philosophy,” Anthony Howe argues that “Perhaps the most important
philosopher of all for Shelley was David Hume” because of his modified skepticism (104). For
Shelley’s references in Note 12, see Hume’s Enquiry Chapter VIII: “It seems almost impossible,
therefore, to engage, either in science or action of any kind, without acknowledging the doctrine
of necessity, and this inference from motives to voluntary actions” (93) and “If these
circumstances form, in reality, the whole of that necessity, which we conceive in matter, and if
these circumstances be also universally acknowledged to take place in the operations of the
mind, the dispute [between Liberty and Necessity] is at and end” (94).
31
Darwin makes note of his reading and awareness of Hume throughout his journals and was
particularly interested in Hume’s work on “The Reason of Animals” and “Natural History of
Religion” (Huntley 457). As noted before, Darwin cites Hume’s work in his N notebook (88).
Darwin was reading Hume at around the same time in 1838 that he read Malthus (Huntley 457).
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focuses on the relationship between humans and orangutans, which suggests his awareness of the
work of William Lawrence on comparative anatomy and the theories of Erasmus Darwin, Lord
Monboddo and Jean-Jacques Rousseau about the possible links between all primates. Indeed,
Erasmus Darwin’s theory of evolution from other primates turned Samuel Taylor Coleridge
against the poet he had previously admired. In a letter to Wordsworth in 1815, Coleridge objects
to “the absurd notion of … Darwin and all the Believers -- even (strange to say) among Xtians)
of Man’s having progressed from an Ouran Outang state -- so contrary to all History, to all
Religion, nay, to all Possibility” (30 May 1815) (Collected Letters IV 574-5). Shelley, like
Erasmus Darwin and William Lawrence, cites biological similarities between humans and the
“orang-outang” in both of his vegetarian treatises, as well as in his notes to Queen Mab:
“Comparative anatomy teaches us that man resembles frugivorous animals in everything, and
carnivorous in nothing” (Note 17 VIII.211-12) (Complete 299), a phrase he repeats directly in
Vindication (Prose 79). More specifically, he argues in Queen Mab, “The orang-outang perfectly
resembles man both in the order and number of his teeth. The orang-outang is the most
anthropomorphous of the ape tribe, all of which are strictly frugivorous. There is no other species
of animal, which live on different food, in which this analogy exists. In many frugivorous
animals, the canine teeth are more pointed and distinct than those of man. The resemblance also
of the human stomach to that of the orang-outang is greater than to that of any other animal”
(Complete 300). For this passage, Shelley cites the Rees’ Cyclopaedia entry on “Man” (Vol.
XXII) by Lawrence (300). Shelley makes nearly identical claims in A Vindication of Natural
Diet, where he uses comparative anatomy, particularly the resemblance of intestines in addition
to colons, teeth and stomach (Prose 80) to further argue for humans’ similarities to other
primates. Following Rousseau, Shelley marshals this scientific evidence to demonstrate that
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man’s “natural” state is vegetarian; as the reviewers of Lawrence’s work feared, it is only a small
leap then to claim an evolutionary relationship between humans and other primates based on
their homologous biology.
An evolutionary link between all creatures means that everything that humans experience
must have its origins in the rest of the natural world. This idea leads to a sense of kinship and
sympathy with fellow creatures that abounds in Shelley’s work. Mary Shelley notes of Queen
Mab that “He [Shelley] was animated to greater zeal by compassion for his fellow-creatures. His
sympathy was excited by the misery with which the world is bursting” (“Editor’s Note” 38).
Mary Shelley’s use of “fellow-creatures” (and the variants of “fellow” and “creature”
separately) recur throughout Frankenstein in sympathy with the suffering of the creature as
abandoned by his fellows. Percy Shelley’s sympathy extends especially to animals that are
slaughtered for food, which Shelley views as a cruel, unnecessary, and unhealthful act. All of
Shelley’s utopian visions imagine an end to carnivorism for both humans and animals. In Queen
Mab, for example, Shelley describes it thus: “No longer now / He slays the lamb that looks him
in the face” (VIII 211-12).
Shelley’s sympathy for animals derives from his belief in their interconnections with
humans, even creatures outside of the class of mammals. Indeed, Shelley is reported to have
bought crayfish only to return them to the river to prevent them from being eaten (Perkins 4).
Romantic writers often chose more extreme cases for sympathy, such as insects, snails, worms,
mice, etc. (Perkins 4) in order to widen the scope of feeling and ethical response to the natural
world. Further, the idea that creatures further away from humans on the evolutionary tree
nonetheless had shared characteristics with humans provided powerful evidence for evolutionary
progression (Clark 110). Shelley’s sympathy for all life is grounded not simply in sentimentality,
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but in a broader system of ethics found in Montaigne and Bentham, not to mention Shelley’s
close ties to other proponents of vegetarianism such as John Newton and Joseph Ritson, that
acknowledges that nonhuman creatures feel and experience pain similar to humans. Shelley
explores the nature of cruelty in Note 12 to Queen Mab which suggests that if vipers and tigers
were not dangerous predators, humans would have no just cause to harm them (Complete 261).
The subject of human-animal kinship and therefore the origins of humanity in the animal
kingdom was central to Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theory. He notes anecdotally, “Seeing a
dog & horse & man yawn, makes me feel how <much> all animals <are>built on one structure”
(21). His work on the similarities between all creatures recurs in his notebooks throughout the
period, finding fullest expression in The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals (1871).
Lesser known are Darwin’s writings on animal suffering. Darwin recognizes that “Even the
worm when trod upon turneth […] now this is the oldest inherited & therefore remains” (15).
Darwin continues to theorize the instinct in all animals to avoid pain and death. “Montaigne Vol.
I has well observed one does not fear death from its pain, but one only fears that pain which is
connected with death!--How has this instinctive fear arisen?” (22).32 Darwin recognizes that
cognition, emotion and expression (language) must be related both for humans and for animals:
“Therefore I say grant reason to | any animal with social & sexual instincts/ & yet with passion /
he must have conscience” (N notebook 70). In his notebook, he allows for wide possibilities in
animal communication: “The distinction / as often said/ of language in man is very great from |
all animals—but do not overstate—animals communicate to each other. […] How far they
communicate not easy to know,--but this capability of understanding language is considerable”
(24). In Chapters 2 and 3 of the Descent, he argues more formally “there is no fundamental
32
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Emerson. Darwin cites Hume’s “Of the Reason of Animals” in his N notebook (88).
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difference between man and the higher mammals in their mental faculties” (35) and “The
difference in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, is certainly one of degree
and not of kind” (Descent 105). This same claim is made in his notebook based on his reading of
a work in response to William Paley’s natural theology: “Lrd. Brougham/Dissert./says animals
have abstractions because they understand signs.--very profound.--concludes that difference of
intellect between animals & men only in kind. Probably very important work” (N notebook 62).
Likewise, for Lawrence, human and animal intelligence share key attributes: “We cannot deny to
animals all participation in rational endowments, without shutting our eyes to the most obvious
facts” (109). Lawrence’s examples of animal intelligence are taken in part from von Humboldt
on the elephant, dog, and mule (109), animals that, like the oyster, acquired representative
symbolic weight, in definitions of species and theories of animal feeling and intelligence.33
These biological connections between humans and other animals form the basis of ecology; from
these scientific and philosophical ideas Shelley developed his own understanding of poetry as a
medium akin to the natural world in which he can represent such interconnections among all life
through the poetic power of language.

Part III. Poetic Ecology in “The Sensitive Plant”
Shelley’s poem “The Sensitive Plant,” (likely written in the spring of 1820, well past
Shelley’s more materialist phase) brings together much of his scientific and philosophical
knowledge in order to demonstrate the interdependence of parts in both language and nature. The
poem allegorizes the change of seasons from spring to winter from the perspective of the titular
plant; thus the removal of sunshine and care represented by the Lady (mother nature/spring)
33

For more on animal symbolism in philosophy, see Plato’s Animals: Gadflies, Horses, Swans,
and Other Philosophical Beasts, edited by Jeremy Bell and Michael Naas.
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results in a terrible loss of life. Shelley allegorizes the sensitive plant as an annual whose life
cycle only lasts one year in comparison to all the other flowers which are perennials and have
thus been through the life/death/rebirth cycle before. The poem is often read critically through
this botanical metaphor; in this way, the mimosa represents human perspective as limited, while
the flowers are immortal. I read “The Sensitive Plant,” particularly Part III, as an accurate
representation of an ecosystem that reflects what Timothy Morton calls the “dark side” of
ecological interdependence as Shelley explotes interconnected suffering and death as ecological
processes in Part III. Because these are the experiences of the poet and the plant, they are
rendered the most vividly. Even though the plant figure is undoubtedly allegorical, Shelley’s
choice to cast a nonhuman figure intricately enmeshed in an ecological web as the
protagonist/victim in the poem demonstrates his sense of the shared structures of feeling and
experience between humans and other life forms. Going beyond even other animals, Shelley’s
poetry examines the material and affective interconnections between all organic life.
After all the ecological degradation of Part III, the poem’s conclusion attempts to assure
the reader that this suffering and death are not reality, but the note rings false and is perhaps
intended as satire. In many ways, the sensitive plant itself can be read as the poetic embodiment
of Shelley’s more sustained attention to “a spirit ... at enmity with nothingness and dissolution”
that he explores in “On Life” (Poetry and Prose 506). Mary Shelley and Charles Darwin take up
this struggle after Percy Shelley’s work, and Mary Shelley devotes The Last Man to the immense
difficulty of accepting what she calls the “grim unreality” of extinction. Darwin also struggled to
allow for extinction in his theory of natural selection, but ultimately accepted that Natural
selection “entails extinction; and how largely extinction has acted in the world’s history, geology
plainly declares” (Origin 105). “The Sensitive Plant,” shares with “Alastor” a central figure in
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deep communion with its fellow natural beings only to experience a dramatic reversal of health
to decay and death. Whereas in “Alastor,” the last 530 of its 720 lines are devoted to the poet’s
suffering and death from a pursuit of idealism, Part I and Part III of “The Sensitive Plant” are
roughly parallel (28 and 29 stanzas respectively) in setting up the pleasure and perfection of
paradise followed by its gruesome demise. The intervening Part II consists of 15 stanzas on the
Lady who, like her garden, is introduced and then dies, while the conclusion is a short 6 stanzas
and removed from the action of the poem. Richard Caldwell suggests that the poem’s form
revolves around the number seven and therefore the number of days in the Biblical creation story
(Caldwell 227), but the six-stanza conclusion does not fit this model. Likewise, in Part III, the
death of the Lady lasts three days and then on the fourth day her body is interred in a direct
reversal of the Biblical resurrection story. If the poem has any Christian overtones, it offers an
alternative creation story in which the central actor, the plant, has no agency in its suffering or
demise. This shift, from human to nonhuman character, then may demonstrate Shelley’s critique
of Christianity’s concept of original sin by creating a fall from grace narrative in a garden where
there is no cause or responsibility for expulsion from paradise.
Following these shifts, I read the poem as diverging from what Alan Bewell calls
Shelley’s “biosocial utopia” in both Queen Mab and Prometheus Unbound, in which Shelley
connects “social revolution” and “physical environment” (629). “The Sensitive Plant” allows no
opportunity for revolution or even for agency at all; the plant is the victim of a nature that carries
on regardless of its suffering or death. Michael Scrivner claims that typically Shelley’s “‘nature’
not only presents no insuperable obstacles to reason, but it itself rational” (68). In “The Sensitive
Plant,” Shelley explores this sense of nature as a matter of perspective. For the plant and its
ecosystem, the loss of spring wreaks havoc on their world, throwing it into chaos, yet the
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narrator asserts that all this is not as it seems. What makes the poem so compelling is the
focalization from the view of the plant whose world is dominated by sensory experience, like
Plato’s oyster. In an insightful reading of Shelley’s paired Hymns to Apollo and Pan, Earl
Wasserman claims that Shelley never fully reconciles his skepticism and idealism. He argues that
Apollo’s idealism is set up as equal to and even undercut by Pan’s emphasis on lived experience.
Similarly, in “The Sensitive Plant,” as soon as the poem’s conclusion zooms out to an external
perspective, the vividness of experience is replaced by the narrator’s “modest creed” that this
poem was not reality. The narrator, however, does not claim omniscience and repeats two
skeptical phrases: “I cannot say” (line 4) and “I dare not guess” (line 9) applied respectively to
the feelings of the plant and the mind of nature.
“The Sensitive Plant,” then, represents a range of philosophical perspectives that Shelley
developed over time. Shelley was torn between materialist and idealist poles, and while he was
pulled toward the Platonic, he never lost his sense of skepticism. Stuart Curran suggests that
“Shelley’s interest in Plato had grown steadily as his devotion to practical reform waned” (likely
around 1817), which leads Curran to argue that Prometheus Unbound represents Shelley’s
attempt to fuse materialism and idealism into “skeptical idealism” (95-118). Similarly, Bewell
notes that “an increasing pessimism dominates his work” as he loses faith in social reform (628).
Kenneth Neil Cameron traces a similar journey for Shelley, particularly Shelley’s acceptances
and rejections of one the one hand, d’Holbach, Hume, Locke, and on the other, Berkeley.
Cameron concludes that Shelley “felt that skepticism as a system of philosophy, while essential
for the abolition of theological ‘error,’ was negative rather than creative” (588). This critical
summary best places Shelley in the tradition of skepticism, that while unsatisfying, remained
with him as he was unable to substitute anything else fully in its place, what he describes at the
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end of “Mont Blanc” as a kind of philosophical “vacancy” (line 144).
In his essay “On Life,” Shelley discusses his evolving perspectives on philosophy. He
explains his rejection of materialism after embracing it in his youth. While he begins with bold
criticisms of materialism as full of “shocking absurdities” with “fatal consequences in morals”
and “violent dogmatism,” he moves into a more nuanced view of his own struggle between
philosophical schools. His later claims get to the heart of the struggle:
But I was discontented with such a view of things as it afforded: man is a being of high
aspirations ‘looking both before and after,’ whose ‘thoughts that wander through
eternity,’ disclaim alliance with transience and decay, incapable of imagining to himself
annihilation, existing but in the future and the past, being, not what is, but what he has
been, and shall be. Whatever may be his true and final destination, there is a spirit within
him at enmity with change and extinction [nothingness and dissolution].34 This is the
character of all life and being.” (emphasis added Poetry and Prose 506)
Shelley here recognizes that a materialist view of the world seems to diminish the role of the
human, particularly in the capacity for consciousness. In characteristic form, though, Shelley
extends the desire to live and not die to all creatures, something both Charles Darwin and
Sigmund Freud later theorize in their works on instincts. Shelley keeps both possible versions of
the “enmity” phrase, beginning with the more philosophical or metaphysical, and writing above
it the more scientific description, which reflects his kinship with both systems of thought.
Shelley’s complex syntax here about the nature of time reflects his deep resistance to the
impermanence of materialism. Similarly, earlier in the essay, he complicates his syntax in his
disavowal of materialism: “I confess I am one of those who am unable to refuse my assent to the
34

In the manuscript copy, Shelley keeps both phrases with the scientific phrase written above
(Reiman and Fraistat 506).
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conclusions of those philosophers who assert that nothing exists but as it is perceived” (emphasis
added 506). Here, Shelley repeats “I” and “am” twice each to preface his claim, but at the same
time uses the less personal phrase “one of those.” The complexity of the next phrase “unable to
refuse my assent” likewise suggests the struggle he has undergone (and may continue to
undergo) in moving away from materialism and toward skepticism. Later in “On Life,” he
affirms his skeptical position: “We are on that verge where words abandon us, and what wonder
if we grow dizzy to look down the dark abyss of—how little we know” (508). Reading “The
Sensitive Plant” as an enactment of the conflict between Shelley’s philosophical views reveals
his desire to respond to the experience of suffering in the world.
Shelley links the human and nonhuman worlds in his poem not only allegorically, but
also details a whole host of nonhuman ecological interconnections between plants, soil, air,
water, light, worms, insects, mice, birds, etc. From this series of ecological entanglements, I read
the poem as a precursor to Charles Darwin’s famous “tangled bank” passage that concludes
Origin, where Darwin too struggles with ending on a note of extinction and instead searches for
a kind of meaning to such ecological processes:
It is interesting to contemplate a tangled bank, clothed with many plants of many kinds,
with birds singing on the bushes, with various insects flitting about, and with worms
crawling through the damp earth, and to reflect that these elaborately constructed forms,
so different from each other, and dependent upon each other in so complex a manner,
have all been produced by laws acting around us. These laws, taken in the largest sense,
being Growth with reproduction; Inheritance which is almost implied by reproduction;
Variability from the indirect and direct action of the conditions of life, and from use and
disuse; a Ratio of Increase so high as to lead to a Struggle for Life, and as a consequence
to Natural Selection, entailing Divergence of Character and the Extinction of less
improved forms. Thus, from the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted
object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals,
directly follows. There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having
been originally breathed35 into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has
35

In the second and subsequent editions, Darwin’s inserted "by the Creator" after “breathed
into,” likely to quell religious objections to the first edition.
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gone circling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless
forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being evolved. (490)
Darwin figures the “tangled bank” as an ecosystem that becomes a microcosm for all of nature.
He then proceeds to enumerate the laws of nature that govern ecosystems and ultimately lead
toward struggle and extinction. But Darwin does not want to conclude with this bleak set of
facts. Instead, he attempts to find purpose and beauty in this struggle--something that Shelley
could never reconcile.
Both Shelley and Charles Darwin likely drew inspiration directly from Erasmus Darwin’s
The Botanic Garden, in particular Canto IV “Of Good and Evil,” which address the issue of
predation and competition in the natural world and details the immense and violent struggle for
life among all creatures. There is a double entendre in Charles Darwin’s admission that “writing
on transmutation” felt like “confessing to a murder” (Huxley 273). Not only was Darwin
“murdering” a certain belief system centered around a beneficent God, but nature was itself full
of bloodshed. Both the Darwins took this insight in part from the work of Thomas Malthus. In
Origin, Darwin defines his central contribution, the theory of natural selection, as the “doctrine
of Malthus applied with manifold force to the whole animal and vegetable kingdom” (63).
Malthus’s influence is likewise evident on Erasmus Darwin who writes “But war, pestilence,
disease, and dearth, / Sweep the superfluous myriads from the earth” (Temple IV.373-4). Darwin
claims “From Hunger’s arm the shafts of Death are hurl’d, / And one great Slaughter-house the
warring world!” (Temple IV.65-6). This canto goes on to recount the battles between wolf and
lamb, eagle and dove—animal relationships that have long histories of both religious and
political symbolism. But Erasmus Darwin also recognizes that even the plants are at war:
Through the thick ranks of vegetable war;
Herb, shrub, and tree, with strong emotions rise
For light and air, and battle in the skies;
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Whose roots divering with opposing toil
Contend below for moisture and for soil (Temple IV.41-6)
Erasmus Darwin likewise seeks to find meaning in this “vegetable war,” coming to a materialist
conclusion on the ecological purpose of death:
hence when a Monarch or a mushroom dies,
Awhile extinct the organic matter lies;
But, as a few short hours or years revolve,
Alchemic powers the changing mass dissolve;
Born to new life unnumber’d insects pant,
New buds surround the microscopic plant;
Whose embryon senses, and unwearied frames,
Feel finer goads, and blush with purer flames (Temple IV.383–90)
While Darwin uses “Monarch” here to refer to the butterfly, he also codes the radical ideas of
both revolution and the human species in the term; thus, the human Monarch is made equivalent
to the butterfly or the mushroom: both die and from their decay new life springs. This material
process for all life, including the human, is then a model for society, as the subtitle of the poem
“the Origin of Society” implies, in which political revolution can bring about a new era of social
peace. Emily Dickinson, writing decades later, seems to recognize the radical potential of both
the mushroom (nature’s “apostate”) (Poem 1350) and the butterfly, rendered both material and
political in death in “Color - Caste - Denomination” (Poem 970). In “The Triumph of Life,”
Shelley ends with a dark vision of life that links human shapes (“phantoms”) to apes surrounded
by bats, flies and gnats, “arrayed in which these worms did monarchize / ‘Who make this earth
their charnel” (lines 487, 493, 508, 504-5). Here, as in Erasmus Darwin’s poetics, suffering,
decay and death are central to nature (even as both poets reject this as the only and final
possibility for life); the figure of the worm here reverses the hierarchy of man’s supposed
dominion over nature: the worm is now the monarch in death. Shelley describes this in “Alastor”
as the “worm’s outrage” (line 702) and links humans to plants and worms in death in: men / Go
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to their graves like flowers or creeping worms” (lines 621-2). Both poets use this relationship
between all organic life to combat any claim for human exceptionalism: “—Stoop, selfish Pride!
survey thy kindred forms, / Thy brother Emmets, and thy sister Worms!” (Temple.IV 427-8).36
Erasmus Darwin’s vivid poetry about the violence of nature influenced Percy Shelley’s
use of gothic horror throughout his poetry and in the long decay section of “The Sensitive Plant.”
Further, the influence of Malthus on the Shelleys’ ecogothic texts is significant even as they
vehemently resisted Malthus’s politics and the social implications of his arguments. In
Vindication, Shelley alludes to Malthus’s theories, describing “disease and war, those sweeping
curtailers of population” (Prose 86). Shelley broadens this sense of man’s subjection in
Prometheus Unbound in which humans struggle to overcome the forces that control them: “Nor
yet exempt, though ruling them like slaves, / From chance, and death, and mutability,” (3.4.2001). Whereas for Shelley, disease and war were caused by human failures, chance, death and
mutability are forces of Necessity that control nature and humans who are subjected to nature.
Hence, Prometheus’s reconciliation begins a process, perhaps evolutionary in nature given the
qualifying “Nor yet...though,” to rid the world of the sources of death and suffering. Indeed,
Shelley’s attention to mutability in poems like “Mont Blanc,” “Mutability” and even
“Ozymandias” suggests an attention to variation and change, the mechanisms of transmutation.
As in “The Sensitive Plant,” some of the most vivid passages of poetic ecology in Prometheus
Unbound stem from the details of the plague spoken by the “Spirit of the Earth”: “When Plague
had fallen on man and beast and worm, / And Famine; and black blight on herb and tree; / And in
the corn, and vines, and meadow-grass, / Teemed ineradicable poisonous weeds / Draining their
growth (I.172-176). Here, the plague affects alike all species: humans, other animals, and plants,
36
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but the following details are of the plants’ suffering in particular. Shelley seems to relate to the
human experience most strongly to plants’ lack of agency, their rootedness or boundedness, and
therefore dependence on elements beyond their control.
In “The Sensitive Plant,” Parts I and III describe the garden as a complete ecosystem,
accounting for the complex processes by which each species lives or dies. In Part I, all of the
plants in the garden are nourished by wind, rain, and sunlight. The plants, trees, and the stream in
provided habitats (“roof” line 57) for the glow-worm and other insects, as well as the
nightingale. Shelley’s use of similes, metaphors, and synesthesia throughout the poem intermixes
all categories: the spring is like love, the mimosa like a doe, the rose like a nymph, flowers like
an infant, etc. Hence, all life in the poem is linked: “For each one was interpenetrated / With the
light and odour its neighbor shed / Like young lovers, whom youth and love make dear, / Wrapt
and filled by their mutual atmosphere” (lines 66-69). Shelley uses the analogy here of love, as in
Prometheus Unbound where Asia claims that love “makes the reptile equal to the god” (II.V.43),
to show ecological dependence, not only between different forms of life, but within their broader
habitat or “mutual atmosphere.”
The accretion of comparisons is heightened by the poem’s use of anaphora with “And”
joining nearly every stanza (25 lines begin with “And” and 29 have internal “and”s in Part I’s 28
stanzas totaling 114 lines). After the detailed poetic rendering of all the species in the ecosystem,
Shelley builds up the interconnections in both form and content:
And when evening descended from Heaven above,
And the Earth was all rest, and the Air was all love;
And delight, though less bright, was far more deep,
And the day’s veil fell from the word of sleep,
And the beasts, and the birds, and the insects were drowned
In an ocean of dreams without a sound
Whose waves never mark, though they ever impress
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The light sand which paves it—Consciousness. (lines 98-105)
In these two stanzas, rest, love, and delight correspond to the soil (Earth), atmosphere (Air), and
sunlight (Heaven). Shelley makes this intermixture of physical and metaphysical most explicit in
the use of “delight, though less bright” (line 100). Shelley undoubtedly has Prospero’s famous
speeches in The Tempest in mind here in which the ocean, sleep, and consciousness are linked
(4.1.146-163, 5.1.79-84). Shelley’s syntax suggests an extension of consciousness to all the
creatures named in line 102, perhaps following Plato’s “anima mundi” and/or Spinozaninfluenced panpsychism. This intermixture continues in the next stanzas in which the song of the
nightingale interpenetrates the dreams of the mimosa (lines 106-109), giving both bird and plant
forms of consciousness. The image of every life form drowning in the waves of an ocean serves
as foreshadowing for Part III in which all the life forms perish in winter’s ice. These lines are
likewise allusive to the scientific theory of Catastrophism, the idea that the earth has undergone
major geologic events that change its composition and form radically, which was considered
compatible with the Biblical story of the flood.
Shelley mirrors the first and third parts of the poem in both structure and content as the
holistic perfection of Part I gives way to complete degradation in Part III. Shelley increases his
language of connection formally in the section on suffering and decay, beginning 28 lines with
“And,” likewise adding 44 internal “and”s and one more stanza than in Part I. Shelley’s
repetition of similes and metaphors likewise continues but now reverses the content and tone.
Seeds become weeds, leaves become clay, and the trees and plants are now a “leafless network
of parasite bowers” (line 48). Whereas all of the comparisons in Part I reflect a kind of harmony
between all things, the connections in Part III demonstrate the subjection of all life to violence,
suffering, and death: the garden is like a corpse, the lilies “Like the head and the skin of a dying
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man,” plants rot on the stalk “like a murderer’s stake,” etc.37 In perhaps the most memorable
example, the north wind preys upon the garden “Like a wolf that had smelt a dead child out”
(line 111). In this section, as before, Shelley traces the interconnections between the weather,
plants, animals, and insects. As winter comes, everything freezes: “The earth and the air and the
water bound” (line 95). “Bound” here signifies both the process of freezing, but also the previous
sense of linked as in the “mutual atmosphere” in which all elements are “interpenetrated.”
Shelley follows this stanza with a cascade of ecosystem collapse: from the frost, the weeds
“decay” (line 100), then “And under the roots of the Sensitive-plant / The moles and the dormice
died for want. / The birds dropped stiff from the frozen air / And were caught in the branches
naked and bare” (lines 102-105). At all levels—below the soil, in it, and above it (previously
figured as earth, air, and heaven)—all life ends. If the sensitive plant is an allegory for humanity,
it does not receive any special treatment or exemption from this process; rather, it suffers along
with all its fellow inhabitants. By the end of the section, when winter gives way to summer, the
only survivors of the carnage are “[But] the mandrakes and toadstools and docks and darnels /
Rose like the dead from their ruined charnels” (lines 116-17). These final lines echo Erasmus
Darwin’s mushrooms, but do not bear much symbolic weight as signs of hope, purpose, or
political revolution. Stuart Curran argues that the ending reflects that “The triumph of life then
becomes, as Shelley saw, one of death; and only ‘the sacred few’ remain unscathed. This is
something more than traditional English pessimism reasserting itself in response to fruitless war
and peace. It is part of a larger vision that profoundly questions the nature of man’s relationship
to his society” (11). But the “rare few” will also be subject to the same fate of death, thus Shelley

37

This stanza is canceled in Mary Shelley’s manuscript, which would even out the stanzas, but
there is speculation that it was taken out because of its content in describing a gibbet in which a
criminal’s body was left out to rot as a deterrent to crime (Reiman and Fraistat 293).
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reserves any shift in tone to possible redemption only in the separate Conclusion in which the
narrator attempts to interpret the preceding scenes of violence, suffering, and death as part of
“this life / Of error, ignorance and strife” (lines 9-10). Shelley attempts to find hope in the idea
that, in contrast, “For love, and beauty, and delight / There is no death nor change, their might /
Exceeds our organs--which endure / No light—being themselves obscure” (lines 21-24). Here,
the metaphysical “light” is rendered superior to the “obscure” “organs” of our sensory
perceptions, yet the basis of the poem rests on the sensory experience of the ecosystem
described. In this way, Shelley’s poem ends, as in “On Life” with a skeptical sense that we
cannot know or understand nature or our place within it.
Both Erasmus Darwin and Percy Shelley were thinking through the relationships of
plants to one another and to the world around them in ways that led to Charles Darwin’s own
experiments on plant intelligence and movement. Contemporary scientists continue this same
debate today. Several recent works have taken up these questions: Daniel Chamovitz’s What a
Plant Knows: A Field Guide to the Senses (2012), Eduardo Kohn’s How Forests Think: Toward
an Anthropology Beyond the Human (2013) and Peter Wohlleben’s The Hidden Life of Trees:
What They Feel, How They Communicate, Discoveries from a Secret World (2016). Each of
these authors claims that because plants communicate in ways that are foreign to human
understanding, we have been unable to assess both the intelligence and feeling of these other
beings. In 2013, in the midst of this debate, Michael Pollan wrote “The Intelligent Plant:
Scientists debate a new way of understanding flora” for The New Yorker. Pollan discusses the
revival of Charles Darwin’s work on plants in the new controversial field of “plant
neurobiology:” “Plants speak in a chemical vocabulary we can’t directly perceive or
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comprehend” and recent studies suggest that “plants may display a form of kin recognition” (par.
19). 38 Pollan recounts the intense debate over one plant in particular, the mimosa:
The most controversial presentation was ‘Animal-Like Learning in Mimosa Pudica,’ by
an animal ecologist. ‘None of the reviewers had problems with the data.’ Instead, they
balked at the language she used to describe the data. But she didn’t want to change it.
‘Unless we use the same language to describe the same behavior’—exhibited by plants
and animals— ‘we can’t compare it,’ she said. Scientists are often uncomfortable talking
about the role of metaphor and imagination in their work, yet scientific progress often
depends on both. (par. 26)
The emphasis here on language, metaphor, and imagination makes Shelley’s poem all the more
relevant to the current debate. The mimosa, like the zoophyte, has long drawn attention for its
seemingly liminal role between the plant and animal kingdoms. Charles Darwin, in The Power of
Movement in Plants (1880), focused on shared sensitivities between animals and plants. He
studies two species of the mimosa, Mimosa pudica and Mimosa albida. He concludes his study
with the claim that “It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the tip of the radicle thus endowed,
and having the power of directing the movements of the adjoining parts, acts like the brain of one
of the lower animals; the brain being seated within the anterior end of the body, receiving
impressions from the sense-organs, and directing the several movements” (574). Here again,
Darwin moves toward literalizing the metaphor between plant and animal intelligence and
feeling.
In Erasmus Darwin’s The Loves of the Plants, the poet endows plants with human
characteristics, particularly the ability to feel. Darwin devotes 16 lines and a long note (about
300 words) on the “Mimosa, the Sensitive Plant” (I.301-8) in which the Mimosa is figured as a
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between the time scale at which plants live and our own” (par. 40). This issue of scale and
intelligibility is likewise at the center of David Rothenberg’s work to slow down recordings of
animal sounds to make their musical structure evident to humans.
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“chaste” maiden. King-Hele marks the similar structure of rhyming couplets in both Darwin’s
and Shelley’s poems (Erasmus 209), but qualifies that “[i]n tone and philosophical quality
Shelley’s poem is at some distance from Darwin; however, the similarity in title, subject and
technique make it very difficult to deny Darwin’s influence” (201). In addition to Darwin’s The
Loves of the Plants, Shelley could have drawn inspiration from two other earlier poets who
feature the mimosa in their work. In William Cowper’s “The Poet, the Oyster, and Sensitive
Plant,” the three titular figures debate the pain caused by sensitivity (again recalling Plato’s
oyster), while Charlotte Smith’s “The Mimosa,” in The Peacock at Home; and Other Poems
(1809) sets up the plant as overly sensitive: “But you, Mimosa! nothing pleases, / You, what
delights your comrades teases, / What they enjoy you try to shun” (lines 3-5). Shelley’s mimosa,
however, is figured as full of life, feeling, and desire. As in Erasmus Darwin’s The Temple of
Nature where limbs become one another biologically and linguistically, early nineteenth century
scientific discoveries showed similarities between plants and animals, including the idea of
leaves as the lungs of the plant. Further, “experiments with air showed that animals needed
oxygen but exhaled carbon, while plants needed carbon and gave out oxygen” (Ruston 26),
which led to better understanding of the interdependence between all life that would form the
basis of ecology. Shelley seems to find in the mimosa a figure to bridge the different kingdoms
that make up the natural world as an ecological system.
Because of Shelley’s early tragic death in 1822, there is no way to know in which
directions his own scientific and philosophical speculations would have developed had he lived.
King-Hele goes so far as to claim that “If Shelley had been born a hundred years later, the
twentieth century would have seen a Newton among chemists” (Shelley 165). Regardless of the
necessarily speculative nature of such a suggestion, there is strong evidence for the claim that
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Shelley was “the most scientifically-minded poet of the age” (Bush 111). Shelley’s forays into
science and its relations to materialist and skeptical philosophy, in part through the influences of
Erasmus Darwin and William Lawrence, brought him nearer to Charles Darwin’s later
evolutionary conclusions than might be expected. Shelley contributed to a new understanding of
nature that transformed materialist mechanism into a living, organic whole made up of
interconnected parts. Shelley extended these relations to include species and language, humans
and other animals, mind and matter. Though his unique form of poetic ecology, he demonstrated
the interconnections between all life in ways that acknowledged the biological realities of
suffering, deacy, and death as necessary parts of nature. Charles Darwin listened to the “awful
tongue” of nature in Shelley’s poetry as he too confronted the Malthusian aspects of organic life.
Likewise, Mary Shelley, in response to a series of deaths of her loved ones, was left to confront
even more directly some of the darker ecological themes in Shelley’s poetry that Charles Darwin
would later formalize in his theory of natural selection.
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Chapter 2. “Lost in darkness and distance”: Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein and the
“Question of the Animal”
“The animal question has been rather neglected by philosophers till quite lately. But when you
really begin to look into it, it raises a host of large and interesting questions about such things as
the meaning of equality, the importance of reason in human life and its relation to feeling, the
significance of a social contract, the importance of language, the concepts of childhood and
maturity, and the human race’s general view of itself in relation to the physical universe”
(Mary Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter)
Introduction
For any reader of Frankenstein, Mary Midgley’s questions in Animals and Why They
Matter clearly resonate with the central themes of the novel; and yet, the “animal question” has
begun to be explored only very recently in Romantic texts, and in Frankenstein specifically.
How might our perspective on the canonical figure of the Creature change if we consider him to
be part of a broader discourse on animality in a time when definitions of species, including the
human in relation to other animals, were being called into question? The Creature has been read
in useful ways as a symbol for oppressed groups based on race, class, gender, sexuality, and
disability--for any group that has been “animalized” and therefore had its “humanity” denied.1
Indeed, this exclusionary definition of the human has been used against both humans and other
animals alike; given the centrality of animalization to all forms of prejudice, it is a necessary,
but often overlooked, basis for such critical inquiries. Glen Brewster notes that “the cultural
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Among the articles on race, of particular interest is Judith Barbour’s claim that in the nineteenth
century, “Natural history was taught to English children as a racialist and class-bound aesthetics
of face, body and gait. Human movement, stature, posture, body shape, height, hirsute or smooth
skin and skin colour, were indexed on a Eurocentric scale.” (18). See also Ronald Paulson’s
reading of the Creature as part of Waterloo “the Enlightenment-created monster leaving behind
its wake of terror and destruction across France and Europe, partly because it had been
disavowed and misunderstood and partly because it was created by reason rather than love”
(545). See also, Anne K. Mellor’s “Frankenstein, Racial Science, and the Yellow Peril.”
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significance of the Creature's monstrous body has become a sort of free-floating signifier of the
dominant anxieties of changing times” (75). While the Creature has been read as representing
both nature (most notably by Jonathan Bate and Anne Mellor) and animals themselves (in a
recent essay by Stephanie Rowe), in this chapter I read the Creature as inherently hybridized
between the human and animal worlds as he struggles against these imposed categories. The
Creature embodies these categories simultaneously because he reveals the human as animal, and
the animal as human; thus I am not arguing that the Creature should be denied a human identity
(a tenet which the novel’s characterization and sympathy clearly support), but rather that he
represents a critique of the discourse of the human/animal divide and the violence that ensues
from it. Shelley’s novel thus redefines the very category of the human to demonstrate that we
are all versions of the Creature, human-animal hybrids made from the material world; in our
limbs, our organs, our eyes, etc. we are all made of animal parts in Darwin’s sense of both
origins and descent.
While Shelley’s novel (1818) precedes Origin of Species (1859) and The Descent of Man
(1871) by decades, as we saw in the previous chapter on Percy Shelley, the
transmutation/transformism debate (as it was previously called before the term evolution
superseded it through Charles Darwin’s work) was a significant part of late eighteenth and early
nineteenth-century science, beginning with French materialism, often associated with Julien
Offray de La Mettrie (1709-1751) and a theory of evolution (transformisme) by Jean Baptiste
Lamarck (1809). In these ways, Enlightenment science had already opened the door to the
possibilities of evolution2 and a biological relationship between humans and apes.3 Closest to

2

Anne K. Mellor reads Victor as usurping rather than confirming evolution in a “parodic” form
of “creationist theory” (101), while Marilyn Butler reads the novel as responding to the vitalist
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home for Mary Shelley were the proto-evolutionary ideas of Erasmus Darwin, explicitly named
in Percy Shelley’s preface to Frankenstein (1818), and the materialist philosophy of William
Lawrence, the Shelleys’ physician, discussed in the previous chapter.4 At this time, natural
theology (a branch of natural history conducted in the service of religion) was unwittingly
providing substantial evidence for the transmutation of species, as with the work of comparative
anatomist Georges Cuvier, whom the Shelleys read. Additionally, the Shelleys were keenly
aware of the first formal debates about animal rights and animal suffering, beginning with the
work of Jeremy Bentham in 1780 and the many early nineteenth-century vegetarian treatises,
including Percy Shelley’s, about animal suffering that insisted on animals’ similarities to humans
and urged ethical consideration given these facts.
With this particular context in view, this chapter focuses on the anxieties over the
relationship between humans and other animals that began to be theorized in late eighteenthcentury taxonomy and comparative anatomy, and which escalated in controversy throughout the
nineteenth century.5 The Creature’s creation needs to be read as a speciation event within this

debate, which she argues is a precursor of the evolutionary debate already foreshadowed by
radical French materialism at the time (404-416).
3
Linnaeus in 1735; Lord Monboddo in 1774; Erasmus Darwin in 1796; and Lamarck in 1809.
4
It is very likely that William Lawrence’s work on materialism and early evolutionary thought
had an influence on the novel, especially given his close relationship to the Shelleys as their
physician. Marilyn Butler argues for the influence of William Lawrence on Frankenstein in her
introduction to the 1818 text.
5
Anxiety about the border between humans and animals goes back to antiquity, as in figures of
human-animal-God hybrids. Derrida specifically mentions the chimera because of its
signification as an illusion, its association with hunting in mythology, and Descartes' invocation
of it. It is usually a lion, goat and snake amalgamation, signifying an illusion. For Derrida, the
chimera is our conception of the animal, reducing all species and genders of animals into one
monstrous category (41).
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early evolutionary scientific context.6 I will argue that the novel explores the “animal question”
through a focus on the core concepts of species and materiality in defining the Creature. These
concepts are extended in the novel into ontological and ethical frameworks through the concepts
of faciality and language, both of which are granted to humans, but not to other animals. In
response to these exclusions, the Creature attempts to force Victor into a violent form of
becoming-animal, but Victor clings to his rigid separation between the human and nonhuman
worlds, in which the Creature remains forever consigned to the latter. In this way, the Creature
occupies Derrida’s “Question of the Animal” which for Derrida stems from Western
philosophy’s dominant trope: the human construction of the Other as “the animal” in which we
collapse all individual animals of various species, sex, etc. into a figure set in binary opposition
to “the human.” This chapter will argue that Shelley presents a cogent deconstruction of both of
these terms through the figure of the Creature.

Part I. On the Origin of the Creature
While the novel never specifies exactly how Victor assembles and animates the
Creature, it does reveal that Victor gathers body parts that are both human and animal: “I
collected bones from charnel houses; and disturbed, with profane fingers, the tremendous
secrets of the human frame. … The dissecting room and the slaughter-house furnished many of
my materials” (38). Shelley draws this image of the scientist directly from popular culture at the
time when “surgeons acquired a reputation as corpse defilers, grave robbers, and necromancers.
As both dissectors of corpses and vivisectors of the living, surgeons threatened the integrity of

6

In his article, “The Nightmare of Evolution: H.G. Wells, Percival Lowell and the Legacies of
Frankenstein’s Science,” Robert Markley names Frankenstein as an influence on H.G. Wells’
work on evolution.
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the body” (Engelstein 61). The Murder Act of 1752 allowed for convicted murders to be
dissected for scientific purposes, but the “black market” for bodies continued, much to public
outcry, until the Anatomy Act finally was passed in 1832 to allow for the dissection of donated
bodies. Further representing the popular figure of the scientist, Victor directly refers to his own
practice of animal vivisection: “I tortured the living animal to animate the lifeless clay” (37).
Victor likely uses animals, much like a comparative anatomist (Fulford 7), to learn how to
construct and animate his creature, but Shelley’s phrasing also indicates that animal parts may
become part of the creature’s enlarged, patchwork body itself.7 Stephanie Rowe, in “Listen to
Me: Frankenstein as an Appeal to Mercy and Justice, on Behalf of Persecuted Animals”
suggests that there is likely a wide range of animals from which the larger-than-human creature
could be culled. Rowe suggests that in the slaughterhouse, there would be cows, pigs, sheep,
birds, horses, etc. and from the dissecting room: pigs, rabbits, birds, dogs, cats, and even apes
(137). The Creature’s bodily composition and vivification necessarily remain a mystery in the
novel. Here, Victor “plays” the role of natural selection, usurping nature’s processes through
scientific intervention, but he does not reveal the process for fear of its consequences. In this
way, Shelley anticipates this kind of ethical question in science and Victor becomes a protoDarwinian figure as he struggles to accept the future implications of his potentially “monstrous”
discoveries. Victor, however, is unable to cope with the actualized consequences of his
scientific practice, which is one of Shelley’s most prescient insights into the coming scientific
and social debates over Darwin’s work on evolution. Many historians of science regard the
scientific debates between Lawrence and John Abernethy (beginning in 1816) and later between
Cuvier and Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire (in 1830) as proto-evolutionary in nature; thus,
7

Both McLane in Romanticism and the Human Sciences and Mellor in Mary Shelley suggest that
the Creature has both human and animal parts.
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Shelley’s insights about the ethics of science emerge from her own time period as the
background from which Charles Darwin’s work would develop.
With this background in mind, we find in the novel that Victor begins by conceiving of
the Creature as a new species different than human, but quickly proceeds to animalize his
creation after animation. For Victor, the Creature becomes a violent predator from the moment
he becomes autonomous, whereas the Creature views himself as human and is confounded by
his treatment as if he were an animal. Victor reinforces the Creature’s liminal status from the
very beginning of the novel. Though he originally sets out to create a human, he quickly comes
to describe the Creature as part of a new and distinct species (italics added):
It was with these feelings that I began the creation of a human being. As the
minuteness of the parts formed a great hindrance to my speed, I resolved,
contrary to my first intention, to make the being of a gigantic stature; that is to
say, about eight feet in height, and proportionably large. … A new species would
bless me as its creator and source. (37)
In this way, the Creature resides, at least ontologically, if not also physically, between the human
and nonhuman. As Stephani Engelstein suggests, because of his bodily composition, the Creature
“not only defies any attempt at classification, but renders classifications nonsensical" (183).8
While the Creature is presented as a new “species,” alone of his kind (a claim which both Victor
and the Creature make), Shelley endows the Creature with all the markers of Godwinian
humanism—inherent goodness, shared needs such as love and companionship, and a capacity for
rationality, sympathy, and language—yet, he is circumscribed by his body as non-human and
8

In yet another of the novel’s tragic ironies, Victor’s desire to create a new species effectively
ends his own family line (Engelstein 215). Peter Heymans frames this fact in evolutionary terms,
noting that the blasted tree in the novel becomes a form of phylogenetic tree that represents the
extinction of the Frankenstein genetic line (118).
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animalized. The Creature thus confounds the very idea of what it means to be “human” in his
embodiment and calls attention to humanism’s own biases and exclusions. As Matthew Calarco
argues in Zoographies, “it is always one version or another of the human that falsely occupied
the space of the universal and that functions to exclude what is considered nonhuman” (10).9 The
term “species” reoccurs in the novel. As we have seen, it is Victor’s goal to create a new
“species” that will worship him, but instead the Creature declares war on humans as a “species,”
calling attention to the divides in the discourse of speciation. As a discourse, “species” was
closely linked to questions of class, nationality, race, gender, and sexuality, and came to stand for
a supposedly objective scientific truth that was then used to justify various forms of oppression
and violence.10
Yet species was not originally a scientific term. The concept of species originated in
Plato’s Forms or Ideas (εἶδος, eidos/eidē); thus, species was originally a metaphysical ideal, not a
physical or material one. Aristotle linked species to essence (Latin essentiae), what he called the
“what-it-is-to-be” (to ti ên einai, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι). Aristotle used this concept of species in
conjunction with the broader term genus (γένος) as forms of logic in the categorization of both
the metaphysical and physical worlds (Wilkins and Doak 11). The original metaphysical
conception of “species” arguably influenced the typological classification of biological species in

9

Derrida likewise critiques the concept of humanism and is dismissive of the association of the
human with the ethical, as in the term “humane,” noting that “imperialism, acting in the name of
human rights and the humanity of man, excludes men and humanity and imposes on men
inhuman treatments. Treats them like beasts” (73). In this vein, Allan Hunter argues that the
novel emphasizes anxieties over science and technology, particularly in terms of the power of
evolution in which a new species could supplant humanity. The Creature’s “humane” nature is
not enough to qualify him as human, exposing the prejudice that undercuts humanist ideals.
10
For a history of scientific racism during the time period of the novel, see Anne K. Mellor’s
“Frankenstein, Racial Science, and the Yellow Peril” and Robert Sawyer’s “Mary Shelley and
Shakespeare: Monstrous Creations.”
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pre-Darwinian natural history in which species came to be seen as a series of variants from an
original ideal form. This Neo-Platonism and Aristotelian logic is likewise evident in the work of
Linnaeus and Cuvier in their biological classification systems (2), thus we find direct influences
in the evolution of the idea of species: “Aristotelian categories strongly influenced the NeoPlatonists, who in turn influenced the medieval scholastics from whom Linnaeus drew his
ranking categories” (28). Originally species was a term that could be applied to any classification
of objects, but with the rise of science in the seventeenth century it was increasingly associated
with the study of biology (9) as “[f]rom Linnaeus to Darwin, there was an increasing emphasis
on empirical rather than a priori classification” (3). In the seventeenth century, in particular,
“species” was used to mean “[t]he image of something as cast upon, or reflected from, a surface;
a reflection” and “[a] thing seen; a spectacle; esp. an unreal or imaginary object of sight; a
phantom or illusion” (“species”). Species, then, was never a stable or fixed identity, but rather an
appearance. John Locke recognized this, extending Aristotle’s concepts into “real” and
“nominal” essences, in which the Platonic concept of species was only possible nominally. In
this way, the Creature embodies the etymological multiplicity of the word “species” itself at a
time when it was becoming central to scientific discourse. Thus a speciation event is both a
continuity and a difference; it is this inherent duality of evolution that rigid categorization seeks
to deny and repress. Species moved away from the concept of “essence” after Darwin (Wilkins
and Doak 1-6); for Darwin, species was not a stable category but rather a statistical abstraction
that he defined as “one arbitrarily given for the sake of convenience to a set of individuals
closely resembling each other” (Origin 52). Perhaps surprisingly, the definition of “species” is
not settled even in present-day biology. For example, geneticist Jody Hey claimed in 2001 that
“species are merely conventional objects used for communication, a reinvention in some respects
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of John Locke’s earlier conventionalism” (Wilkins and Doak 7). The debate over the scientific
definition of “species” continues in current biology with arguments for different “species
concepts” by which to classify species (198). “Species” then, despite the modern synthesis,
remains at least in part a heuristic device following its original Platonic connotation.
By marking the Creature as a separate species, Victor consistently denies the Creature
entrance into the definition of the human through the language of animalization. After Victor’s
first glimpse of his Creature after his abandonment, he debates, “Besides, the strange nature of
the animal would elude all pursuit … Besides, of what use would be pursuit?” (51). Notably, in
this rhetoric of pursuit, Victor refers to the Creature as an animal--the only time he will do so
directly in the novel. Toward the end of the novel, when Victor attempts to convince the
magistrate to pursue the Creature, he again employs the language of animals and hunting: “if he
has indeed taken refuge in the Alps, he may be hunted like the chamois, and destroyed as a beast
of prey” (153). Likewise, the scenes surrounding William’s murder call this same animalization
into question. William conceives of the Creature as an animal, terrified of his physical
appearance, even as the Creature insists that he has no intention of hurting him. The Creature is
caught between the visual and the verbal: “monster! ugly wretch! you wish to eat me, and tear
me to pieces” (106). The fear of being devoured and dismembered here calls attention to the
Creature as a predator, reiterating Victor’s animalized rhetoric of hunting and prey.
Victor reinforces his human authority over the Creature through the competing languages
of animalization and humanization. He refers to the Creature in subtly animalized terms during
his first encounter with him after the murder of William: “Do not you fear the fierce vengeance
of my arm wreaked on your miserable head? Begone, vile insect! or rather stay, that I may
trample you to dust!” (74). Janelle Schwartz reads this as Victor’s attempt to (literally) belittle
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the Creature in order to restore a sense of a sense of human superiority that his experiment
usurped (179-80). Victor’s rhetoric is viscerally violent as he threatens the Creature. By the end
of the novel, the Creature will refer to himself as “trampled on,” (169) underscoring the violence
done against his person. The reference to an insect recalls but inverts Victor’s early description
of Elizabeth as “playful as a summer insect” with eyes “as lively as a bird’s” (23), both of which
highlight Elizabeth’s association with fragility and the air. He further refers to her as like “a
favourite animal” (23).11 Here, both the Creature and Elizabeth are associated with animals and
the natural world, over which Victor claims human and male dominion.12 Internalizing Victor’s
rhetoric, the Creature describes his own emotional anguish as animalized: “I gave vent to my
anguish in fearful howlings. I was like a wild beast” (101).
Further underscoring Victor’s positioning of the Creature as animal rather than human is
his insistence that the Creature “fly from the habitations of man, to dwell in those wilds where
the beasts of the field will be your only companions” (109). Victor’s proscriptions reflect his
sense of the Creature’s liminal status between human and animal as a threat and his consequent
attempts to consign the Creature to the latter. The phrase “the beasts of the field” is a Biblical
one that recurs at least six times in the Hebrew scriptures. Of these, the most significant is in
Isaiah 56:9, “Come, all you beasts of the field, / come and devour, all you beasts of the forest!”
(Revised Standard Version). This particular passage is often titled “God’s Accusation Against the
Wicked” and it casts the physical degradation of a dead body by animals as a sign of God's
curse.13 Victor, then, likely alludes here to his sense of himself as a god-like figure who doles out

11

See Joseph Campana on the aesthetics of insects in “The Bee and the Sovereign? Political
Entomology and the Problem of Scale” (94-113).
12
In the 1831 edition, he calls her “a distinct species” (191).
13
There are several other instances of this type of Biblical curse: 1 Samuel 17:44-47; 1 Kings
21:23; and Revelation 19:17-18.
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salvation and damnation—a role the Creature explicitly ascribes to him (following his reading of
Paradise Lost). Victor then symbolically expels the Creature from Paradise, from a Westernized
human identity, as he links the Creature’s animality and body to the curse of the “wicked.” The
Creature’s supposed geographic expulsion is also an ontological one, in which he, like the
Hebrew figure of the scapegoat, is set forth into the wilderness symbolically endowed with the
concept of sin.

Part II. Monstrous Materiality
Critics have long explored notions of the Creature as both monstrous and uncanny, yet
little work has been done to connect these descriptors to the concept of species.14 In the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, monstrosity was tied to theories of transmutation which
could produce “monstrous” hybrids. The etymology of “monster,” a frequent epithet for the
Creature,15 is linked to the same root as in demonstrate, the French root of monstre meaning to
show (something that might otherwise be hidden)16 or an uncovering of what is beneath. In
classical Latin mōnstrum signified portent, with the base of monēre, meaning to warn, and
monstrare, meaning to exhibit (“monster”).17 This idea of uncovering the hidden is likewise
present in the root of the word species, specĕre, meaning to look (“species”).18These terms thus

14

See Heyman and Engelstein for further discussion of this.
The term “monstrosities” was not replaced in scientific discourse with “abnormalities” until
1835 (Engelstein 3). What became known as “teratology” formalized the study of birth defects
(Cooper 88).
16
See Engelstein (215); Freeman (27); and Dutoit (851), who discusses how both Foucault and
Derrida associate monstrosity with spectacle (847).
17
These definitions of monster have a long history. See, for example, studies by David Williams
and Katherine Park.
18
17th century definition of species: “The image of something as cast upon, or reflected from, a
surface; a reflection. Obs. A thing seen; a spectacle; esp. an unreal or imaginary object of sight; a
phantom or illusion. Obs. Zool. and Bot. 1608,” applied to humans in 1711 (“species”).
15
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center on the concept of uncovering something through the visual, which is likewise fundamental
to the uncanny. Freud defined the uncanny in response to Schelling's conception of "everything
that ought to have remained ... hidden and secret and has become visible” (132).19 The creature is
deemed “monstrous” in part because his very embodiment forces an uncanny recognition of the
human kinship with animals and the material world because he is a new species created from
entirely material processes.
The rhetoric of monstrosity is focalized through Victor’s perception of his creation.
Victor alternates epithets for the Creature, but he is referred to as a monster 32 times in the 1818
edition. In the novel, the creature becomes a monster, at least to Victor, immediately upon his
animation, but the Creature’s identity is never fixed ontologically or linguistically. Victor
alternates between the terms “creature” and “monster,” sometimes even in the same few lines, “I
then reflected, and the thought made me shiver, that the creature whom I had left in my
apartment might still be there, alive, and walking about. I dreaded to behold this monster” (42).
Notably here, Victor conceives of the creature as a monster even before the creature has
committed any crimes. The term “creature” occurs 68 times in the novel and is used in reference
to most of the human characters in the text, not only the creature, often as a sign of affection.
Shelley’s use of “creature” to describe all of the human characters signifies their link to each
other, as well as more implicitly Victor’s to the Creature himself.20 In the absence of a proper
name, the Creature is frequently referred to in criticism as such or as “the monster” or
“Frankenstein’s monster,” yet these latter designations focalize the novel through Victor’s
perspective. The closest moment to a form of naming is when Victor states upon the Creature’s

19

For other readings of the Creature as uncanny, see Heymans 122 and Collings’s concept of the
Creature as the “political uncanny” (22).
20
I will discuss Shelley’s use of the related term “fellow-creature” later in this chapter.
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animation, “I saw the dull yellow eye of the creature open” (39).21 The term underscores the
creature’s liminal status and recalls attention to his position as something created, and thus to his
material existence.
Monstrosity became closely connected to debates about the evolution and definition of
species in Shelley’s time. The traditional definition of “monster” is associated with both
animality and hybridity: “a mythical creature which is part animal and part human, or combines
elements of two or more animal forms, and is frequently of great size and ferocious appearance”
(“monster”). In the Middle Ages, Pliny the Elder distinguished different definitions of monsters,
which were characterized by their uniqueness: “They were monsters not so much because they
were deformed, but because they were rare and extraordinary. From this point of view, a monster
was a curiosity, a portent, an unusual sight” (Blakemore and Jennett). By the Renaissance,
however, the study of anatomy began to challenge the amorphous definitions of “monster”
leading toward an emphasis on physical deformity, meaning “disfigured person” or “misshapen
being” (Blakemore and Jennett). This gave rise to teratology, the study of physical abnormalities,
from the Greek teras, meaning sign or warning. In her chapter on teratology, Melinda Cooper
notes that the “monstrous” was frightening because it was “a demonstration of nature’s
unfathomable and always surprising possibilities of self-transformation, metamorphosis, and
transmutation” (88). In this way, monstrosity is clearly linked to fears about evolution and the
power of materiality. This is evident in Geoffroy’s theory of monstrosity, which was in direct
conflict with Cuvier’s more rigid classification system. In Geoffroy’s work, there was “no
preordained typology of forms in nature,” which anticipates evolutionary theory (90-91). In his
1832 Traité de Teratologie, he even suggested that the word “monster” be eliminated as a
21

I have chosen to capitalize Creature to designate a proper name for the character in the absence
of one.
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description of physical deformity (Blakemore and Jennett), which implies a rejection of the
stigma of “monstrosity” that Shelley likewise explores in Frankenstein.
By the nineteenth century, there was a marked “transition from the understanding of
monsters as beings ‘from outside’ to seeing them as ‘deviations from within’” (Blakemore and
Jennett).22 Monsters had typically symbolized “punishment for sin or the fecundity and diversity
of creation,” which of course are related subjects (Browne) and the Creature embodies both for
Victor. Biologically, “monsters” were the products of mutations usually via sexual reproduction;
hence, the (continued) backlash to Darwin’s “monstrous” discovery: random chance governs the
changes from one form to the next. This “monstrous” mutation is at the very heart of all
existence; thus, we are all “monstrous” in the biological sense.23 Though Darwin’s work could
not originally include a synthesis with Mendelian genetics, his work cannot be separated from
the fear of monstrosity as biological. This anxiety over sexual reproduction offers us another way
in which to read Victor’s dream in which Elizabeth becomes his mother Caroline. Not only does
Caroline reproduce herself asexually in the form of Elizabeth both domestically and in Victor’s
dream (Engelstein 204), but the intermixture of mother/lover clearly reveals Victor’s fears of
sexual reproduction as potentially “monstrous” in its production of a new being. That Victor
produces his creature asexually reinforces this fear and suggests that his “sin” is to usurp nature’s
own processes, as both Bate and Mellor call attention to.
Yet, the novel complicates the binary of artificial/natural since nature’s own processes
are themselves potentially “monstrous” in transmutation. Indeed, the fear of viable hybridization
22

Even into the later nineteenth century, monstrosity remained linked to hybridity in the popular
imagination, as in an 1881 Harper’s article detailing mythical plant-human, animal-human, and
plant-animal hybrids as “monsters,” which speaks to the ongoing debates over Darwin’s work at
the time (Moncure D. Conway, Harper’s, pp. 97-106 Dec. 1881).
23
Darwin was interested in explicit “aberrations and variations” including “pigeon squabs” and
“abortive plants” (Browne).
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was central to concerns about the mutability of species because it allowed for the possibility of
entirely new species. Many naturalists and philosophers opposed to transmutation thus asserted
that all hybrids were sterile, as in the case of mules.24 Linnaeus, for example, was originally
opposed to the idea of the transmutation, in part based on his belief that “a deformity violated the
natural plan. Monsters, in his view, could not replicate themselves” (Browne). But after
extensive work with hybridized plants25 and by the twelfth edition of Systema Naturae (1766), he
reconsidered his positions (a fact often forgotten). Linnaeus’s contemporary, Baron d’Holbach (a
significant influence on Percy Shelley as we saw in the last chapter), on the other hand, fully
accepted the role of hybridity in species transmutation (Bowler 80). In this way, “monstrosity”
was closely linked to the possibilities of transmutation.
Through this rigid separation between the human and animal worlds, Victor adopts a
Cartesian attitude toward the Creature as a kind of animal. In Derrida’s words, Descartes (like
Victor) proclaims "The animal that I am not" (73). Descartes rejects the idea of humans as
rational animals in favor of the human as “a thing that thinks,” preferring “thing” to “animal.”
For Descartes, animals are automatons that only appear to have characteristics similar to
humans, such as emotions. Victor adopts this Cartesian attitude toward the Creature whenever
the Creature claims to be human. Descartes, like Victor, is haunted by his dreams, in which his
anxieties over the borders of the human permeate his meditations. Descartes’ mind/body dualism
directly informs Victor's failure to recognize the creature’s embodiment until it is animated—
prior to this moment, the Creature, to Victor, is only an idea that exists in his mind’s eye. To

24

Both Oliver Goldsmith in Brooke's Natural History (1763) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau in
Émile (1762) make this claim.
25
Breck’s “New Book of Flowers” “warned readers… to avoid growing hybrids that defy
classification and become ‘monsters’” (Farr 166).
  

91
recognize the animal as subject rather than object, and to recognize the animal as human and the
human as animal is the source of Victor’s terror that causes him to flee his creation.
The moment of the Creature’s animation thus is central to understanding his liminal
identity between human and animal. David Collings’ Lacanian reading of the Creature’s face
upon animation underscores the Creature’s transition to animate. For Collings, “the horror of
those eyes is that they appear to be objects even though the creature opens them on his own …
the creature derives its uncanniness in part from this capacity, despite his status as a visual
object, to look back” (208). Collings’ emphasis on the eyes here recalls the root of the word
species, meaning to look. The Creature is conceived of not as “a person like Victor himself, but a
demonstration model, a successful laboratory experiment” (200), but the Creature demonstrates
the falsity of this binary as his embodied duality of object-become-subject undoes those very
distinctions (207). In Lacanian terms, the mirror stage occurs when “an organism that
experienced itself as an incoherent amalgam of various impulses, sensations, and drives
recognizes itself … as a single and coherent body” (207). In the case of the Creature, “the mirror
stage does not confirm the integrity of the body but reveals the fragmented reality of the body
that underlies its fictive coherence” (207). The Creature thus exposes the body, whether human
or animal, as an assemblage. For Collings, the consequence of this is an “unraveling the very
idea of the human” (207) and Heymans echoes this consequence, in which Victor’s
“anthropocentric procedures of dualisation and marginalisation […] turn against himself” in the
figure of the Creature (129). The Creature’s liminal status thus shatters the very categories
between which Victor positions him.
This anxiety over the borders between species is evident everywhere in Frankenstein, as
Victor disavows any connection to the Creature who comes to embody the materiality of the
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human form, exposed in its similarities to both animals and machines. When Victor proclaims
his horror at the creature’s animation, he specifically calls attention to how “His yellow skin
scarcely covered the work of muscles and arteries beneath” (39). As this famous passage
indicates, the novel pays close attention to the materiality of the Creature’s body. The creature
exposes the body, all bodies, as a Deleuzian assemblage, an amalgamation of various materiality
and movements, that renders Cartesian dualism a fantasy (Deleuze and Guattari 8).26 In Anxious
Anatomy, Stefani Engelstein argues that the scientific debates of the nineteenth century centered
on anxiety over the “instrumentality of the body, with its suggestion of a materially imposed
teleology” (17); thus, “The human body that emerged from these debates manifests a series of
threatening contradictions” (9):
Once the body is formulated as an amalgam of organ systems, each of which
plays a specific role in the body, then the body itself can no longer be seen as the
smallest meaningful organic unit. A body, moreover, that fits neatly into the
animal kingdom as part of an orderly system of classification, and that functions
as part of its ecological environment, is no longer the largest meaningful organic
unit. At this point, the body ceases to belong to an individual whose rational
control it serves and becomes an assemblage with a multitude of purposes or
drives of its own that threaten to usurp the identity of the human. (2)
It is precisely this anxiety that the Creature evokes, particularly in the exposure of the material
“machinery” beneath his face.27 The Creature with his exposed and non-conforming body

26

The French term for assemblage, agencements, carries with it the sense of nonhuman “agency”
that is at the heart of new materialism.
27
In her essay on anti-vivisections movements in the 1820s, Anita Guerrini references the debate
between Charles Bell and François Magendie on the role of vivisection in understanding the
physiology of sensation. Bell’s work on the muscles and nerves of the face was religious in
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violates the supposed difference between humans and other animals. His existence forces a
“recognition of oneself not as an integral totality, but as a system of organs and a part of a system
of individuals” (217). Thus, Rowe claims that in the Creature’s moment of animation, “the
aggregation of the creature’s multiplicity into a single being becomes monstrous” (138) because
it exposes the various parts that constitute the whole, thereby recognizing a multiplicity that
undermines the individual.
The emphasis on the body as a series of systems of interconnection draws from both
ecological and evolutionary interdependence. In The Aesthetics of Species, Peter Heymans
directly relates Frankenstein to fears about evolution, describing the creature’s physical traits as
an “aesthetic shock” that exposes the body as material. He reads Victor’s “panic-stricken
abandonment of the Monster” as symbolic of “many Romantics refusal to accept evolutionary
theory in the flesh” (2). Engelstein relates Victor’s flight to Descartes in The Passions of the
Soul, where he describes how flight from a frightening creature shows a form of instinct and
suggests that fear results from “a close relation to things which have been previously harmful to
the body” (Engelstein 189; Descartes 342). The Creature’s representation as the material
vulnerability of the body—the very principle which his creation was meant to supersede—thus
causes every character in the novel a sense of horror in response.28 In this way, Janelle Schwartz
reads the novel as “a fully realized account of nature’s kinetic materiality” (153) in which the
Creature is “an exaggerated artifice of the role of decomposition in nature’s organic cycle” and
thereby a kind of “monstrosity” inherent within nature itself (154).

nature and inspired Darwin’s refutation in his M and N notebooks. In light of this historical
context, Guerrini focuses not on the Creature’s eyes, but his mouth: “The creature’s attempt to
smile - a peculiarly human trait – is especially grotesque [to Victor], and underlines his
ambiguous status between human and animal” (74).
28
For all the characters’ reactions to the Creature’s face/body, see Dutoit 853-4.
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This deep fear of materiality was (and is) at the center of controversies over evolution. In
the appendix to The Endurance of Frankenstein, the editors trace a brief history of half-human
monsters, drawn from Aldous Huxley’s Man’s Place in Nature (1863) about the evolutionary
relationship between humans and apes. Though this text was published after Frankenstein,
Huxley’s description of the homology between humans and apes is resonant with Victor’s horror
upon the animation of his Creature: “brought face to face with blurred copies of himself, the least
thoughtful of men is conscious of a certain shock, due perhaps, not so much to disgust at the
aspect of what looks like an insulting caricature, as to the awakening of a sudden and profound
mistrust of time-honoured theories and strong-rooted prejudices regarding his own position in
nature, and his relations to the under-world of life” (Huxley 80-81; Levine and Knoepflmacher
321-22). The editors argue that Victor’s denial of the Creature’s relation to humanity would no
longer be possible in a post-Darwinian world (322).
The Creature himself employs a similar rhetoric to Huxley’s in his exhortations to Victor
to acknowledge their relation. He cries, “my form is a filthy type of yours, more horrid from its
very resemblance” (97). The Creature’s resemblance to humanity makes his exclusion from it all
the more painful. Here, the Creature borrows the concept of typology from both Biblical
scholarship and natural theology to claim his relation to Victor, describing himself as a “type” of
the human form.29 Nineteenth-century typology derived from natural theology, which linked
humans to animals through homologous forms, though these similarities were read as evidence
of a single creator rather than as evolutionary kinship. Natural theology borrowed this concept
from Christian typology in which figures from the Hebrew scriptures were read as prophecies
(types) of Christ. In keeping with the latter, the Creature constantly looks to Victor to be his

29

  

For an overview of both types of typology, see Chapter 4 on Ralph Waldo Emerson.
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creator and savior,30 but Victor is unwilling to accept this role, casting himself in the same dual
positions that the Creature claims: Adam and Satan. The Creature attempts to understand himself
in terms of the human and divine, but Victor repeatedly consigns him to the animal and material
worlds in an attempt to keep these realms rigidly apart even as the Creature’s very existence
contradicts this fact.
The Creature’s liminality, particularly in his association with materiality, is judged both
socially and aesthetically as “monstrous.” Following de Man, Heymans argues that “For the
Romantics the aesthetic was not only the site where political bias was naturalized into biological
truth, but how it was also a deeply moral place where one’s supposedly intuitive perceptions of
reality were exposed as cultural productions of social inculcation and habit formation” (1). This
concept is reinforced through the novel’s concentration on the word “filth.” The Creature’s
association with “filth” builds from Victor’s initial rejection of the Creature as violating an
aesthetics of beauty that is both euro- and anthropocentric. This kind of rhetoric that links human
and Western domination over nature is all too prevalent in the time period, even in Coleridge,
who comments, “As Man, so the world he inhabits. It is his business and duty to possess it and
rule it, to assimilate it to his highest nature. If instead of this, he suffers to become possessed,
ruled and assimilated by it, who, like the African negro or South American savage is a mischief
to man even by the neglect of his function as a Man. The neglected earth steams up poisons that
travel” (“Semina rerum” 152). In this context, the Creature’s willingness to go to South America

30

Dutoit suggests the Creature rather than Victor is associated with God (858). Similarly, Mellor
discusses the Creature as the sublime (131).
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characterizes his decision to acquiesce to Victor’s perception of him as animalized and
nonhuman.31
In this way, the Creature is characterized by Victor aesthetically and morally as a
degenerated form of the human that has become an animalized “savage.” This categorization is
reinforced through the recurrent use of the term “filth,” which is associated with both animality
and materiality. The Creature himself internalizes this, describing himself, as has already been
noted as “a filthy type of yours, more horrid from its very resemblance” (97). Here, the Creature
identifies the species boundary, viewing himself as a mutated form. Victor directly links filth to
animality in his nightmare while assembling the female creature in which he is haunted by “a
multitude of filthy animals inflicting on me incessant torture” (111) in yet another of the novel’s
inversions, since it is, of course, Victor who tortures animals in this quest for scientific
knowledge. Victor’s workshop filled with body parts from the “dissecting room and the
slaughter-house” is thus one of “filthy creation” and he describes his work as “a filthy process in
which I was engaged” (127). Victor carries this sense of filth into his first sighting of the
Creature outside of that space: “it was the wretch, the filthy dæmon to whom I had given life”
(54). Even when Victor begins to feel compassion for the Creature, it quickly turns to disgust
when he sees “the filthy mass that moved and talked” (110). The Creature here is objectified not
even as animal, but as an assemblage of parts for whom there can be no form of intersubjectivity.
The association of filth with animality originates from the conception of pollution of a
pure form,32i.e. the animal as a polluted or lesser form of the human, which is linked to death as
a form of corruption to which humans and other animals are subject. Though the Creature
31

See Heymans, who links the concepts of animality and species to the Romantics’
understanding of the sublime, the beautiful and the ugly (1).
32
We find this same discourse of purity and pollution in the pseudoscience of race in the time
period, in which marginalized others were often animalized as a way of denying their humanity.
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attempts to resist humans’ characterizations of him as a “monster,” by the end of the novel he
reiterates Victor’s language in which he has become “[p]olluted by crimes” (170). Filth and
pollution carry significant weight in cultural constructions of identity and community, as Mary
Douglas demonstrates in her well-known study Purity and Danger: an analysis of the concepts
of pollution and taboo (1966). For Douglas, purity and pollution are representative of
perceptions of order and disorder: “to be holy is to be whole, to be one; holiness is unity,
integrity, perfection of the individual and of the kind” (53) and thus “Purity is the enemy of
change, of ambiguity and compromise” (162). The Creature clearly violates this taboo. Douglas
shows how many cultures associate pollution with marginalized groups whose identity is
considered unstable and therefore dangerous: “Danger lies in transitional states, simply because
transition is neither one state nor the next, it is undefinable” (96). Pollution is only possible when
there are rigid categories that can then possibly intermix: “pollution powers … punish a symbolic
breaking of that which should be joined or joining of that which should be separate. It follows
from this that pollution is a type of danger which is not likely to occur except where the lines of
structure, cosmic or social, are clearly defined” (113). The Creature thus is demarcated as
dangerous because his very embodiment joins the human and the animal, and connects the
human to the material world.
The Creature’s bodily composition violates both the distinction of human from animal
and the integrity of the individual. Douglas argues that we “see in the body a symbol of society,
and to see the powers and dangers credited to social structure reproduced in small on the human
body” (115). As has already been discussed, the body, with the discovery of its component parts,
became a model for society in the nineteenth century: “This epoch [around 1800] invested not
only the body itself, but also the natural sciences that evolved to study it, with the weighty
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expectation that they answer questions of human identity, social organization, and ethical
behavior” (Engelstein 1). It is thus the Creature’s body and its supposed disorder that marks him
as monstrous and dangerous. In this vein, Douglas directly links bodily and ideological
vulnerability: “Why should bodily margins be thought to be specially invested with power and
danger? … all margins are dangerous” (121). Bodily margins are considered particularly
dangerous in this sense at both a literal level, as a possible site of intermixture, potentially of
infection/penetration, and at the symbolic level of what they represent about order and the
integrity of the whole. In “The Abominations of Leviticus,” Douglas shows how unclean animals
are usually labeled as such because they violate a sense of wholeness and order. They are related
to “Any class of creatures which is not equipped for the right kind of locomotion in its element,”
such as many animals “whose forefeet are uncannily hand-like” (56). Another example is the
snake and she discusses whether the word sherec should be translated as swarms or creeps, but
she identifies both as “an indeterminate form of movement” (56).33 It is the ambiguity, the
intermixture of a motion better suited to water than to land, that makes the snake “unclean.” She
further links the swarm to death and chaos, “The prototype and model of the swarming things is
the worm. As fish belong in the sea so worms belong in the realms of the grave, with death and
chaos” (56).34 The Creature’s body then is perceived by Victor as “filthy” or “unclean” because
of its associations with both multiplicity and death, thus Victor views this pollution of the body
and identity as a kind of corruption associated with death. He employs the word “corruption”
three times in his descriptions of the reason behind his undertaking (35, 37). The symbol of this

33

The Creature refers to himself as a snake in the highly Biblically allegorized exchange with
Victor about revenge, right before the “wedding-night” threat and both characters imply the
association of the devil with the snake from Genesis (130).
34
As previously noted, the intermixing of animals as morally wrong dates back to antiquity,
especially the figure of the chimera.
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“unjust corruption” that drags the human down to the level of the animal and material is the
figure of the grave-worm that feeds on the dead bodies of humans.35 Victor asks, “how many
brides and youthful lovers have been one day in the bloom of health and hope, and the next a
prey for worms and the decay of the tomb!” (137). For him, the horror is due to the transitional
state from a human identity supposedly above nature to the figure of the human literally and
figuratively beneath nature in the grave: “from being the seat of beauty and strength, had become
food for the worm. … I saw how the worm inherited the wonders of the eye and brain” (35). In
this instance, Heymans reads the grave worms as representing the horror at materiality and notes
that an early review of Erasmus Darwin’s work rejected this kind of materialism on the grounds
that the future state for man then would have to be only “in the form of worms or maggots”
(181). Much as Victor is haunted by “filthy animals” in his experiments, he is likewise haunted
by grave-worms: “I thought that I held the corpse of my dead mother36 in my arms; a shroud
enveloped her form, and I saw the grave-worms crawling in the folds of the flannel” (40).37 The
worms recall the Creature’s reference to humans as experiencing “the lowest degradation, a
condition more abject than that of the blind mole or harmless worm” (89) which inverts the
hierarchy of human over animal. The Creature thus becomes the figure of the grave-worm, a
35

See Schwartz’s Worm Work: Recasting Romanticism.
Several critics have analyzed this scene in ways that are relevant to my argument here about
the association of animality with death. Victor internalizes the exchange of life and death
between his mother Caroline and Elizabeth, which is then symbolized in his nightmare (Schwartz
174). Essentially, Caroline is able to reproduce herself non-sexually through Elizabeth
(Engelstein 204). It is this same inversion that the grave worms come to represent. While they
upend a supposedly natural hierarchy, they also reflect the possibility for renewal within decay
(Schwartz 166). Victor and the Creature come to embody the same position as the worms as
purveyors of both destruction and generation (Schwartz 187).
37
The only other reference to a worm in the novel is metaphorical in which Victor conceives of
his misery as like a worm in his heart, “But I, the true murderer, felt the never-dying worm alive
in my bosom, which allowed of no hope or consolation” (63). Victor’s conception of the worm
alive inside of him, even as a metaphor, signals the very materiality that the other references to
worms evoke.
36
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representative of the natural forces that Victor set out to reverse in his creation. The creature’s
very body is a memento mori, a haunting reminder of the materiality of the body in death. While
meant to overcome material boundaries, the Creature only further reinforces them.
In this vein, there are clear parallels between Victor and the Creature and the later
characters of Jekyll and Hyde in Robert Louis Stevenson’s novella. Both texts use the gothic
convention of doubleness and haunting, but more importantly share an emphasis on faciality and
the nonhuman. Stevenson’s story often is read in relation to anxieties over Charles Darwin’s
theories;38 Shelley’s text is not only a gothic forerunner to Stevenson’s, but a proto-Darwinian
one as well. Stevenson’s description of Jekyll’s relation to Hyde arguably articulates something
Victor identities but never fully makes explicit: “And certainly the hate that now divided them
was equal on each side. With Jekyll, it was a thing of vital instinct. He had now seen the full
deformity of that creature that shared with him some of the phenomena of consciousness, and
was co-heir with him to death: and beyond these links of community, which in themselves made
the most poignant part of his distress, he thought of Hyde, for all his energy of life, as of
something not only hellish but inorganic” (106). Thus, Hyde, like the Creature, is animalized and
associated with non-human materiality.

Part III. Ethics and Exclusions
Victor’s associations of the Creature with animality and materiality function to exclude
the Creature from fellowship or kinship with humans. Victor repeatedly denies the Creature the
classic markers of humanity—rationality, thought, language, etc.—in order to exclude him from
ethical consideration. The Creature is animalized as wholly body, existing outside of language,
38

See, for example, Jay Bland’s The generation of Edward Hyde: the animal within, from Plato
to Darwin to Robert Louis Stevenson.
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including naming. As body, he is even denied the concept of a face. This is perhaps not
surprising given the association of humanity’s unique expressivity of the face, particularly the
eyes and mouth as parts associated with thought and speech, as well as character and feeling.
Throughout the novel, the Creature frames his isolation in terms of a lack of others like
him. The term “fellow” (in French, the same word for “similar,” semblable) occurs in several
compound and hyphenate permutations in the novel; it deserves more scrutiny not only because
of its frequent use, but its relation to a system of ethics. In Lacanian terms, what makes a human
cruel is an aggression against “a fellow that it is targeting, even in a being of another species”
(Derrida 105) and Lacan points out that “even the carnivores recoil in horror” from human
cruelty. Despite Lacan’s direct reference to other species, Derrida argues that animals are
excluded from Lacan’s ethical sense of “fellow,” [semblable] (107-8); they become the
“‘unrecognizable’ and therefore the non-fellow [le dissemblable],” that which is dissimilar and
therefore does not enter into the discourse of ethics (108).39 In Frankenstein, the association of
the term “fellow” with a sense of ethics is pervasive. Victor describes William and Justine as his
“fellow-beings” whose murderer must be brought to justice, just as Elizabeth comes to Justine’s
defense because she is a “fellow-creature” in need (60). In contrast, Victor consistently excludes
the Creature from his sense of “fellows” and thereby refuses to consider his actions toward the
Creature in terms of ethics. Victor repeatedly isolates himself from his fellows: In Ingolstadt,
“Study had before secluded me from the intercourse of my fellow-creatures, and rendered me
unsocial” (49), and with Clerval in Britain, “I feared to wander from the sight of my fellowcreatures, lest when alone he should come to claim his companion” (127).

39

  

See Calarco for an attempt to recuperate a Lacanian ethics for animals.
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The Creature likewise employs the discourse of “fellow” in terms of a system of ethics.
He begins life by identifying humans as his fellows: “I had begun life with benevolent intentions,
and thirsted for the moment when I should put them in practice, and make myself useful to my
fellow-beings” (67). The Creature then learns about the violent nature of humanity for which he
laments: “For a long time I could not conceive how one man could go forth to murder his fellow
[...] I learned that the possessions most esteemed by your fellow-creatures were, high and
unsullied descent united with riches” (89). This marks a shift from the personal pronoun “my” to
the second person “your” that the Creature will repeat to Victor throughout the text as he realizes
his exclusion from a human system of ethics: “You, my creator, abhor me; what hope can I
gather from your fellow-creatures, who owe me nothing? … These bleak skies I hail, for they are
kinder to me than your fellow-beings” and “On you it rests, whether I quit for ever the
neighbourhood of man, and lead a harmless life, or become the scourge of your fellow-creatures,
and the author of your own speedy ruin” (75).40 In both of these passages, the Creature distances
himself from humanity, highlighting his exclusion from human ethical consideration.
Victor's primary failure is his inability to recognize his own kinship with the creature as
both filial and biological.41 In denying any humanity to the Creature, Victor refuses to examine
the construction of “humanity,” clinging instead to a speciesist and specious form of morality
that includes only certain humans and does not apply to other animals.42 He repeats this error

40

The Creature likewise claims, “Satan had his companions, fellow-devils, to admire and
encourage him; but I am solitary and detested.” and in meeting DeLacey, “‘Excellent man! I
thank you, and accept your generous offer. You raise me from the dust by this kindness; and I
trust that, by your aid, I shall not be driven from the society and sympathy of your fellowcreatures”(100).
41
While the concept of “kin” can be dated back to antiquity, the term “kinship” only became
prevalent in cultural anthropology in the second half of the 19th century (“kin” and “kinship”).
42
Midgley notes that the neologism of “speciesism” is an attempt to place animals within the
same context as other marginalized groups where discrimination against them is labeled as
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throughout the text, culminating in his decision to destroy the female creature in the pivotal
scene of the novel. Victor cites his ethical motive as valuing humans as his "fellow-creatures"
over a potential new “race of devils” (128). “Fellow-creatures” is a unique compound noun
meaning “A production of the same Creator … applied only to human beings and (less
frequently) animals” (“fellow-creature”). Even within this very definition, we find confusion
over human/animal boundaries. Ironically, this term was first used in English to describe herbs
and plants as connected to humans in the seventeenth century by Edward Herbert, the elder
brother of the poet George Herbert.43 Edward Herbert was a metaphysical deist whose works
were read by Hume and banned by the Catholic church.44 Herbert’s vision of nature rests on a
harmony that came from a divinity infused into all of material nature, hence his use of the term
as he praises the study of botany as to “know the nature of‘ all herbs and plants, being our
fellow-creatures, and made for the use of man (Herbert 62). Coleridge employs the term in his
periodical The Friend (1809-10) in his essay “Virtue and Knowledge.” Notably, this essay opens
with a comparison of the necessary evils of nature, such as plague and disease, in comparison to
the unnecessary evils of vice. Coleridge references the ravages of plague in order to venerate the
inoculation research of Edward Jenner: “Virtue would not be virtue, could it be given by one
fellow-creature to another” (99). Coleridge’s use here is significantly more anthropocentric than
Edward Hebert’s as it falls within the essay’s context of what Coleridge sees as the human need

sexism, racism, etc. “This is the first large-scale attempt to extend liberal concepts to the borders
of sentience” (65). She later explores its differences with racism, arguing that while species can
be a meaningful category biologically, race is not (98). Yet, as Heymans points out, Darwin
viewed species as an arbitrary form of classification (3).
43
Derrida's use of the French word for fellow (semblable) shares the root with assemblage,
further underscoring the plurality of connection in this term.
44
Herbert’s autobiography was first printed by Horace Walpole in 1764.
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to wage “a systematic war against the evils of nature” (102),45 which is echoed in Victor’s desire
to overcome death in his creation of the Creature.
Anne Mellor notes that Percy Shelley changed an instance of the Creature speaking to
Victor from “your fellow-creatures” to “any other being that wore the human form” (223). The
difference in these terms is significant as the former potentially does not exclude the non-human.
Victor uses the unique compound noun repeatedly in relation to his murder of the female
creature. He refuses to acknowledge this as a crime subject to the law, yet guilt, like his
consciousness of the Creature, haunts him:
I left the house, the horrid scene of the last night’s contention, and walked on the
beach of the sea, which I almost regarded as an insuperable barrier between me
and my fellow-creatures … I was perfectly solitary: a few boats were returning
towards land, but I sailed away from them. I felt as if I was about the commission
of a dreadful crime, and avoided with shuddering anxiety any encounter with my
fellow-creatures. (italics added, 132)
Here, the sea symbolically divides Victor from the rest of the world, and is also a gulf within
himself as both fellow and non-fellow. Victor uses this same phrasing again when he disposes of
the female creature’s body/bodies, “The remains of the half-finished creature, whom I had
destroyed, lay scattered on the floor, and I almost felt as if I had mangled the living flesh of a
human being” (132). In another of the novel’s inversions, Victor’s fears of the female creature as
a possible murderer and rapist become manifest in his own actions toward her inanimate body
(Engelstein 202). Victor is often almost aware, but never able to acknowledge any ethical
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“Fellow-creature” differs from Coleridge’s earlier use of “fellow-men” in the previous essay.
He also uses the former term in the final essay but again in explicitly anthropocentric ethical
terms (538).
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culpability. His sense of his own “humanity” remains intact only by these qualifiers. We find this
phrasing again before the murder of Henry Clerval, “I felt as if I had committed some great
crime, the consciousness of which haunted me. I was guiltless, but I had indeed drawn down a
horrible curse upon my head, as mortal as that of crime.” Victor’s use of “as if” and “as”
functions like his “almost.” Derrida indicts humanity for this willingness to “hide” “forget” and
“misunderstand” the violence we do against animals (26); Victor, too, fails to recognize his
kinship or responsibility to what he has deemed as nonhuman, lost to him in a darkness and
distance of his own making.
Emmanuel Levinas’s conception of the face-to-face encounter with the Other as the basis
of ethics sheds light on Victor’s ethical failures toward the Creature in barring him from the
status of human. For Levinas, the human Other cannot be reduced to Kantian means or to the
self; it is “that which does not reveal itself” (Dutoit 857).46 This face of the Other creates a sense
of ethical responsibility between the self and the Other.47 As we have already seen, in his
Lacanian reading of the Creature’s face David Collings notes that when the Creature is animated,
he gains “the power to look back, to address Victor as a subject, instantly transforming the
relation of expert and object into the interplay between persons” (205). This reiterates Levinas’s
claims for the face as the basis of intersubjectivity between persons. As Thomas Dutoit argues,
“Not only image of the soul, the face and more specifically the eyes are the medium for
interpersonal communication” in Frankenstein (852). We see this when Walton employs the
gaze as sympathy: “I desire the company of a man who could sympathize with me; whose eyes
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This concept is in part drawn from the Hebrew scriptures in which God refuses to show his
face, thus “the face (God) marks the limit of all power and the origin of the ethical” (Dutoit 858).
47
See Levinas, Totality and Infinity. For Levinas, this system of ethics is part of a broader
philosophy in which the Other is a representation of the radical transcendence of God.
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would reply to mine” (13), which is likewise the desire of the Creature in seeking a mate. 48
Derrida’s critique of Levinas’s unwillingness to grant a face,49 as a metonym here for a system of
ethics,50 to animals parallels Victor’s refusal to enter into fellowship with the Creature.51 In his
reading of Levinas, Dutoit posits that the face is “the philosophical ‘figure’ for ethics, morality,
and Law” (849). As noted before, Victor is horrified by the creature’s face in particular upon his
animation. Further, the creature recognizes Victor’s literal and symbolic refusal to meet him
face-to-face; when he speaks to Victor, he covers Victor’s eyes, stating, “thus I take from thee a
sight which you abhor. Still thou canst listen to me, and grant me thy compassion” (75). Here,
the Creature recognizes language as a means of intersubjective connection, which he learned
from the DeLacey family; thus, the Creature attempts to employ language in order to enter into a
system of ethics that he cannot otherwise access through the visual and his embodiment.
Deleuze and and Guattari directly connect the face to signification, marking it as the
origin of the voice and of expression that dominates over all other modalities: “The face is the
Icon proper to the signifying regime, … The face is what gives the signifier substance; it is what

48

Mellor reads this not as a desire for genuine exchange, but as “another form of egotism” (110).
Derrida critiques Levinas’s system of ethics, noting Levinas's responses to the questions:
"Does the fact of having a face imply an aptitude for language? Does the animal have a face?
Can one read 'thou shalt not kill' in the eyes of the animal?" to which Levinas says that he cannot
answer these questions. (108). Derrida notes that Levinas uses the language of animalization to
describe how the Nazis reduced Jews to “subhuman” “apes” (118). But, for Derrida, Levinas
remains caught up in the tradition of the Biblical commandments that limit murder to humans
and allow for animal sacrifice. The animal is not granted a face or a language, and thus is barred
from intersubjectivity. Derrida also critiques Levinas’s focus on the face as anthropocentric in
“Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas.”
50
See Dutoit on the distinction in Levinas between the phenomenological face and the ethical
face (856).
51
As previously discussed in the chapter on Percy Shelley, in Queen Mab, Percy Shelley calls
attention to the face of the slaughtered animal: “No longer now / He slays the lamb that looks
him in the face” (VIII 211-12). In contemporary parlance, vegetarians are sometimes said not to
“eat anything with a face.”
49
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fuels interpretation, and it is what changes, changes traits, when interpretation reimparts signifier
to its substance. … The signifier is always facialized” (115). As Rowe suggests, the Creature’s
animation--and Victor’s close focus on his facial features--marks the Creature’s entrance “into
figuration” (138), and thus into a system of signification.52 Unable to escape the figuration of his
body, the Creature remains trapped outside of faciality, in what Deleuze and and Guattari
describe as the way that “the face crystallizes all redundancies, it emits and receives, releases and
recaptures signifying signs. It is a whole body unto itself” (115). For the Creature, there is no
escape from the signification of his body, even in language itself.
Derrida claims that in the Western philosophical tradition “the animal is deprived of
language. Or, more precisely, of response […] of the right and power to respond, and hence of so
many other things that would be proper to man” (32), thus, "the animal neither speaks nor
responds, […] its capacity to produce signs is foreign to language" (32).53 This claim originates
in Aristotle’s Politics: “man is the only animal who has the gift of speech ... the power of speech
is intended to set forth the expedient and the inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the
unjust. And it is characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and
unjust, and the like and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a
state” (113). Here, it is through language that a subject, as an individual and then as part of a
system of ethics, comes to exist. Animals are thus excluded from any sense of ethics on the
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Dutoit reads the Creature as the “‘figure’ of figurality” itself (84).
Both Agamben and Derrida devote much of their work in Animal Studies to a critique of
Heidegger (for more on this, see Calarco). David Krell argues that Derrida’s most prominent
critique of Heidegger’s anthropocentrism is Heidegger’s assumption that animals do not have
language, particularly a sense of “as” (Krell 4). Calarco reminds us that Heidegger’s
anthropocentrism is the result of his desire to contest the dominance of Darwinian evolution
(147).
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contention that they have no conception of language54 and therefore no conception of themselves
as such, as in the Cartesian model.55
The Creature is denied entrance into any signification beyond his corporeality, despite his
facility with language.56 The Creature is the most eloquent speaker in the text, yet the
popularization of the Creature as mute or without intelligence in film adaptations of the novel
only underscores this history of the animalized other as outside of language.57 Like animals, he is
barred from any signification outside of his “species.” His biology is his destiny, a corpse
excluded from corps. While Victor and Walton confess to being moved by the Creature’s
eloquence, the visual, the specĕre of species, quickly causes their prejudices to return. This
recalls the scene between DeLacey and the Creature, in which he is unfettered from the visual,
where language becomes, for a brief moment, an affective interchange. As Dean Franco puts it,
the Creature, through language, “thinks he can control his signifiers and not the other way
around” (85) but the Creature’s facility with language proves futile within the novel. Victor
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Likewise, language is what separates human and animal for Lacan: the difference between
human response and what he calls animal reaction (Derrida 129). Derrida’s work in
Deconstruction, however, resists this anthropocentrism, refusing to exclude animals from ethical
consideration because of a perceived lack of language. Indeed, Calarco argues that many of
Derrida’s most famous ideas are not meant to be exclusive to humans or human language
(différance, trace, etc.) (106).
55
Calarco reads Derrida’s attempt in The Animal that Therefore I am to distinguish his cat as real
and particular, as opposed to a universal symbol, as the part of the fundamental problem of
representation in language that Derrida is working through in Deconstruction. Calarco takes
seriously Derrida’s claim that “The question of the living and of the living animal … will always
have been the most important and decisive question” (402). Calarco notes that readers of Derrida
may find this surprising, but he goes on to show in Derrida’s work that such a question is often
present, even if not explicit.
56
For deep readings of the Creature in relation to language, see Franco (84-89), and Peter Brooks
“What is a Monster?” See also the discussion of language acquisition in Nancy Yousef, “The
Monster in a Dark Room: Frankenstein, Feminism, and Philosophy.”
and Mellor, “Problems of Perception” in Mary Shelley: Her Life, Her Fictions, Her Monsters
(127-40).
57
See James A.W. Hefferman’s “Looking at the Monster: Frankenstein and Film.”
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states in justifying his destruction of the female creature, “I had before been moved by the
sophisms of the being I had created […] when, on looking up, I saw, by the light of the moon,
the dæmon at the casement. A ghastly grin wrinkled his lips as he gazed on me” (129).58 Here
again, the visual supersedes the verbal, replicating itself--looking, saw, gazed--barring both the
creature, and his potential female mate, from Victor’s ethical consideration.
A name is both a form of language and an entrance into a system of ethics.59 The
tendency in popular culture to endow the Creature with the name of his creator only serves to
underscore this absence in the text. Victor never names the creature because he never recognizes
their kinship, nor the Creature’s identity as an ethical subject.60 Victor becomes like Adam, given
the privilege of naming all the animals. For Derrida, a name is an entrance into ethical
consideration, the premise of which is the capacity to die: “Every case of naming involves
announcing a death to come in the surviving of a ghost” (20). This sense of naming as a
precursor to death61 returns us to Derrida’s central tenet, drawn (though unclaimed) from
Georges Bataille’s “Hegel, Death, and Sacrifice” that humans and animals share their own
finitude as a form of suffering that we must acknowledge. Death and its attendant suffering are
the fundamental principles that unite the animal kingdom. For Derrida, suffering is a shared
incapacitation between humans and other animals that moves away from the rhetoric of capacity
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Walton has a similar reversal at the end of the novel, “I was at first touched by the expressions
of his misery; yet when I called to mind what Frankenstein had said of his powers of eloquence
and persuasion, and when I again cast my eyes on the lifeless form of my friend, indignation was
re-kindled within me” (168).
59
At the time I am writing this (in 2015), there is significant outrage of the murder of Cecil the
Lion, whose individuality was designated by his face and his name, but also became emblematic
of the countless animals being slaughtered in hunting and poaching.
60
Often when I teach this novel, students will ask if we can name the Creature because they feel
that he deserves a name, calling attention to the link between naming and ethics.
61
A common saying is that we die three times: once when we stop breathing, once when
buried/cremated, and once the last time someone says our name.
  

110
(for intelligence, morality, consciousness, etc.) as a litmus test for animals’ entrance into moral
consideration. Instead, “being able to suffer is no longer a power … morality resides there, as the
most radical means of thinking the finitude that we share with animals … the anguish of this
vulnerability and the vulnerability of this anguish” (Derrida 396).
Victor’s final ethical failure toward the Creature comes from his inability to acknowledge
their shared suffering. Jeremy Bentham’s intervention on suffering in the discourse on animals in
1780 was paramount to the burgeoning animal rights movements to which Percy Shelley was
keenly attuned and Mary would have been aware of through him.62 There is no doubt that Mary
Shelley was considering the suffering of animals when writing Frankenstein as she would be
familiar with ethical vegetarianism through both Godwin and Percy Shelley who were engaged
with the major vegetarian writers of the day (Rowe 139). The rhetoric surrounding animal
suffering can be found in numerous vegetarian and anti-vivisection texts from the same period as
Frankenstein,63 including Percy Shelley’s A Vindication of Natural Diet (1813). Percy Shelley
opens his treatise on vegetarianism with the Prometheus story, arguing that the destruction of the
human body comes from the consumption of meat, which was increased by the use of fire.
Frankenstein subtitle, “The Modern Prometheus,” thus takes on an additional meaning in light of
the association between meat and violence.64 Percy Shelley calls attention to the horrors of
slaughter, which the use of fire in cooking makes invisible; this corresponds to Victor’s
experiences in the slaughterhouse and dissecting room, followed by his fascination with the
power of lightning and electricity. Timothy Morton speculates that the Shelleys may have
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Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1780.
See Timothy Morton’s extensive list of 1790s works on animal rights and vegetarianism
(Shelley 33). See also Anita Guerrini, “Animal Experiments and Antivivisection Debates in the
1820s” for a history of political and legal developments.
64
In Ovid, Prometheus is given credit for creating animals (Levine and Knoepflmacher 220).
63
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wanted to write a vegetarian work together sometime during 1814-16. Both were reading Ovid,
Plutarch, Milton, and Rousseau, all of whom regarded a vegetarian diet as ideal (Rowe 140).
Rowe further notes that, as Carol Adams has also pointed out, the Creature himself is vegetarian
(italics added):
My food is not that of man; I do not destroy the lamb and the kid, to glut my
appetite; acorns and berries afford me sufficient nourishment. My companion will
be of the same nature as myself, and will be content with the same fare. We shall
make our bed of dried leaves; the sun will shine on us as on man, and will ripen
our food. The picture I present to you is peaceful and human. (109)
Here, the Creature suggests that he is different than “man” twice, yet still “human,” which again
calls attention to his liminal status. It also underscores the rhetoric of vegetarianism at the time
(following Rousseau) as a choice between a more peaceful life in harmony with nature, as
opposed to one in which humans are corrupted by their own insatiable appetites.65
The Creature’s description of his diet recalls John Oswald’s The Cry of Nature, or An
Appeal to Mercy and to Justice on Behalf of the Persecuted Animals (1791). Percy Shelley was
aware of Oswald’s work through Joseph Ritson’s An Essay on Abstinence from Animal Food, as
a Moral Duty (1802) while he was writing Queen Mab (Morton Shelley 52-6).66 Ritson locates
man in a proto-evolutionary web in order to make his claim for a vegetarian diet: “Man, in like
manner, may, with equal propriety, be arrange'd under the monkey-kind; there being the same
degree of analogy between the man and the monkey, as between the lion and the cat” (12).
Ritson likewise provides an account of human-like apes drawn from Rousseau and Lord
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See Lawrence Lipking, “Frankenstein, the True Story; or, Rousseau judges Jean-Jacques.”
“Shelley's copy of Animal Food is found at the Humanities Research Center of the University
of Texas at Austin” (Morton Shelley 55).
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Monboddo, providing another possible source for Mary Shelley’s depictions of the Creature:
"The monkeys, apes, and baboons [of the island of Borneo]," says captain Beeckman, "are of
many different shapes; but the most remarkable are those they call oran-ootans [sic], which, in
their language, signifys [sic] men of the woods. These grow up to be six feet high ; they walk
upright; have longer arms than men; ‘tolerablely' [sic] good faces … ; large teeth, no tails nor
hair, but on those parts where it grows on human bodys [sic]. They are very nimble-footed, and
mighty strong” (19). Many primates were thought to resemble humans and created the
mythology of such half-human, half-animal figures. The Creature clearly falls into this category,
but Shelley’s insistence on the Creature’s humanity serves to link the human and animal rather
than separate them. Oswald’s work illustrates Bentham’s emphasis on suffering in order to
expand ethical consideration to animals.67 Oswald’s language, like some of Ritson’s (35), is
steeped in an emotional anguish that likewise permeates Frankenstein. Oswald indicts humanity
for its carnivorism:
And while to thy lips I press the purple juice of joy … ; dost thou still thirst
insatiate wretch! for the blood of this innocent little lamb, whose sole food is the
grass on which he treads; his only beverage the brook that trickles muddy from
his feet? Alas! ... Why shouldst thou kill him in the novelty of life; why ravish
him from the sweet aspect of the sun, while yet, with fresh delight, he admires the
blooming face of things.” (40-42)
This passage typifies the contrast of the peacefulness of vegetarian animals with a blood-thirsty
and corrupt humankind set in the form of direct address to the reader. This sentiment is
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See Rowe 139 and Morton Shelley 22-23 on Oswald. For more on Jacobin vegetarianism, see
Morton’s “Joseph Ritson, Percy Shelley and the Making of Romantic Vegetarianism.”
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expressed most directly by Elizabeth in Frankenstein, in which “All men appear monsters
thirsting for each other’s blood” (39).68
The Creature employs the rhetoric of suffering, following vegetarian treatises concerned
for the welfare of animals, constantly calling Victor’s attention to his misery in some of the most
eloquent passages in the novel. “I, the miserable and the abandoned, am an abortion, to be
spurned at, and kicked, and trampled on” (169). Noticeably here, the violence is construed as
bodily, calling attention to the way the creature’s corporeality is central to his plight. By the end
of the novel, the Creature states, “I am content to suffer alone, while my sufferings shall endure”
(168) where the repetition of suffering underscores its dominance. Yet Victor remains unwilling
to acknowledge the Creature’s pain, deeming it outside of an anthropocentric system of ethics.

Conclusion: “Becoming-Animal”
While much criticism has shown Frankenstein’s relation to the politics of its time,
particularly in relation to Godwin’s concepts of political justice and against the backdrop of the
French Revolution, Derrida’s conception of the beast and the sovereign allows us to connect
these issues directly to the Creature’s perceived animality. Victor and the Creature alternate
between the two roles of the beast and the sovereign, caught in an “uncanny, reciprocal
haunting” (Derrida Beast 17), in which the etymological and conceptual relation of “hunt” and
“haunt” as kinds of “running after” comes into relief. Like the beast and sovereign, creature and
creator are dual sides of the same concept, forever returning to each other.69 As Derrida notes,

68

This sentiment is echoed by the villainous Count Cenci in Percy Shelley’s The Cenci: “All
men enjoy revenge; and most exult / Over the tortures they can never - feel” (I.i.77-79, 741),
leading to the dehumanization of his daughter Beatrice who comes to ask, much like the
Creature, “What thing am I?” (III.i.38, 779).
69
See Patrick Brantlinger, “The Reading Monster.”
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“the same living creature is at the same time follower and followed, hunter knowing itself
hunted, seducer and seduced … two forces of the same strategy” (55). Victor, indeed, refers to
himself in terms of feeling followed, as both hunted and haunted. In speculating that the Creature
is following Clerval, Victor observes,
Sometimes I thought that the fiend followed me, and might expedite my
remissness by murdering my companion. When these thoughts possessed me, I
would not quit Henry for a moment, but followed him as his shadow, to protect
him from the fancied rage of his destroyer. I felt as if I had committed some great
crime, the consciousness of which haunted me. (125)
Here, we find a reciprocal haunting in which Victor begins to follow Clerval the way the
Creature is following them both, foreshadowing their intensified pursuit toward the end of the
novel. The Creature haunts Victor like a consciousness of a crime that, as we have already seen,
Victor will not acknowledge took place.
Derrida discusses the division between the beast and the sovereign in terms of what is
associated with each: “master, king, father” and that which is subjected: “the slave, the beast, the
woman, the child” (30). Victor and the Creature directly engage in this kind of language as we
have already seen with Victor repeatedly consigning the Creature to the category of beast. The
Creature attempts to subject himself to his master, but failing this, attempts to assert his
sovereignty. When Victor destroys the Creature’s potential mate, the Creature cries, “You are my
creator, but I am your master;—obey!” (130). The Creature repeatedly refers to feeling like a
slave: “mine shall not be the submission of abject slavery” (108)-- a sentiment that Victor
likewise echoes: “I was the slave of my creature” (118). Both remain caught in the hierarchical
logic of master/slave, unable to escape from the struggle for sovereignty. Deleuze and Guattari
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likewise contrast the sovereign and the subject in their discussion of faciality. They conceive of
the face as that of the despot-god, the public state; and the effaced, “the counterbody” that is
“tortured” and “excluded” by the state. They quote Foucault,” ‘In the darkest region of the
political field the condemned man outlines the symmetrical, inverted figure of the
king’”(Foucault 29; Deleuze and and Guattari 116).70 They theorize, “The one who is tortured is
fundamentally one who loses his or her face, entering into a becoming-animal” (116). Thus, the
rhetoric of face to body becomes that of sovereign to beast.
The Creature’s response to his treatment as the figure of the animal, the beast that is
silenced and excluded, is to force a radical form of compulsory empathy in which he molds
Victor into a version of himself: alone, miserable, and reduced to his corporeality.71 Walton calls
attention to this when he first encounters Victor in the novel’s opening frame narrative, “if you
had seen the man who thus capitulated for his safety, your surprise would have been boundless.
His limbs were nearly frozen, and his body dreadfully emaciated by fatigue and suffering. I
never saw a man in so wretched a condition” (17). Here, Victor’s body too has become shocking
and wretched. At the end of the novel, the Creature makes his final speech to Walton over
Victor’s lifeless body in an inversion of the earlier image of Victor working on the creature’s
then lifeless body. But in the absence of any real response or responsibility from Victor, the
Creature forces him into a violent recognition of their kinship, reducing Victor to wholly body.
Throughout his lectures in The Animal that Therefore I am, Derrida plays with the
concept of “following.” Derrida uses “follow” in several ways that are relevant to Shelley’s
work, particularly a sense of pursuit and of kinship or lineage, which are combined in
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The translation is modified by Deleuze and and Guattari (116n5).
Midgley makes the startling claim that “Exploitation Requires Sympathy,” by which she
means that an understanding of what will make another suffer is necessary for manipulation.
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evolutionary discourse. He writes, “everything in what I am about to say will lead back to the
question of what ‘to follow’ or ‘to pursue’ means, as well as ‘to be after’, back to the question
of what I do when “I am” and “I follow” (3). Derrida’s original title in French, L’animal que
donc je suis, carries the pun on suis as both I am and I follow. For Derrida, the figure of
following is the mythological Chimaera, a monster made of various animal parts, who is a
hunter of beasts (42). Derrida connects this mythology to the Hebrew scriptures, particularly
Cain and Abel. As Krell notes, “Derrida focuses on the fact that in evolutionary history and
even in the biblical account of creation human beings come after the animals they are forever
chasing and subduing once they are expelled from paradise. ‘Following’ is therefore of the
essence, and of being” (2). This is at once a biological as well as an intellectual recognition. For
Derrida, the purpose of such a project is to “move from ‘the ends of man,’ that is the confines of
man, to the ‘crossing of borders’ between man and animal” (3).72
Shelley’s Volume III takes up these questions of pursuit across borders in relation to
animality. It is through a radical form of becoming-animal that Victor and the Creature merge in
the novel’s final volume. Deleuze, similarly to Derrida, critiques the Judeo-Christian conception
of God and its emphasis on animal sacrifice in creating a false binary between the face of the
god and the anus of the scapegoat, in which “Anything that threatens to put the system to flight
will be killed or put to flight itself” (116). This is the project that Victor and the Creature take
on as they pursue each other to the death. The emphasis on pursuit in the struggle for power is
evident in Vol. III as Victor and the Creature engage in a hunt in which other animals are
sacrificed. Dogs and hares traditionally are associated with hunting and heighten the rhetoric of
72

Victor makes a similar claim upon Elizabeth’s death, “if for one instant I had thought what
might be the hellish intention of my fiendish adversary, I would rather have banished myself for
ever from my native country, and wandered a friendless outcast over the earth, than have
consented to this miserable marriage” (146).
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pursuit and tracking in the final volume. In The Beast and the Sovereign, Derrida focuses on the
figures of the wolf and the werewolf (wolf-man) (especially in the third and fourth sessions),
noting the figuration of the enemy as a wolf that must be “hunted down, chased away,
repressed, combated” (88). In the novel, the Creature leaves tracks for Victor to follow, such as
“You will find near this place, if you follow not too tardily, a dead hare; eat, and be refreshed”
(156). The Creature essentially baits Victor with the hare as he takes him closer to his death in a
climate that cannot support human life. As Ron Broglio has noted, the Creature pulls Victor
ever-increasingly toward a nonhuman existence that is made manifest in the outer regions of the
Arctic (38). The Creature drags Victor across the imaginary rings of latitude, like Dante’s
circles of hell, closer to the frozen landscape. Victor becomes more and more desperate for
animal protein, noting “The peasants were shut up in their hovels, and only a few of the most
hardy ventured forth to seize the animals whom starvation had forced from their hiding-places
to seek for prey. The rivers were covered with ice, and no fish could be procured; and thus I was
cut off from my chief article of maintenance” (156). Here, Victor paints a dark portrait of life at
the extremes for both humans and animals. Further, several of Victor’s sled dogs are sacrificed
in his excruciating journey across the ice. The dogs die pointlessly in the quest for revenge and
their labor recalls the mutiny of the men aboard Walton’s ship who do not wish the same fate
for themselves. While Victor cautions Walton not to pursue ambition or glory, he argues the
inverse in his speech to Walton’s crew. In this section, Victor sets up a direct conflict between
man and nature, in which “these vast mountains of ice are mole-hills, which will vanish before
the resolutions of man” and “This ice is not made of such stuff as your hearts might be; it is
mutable, cannot withstand you, if you say that it shall not” (164). Victor’s claim that the
mountains are mole-hills echoes a familiar aphorism, but asserts an almost ridiculous amount of
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power to humans over nature when the very circumstances of his dying body contradict this
speech act. Further, the shift in setting toward the ice solidifies what the Creature represents to
Victor: the nonhuman, material and animal parts of nature that must be vanquished by human
strength. Even to his death, Victor believes that he is the hunter rather than the hunted, forever
claiming his humanity and denying it to the Creature. In her third novel, The Last Man, Shelley
recasts a similar struggle to Victor’s in which all of humanity faces an unknown plague in
which the monstrous materiality of nature and bodies, as represented by the Creature in
Frankenstein, ensures that no anthropocentric fantasy of human mastery over nature is possible.
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Chapter 3. The “grim Unreality”: Extinction Narratives in Mary Shelley’s The Last Man
“As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent date. And one
perhaps nearing its end. If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared, … then one
can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea”
(Foucault, The Order of Things 387).
Introduction
Mary Shelley’s The Last Man (1826) imagines a mysterious plague that annihilates only
the human species at the end of the 21st century. When read in dialogue with Frankenstein
(1818) as a gothic novel, The Last Man suggests that the recognition of our materiality, in all its
seeming monstrosity, is fundamental to an ecological understanding of ourselves as biologically
interconnected to the world in which we live. Both Frankenstein and The Last Man explore the
idea of changes to the human species in their imaginings of a creature who is more-than-human
and a world without humans respectively. The lonely, grieving characters at the centers of these
novels have often been read in relation to Shelley’s own tragic life, but in this chapter I will
examine them as a response to the concepts of species and extinction that arose in eighteenthand nineteenth-century science. While the novel is devoted to a small group of individuals, it
imagines the effects of a plague worldwide: not only on the lives of the central characters and
those they encounter directly, but also on global trade, governance, and immigration. Shelley
likewise shows a variety of effects from the plague ranging from climate changes and domestic
strife to the breakdown of international politics and commerce. The novel’s prophetic quality is
grounded in Shelley’s own historical and personal experience as she witnessed the devastation
that war and colonialism could bring as England and France increasingly industrialized and
globalized during her lifetime; thus Alan Bewell in Romanticism and Colonial Disease reads the
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novel as “amazingly prescient” of future epidemics as he shows the historical continuum from
which Shelley draws (310).1 Shelley works with this material within an apocalyptic literary
genre,2 but deconstructs the conventions of Biblical apocalypse when the earth is not destroyed
along with humanity, nor is the plague attributed to any divine source.3 The plague is a part of
nature rather than outside of it, following the ethos of Frankenstein to move from the
supernatural to a more realist form of the gothic.4 Both the Creature and the Plague are material
others that call attention to our own corporeal vulnerability. Jennifer Wagner-Lawler’s
description of the Plague as “a figuration of the real-as-alterity, but alterity here is more than
uncanny” (765) recalls the ways in which the plague is figured as mysterious, but nonetheless is
grounded in the material interconnections between species, bodies, and environment. Even in
Frankenstein, Shelley examines disease and its transmission in the illness of Elizabeth due to
scarlet fever and the infection that causes the death of Caroline, setting into motion Victor’s
quest to overcome death. The Last Man globalizes this sense of contagion and despite human
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Many critics point to other source material for the novel that includes historical events,
including the Lisbon earthquake; epidemics of typhus and cholera (1817-1824); and the novel
itself makes direct allusion to the “Black Death,” the plague of 1348 (186).
2
As Lee Sterrenburg notes, “Throughout Augustan and Romantic literature there had long been
a concern with catastrophes, the ruins of empire, and the collapse of civilizations. These declineand-fall themes took on a new resonance and intensity after the defeat of the Napoleonic Empire
in 1815” and especially given “Napoleon's complaint that he was defeated in Russia by nature-water, air, and fire” (326).
3
Critics have shown how Shelley’s work responds to Thomas Campbell’s poem “The Last
Man,” (1823), which she is likely to have read (Morrison and Stone 69); Volney’s Ruins of
Empire (which the Creature reads in Frankenstein); and the novel itself directly alludes to stories
of plagues in Boccaccio, Defoe, and Charles Brockden Brown (The Decameron, Journal of the
Plague Year, and Arthur Mervyn respectively). Other possible influences include John Wilson’s
The City of the Plague (1816); Byron's poem “Darkness,” (1816); and Cousin de Grainville’s
novel The Last Man: or, Omegarious and Syderia (1806).
4
See George Levine, “Frankenstein and the Tradition of Realism” and M.H. Abrams’ Natural
Supernaturalism.
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attempts to overcome it (like Victor’s to stop the Creature from ending his family line),
humanity’s numbers dwindle to one by the end of the novel.
Apocalypse, catastrophe, and ruin were in the air (literally and figuratively) leading up to
and into the first half of the nineteenth century. These anxieties were fueled, among many other
factors, by the cultural anthropology of C.F. Volney in The Ruins of Empires (1793), the “year
without a summer” (1816) following the Tambora eruption, and the devastation of the Reign of
Terror and the Napoleonic Wars. Simultaneously, Thomas Malthus’s Essay on the Principle of
Population (1798–1826) precipitated fears of mass starvation and death, while new branches of
natural history, namely geology and paleontology, began to demonstrate drastic changes in the
composition and timescale of the earth. Many of these historical connections have been made by
critics in relation to Romantic literature, including Mary Shelley’s third novel, The Last Man,5
but only recently have scholars examined how Shelley adapts and combines these influences into
a startling new conclusion: the biological extinction of the human species. Just as Frankenstein
has long been heralded as a prescient critique of science, The Last Man should be recognized as a
proto-evolutionary tale that anticipates Victorian and modern concerns about the definition and
extinction of humans as a species.
In the novel, Shelley entwines nature with the plague until it becomes a figure of
“menace” (185) to which the human species becomes “prey” (152). This conception of nature led
Shelley toward ideas similar to those that Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace would
contemplate from the 1830s forward, struggling with nature as a “war” of “famine and death”
(Darwin, Origin 490). Well before any other writer or scientist, Shelley explored the possibility
of human extinction based on material rather than divine forces, in a process that the rest of the
5

Shelley composed the novel between Feb. 1824 and Nov. 1825, and published it in 1826.
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natural world still might survive. These distinctions set The Last Man apart from other literary
and scientific works that remain insistent on forms of human exceptionalism. Likewise, they
make Shelley’s novel increasingly relevant in our own time when critics have only recently
begun to examine ideas of the posthuman and nonhuman agency.6
Shelley’s novel takes up the questions that Volney poses: “if pestilence ensues, is it the
wrath of God which sends it, or the folly of man? When war, famine and pestilence, have swept
away the inhabitants, if the earth remains a desert, is it God who has depopulated it?” (Volney
10). Shelley’s novel response is that it is neither, but rather a material force not human or divine.
Similarly, Shelley divests Malthus of his religious and moral concerns, and instead recognizes in
his work the ideas of a species as a population and of material existence as a form of struggle,
just as Charles Darwin would later realize in his own reading of Malthus in 1838. Though
Shelley’s novel grieves this state, it nonetheless insists on the idea of the human as a species that
is subject to an agentic material world that it cannot control. In this way, Shelley’s 1826 novel
marks the end of a Romantic concept of nature as benevolent, ordered, or safe for humans, and
replaces it with a model of nature as a place of struggle, suffering, and death that anticipates
Darwin’s.
In her journal, Shelley conceived of The Last Man as an homage to a bygone era, at once
personal and aesthetic, identifying herself as “The last man! I may well describe that solitary
being’s feelings, feeling myself as the last relic of a beloved race, my companions, extinct before
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See for example, the work of Timothy Morton, Jane Bennett, and Stacey Alaimo, among
others, in which the concept of toxicity is central to the argument that human bodies are part of a
material “mesh” of which the nonhuman is co-constituent. Shelley’s unique depiction of human
extinction through the toxicity of the plague provides a foundation not-yet-accounted-for in
current critical theory.
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me’” (14 May 1824 Journals 476–7, emphasis added). While this passage is quoted often as
evidence for the novel as a roman à clef, it also suggests Shelley’s attention to the concept of
extinction at this time. Shelley’s use of the words “race” and “extinct” in her journal entry
likewise permeate the novel, and Shelley uses the term “extinction” repeatedly to describe the
ultimate effect of the plague on humanity. She associates the term interchangeably with both
“species” and “race,” as in “to mark the extinction of our species” (245) and “the nearly extinct
race of man” (253).
Shelley’s speculations about extinction derive from her engagement with the scientific
developments of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Although Shelley’s use of
extinction predates Darwinian evolution (1859) and Ernst Haeckel’s definition of ecology
(1866), the concepts of extinction, evolution, and ecology are closely linked. Though there was
significant study of the fossil record in the eighteenth century, most notably by Comte de Buffon
(1707–1788), the rapid rise in the discovery of fossils in the nineteenth century, due in large part
to colonial imperialism, forced the issue of extinction to the forefront of natural history. Georges
Cuvier (1769–1832) was the first to prove extinction empirically with his comparative study of
elephant and mastodon fossils in 1796 (Coleman 108, 119). Cuvier followed this proof with a
four-volume study on quadruped fossil bones that linked extinction to geology in what is known
as biostratigraphy, which correlates the age of rock strata to the fossils within it (127). This work
was foundational to paleontology as a discipline by combining comparative anatomy and
geology, even though the term “paleontology” would not come into use until the 1820–30s. We
know that Shelley read parts of Buffon’s epic Histoire Naturelle7 in 1817 (Shelley Journals
658), and that “Though the Shelleys earlier knew of Cuvier’s work, they ordered his masterpiece
7

Natural History spans 36 volumes written from 1749 to 1804.
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of fossil studies, Recherches sur les Ossemens Fossiles (1812), only a few weeks before Percy
Shelley’s death” (Bailes 673). From Buffon and Cuvier, Shelley would have derived an
association of fossils with extinction. Even though Buffon and Cuvier were deeply committed to
their religious beliefs, they, like numerous other natural historians, provided significant evidence
for the transmutation of species for future naturalists like Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel
Wallace, and for the proto-evolutionary speculations of Mary Shelley in The Last Man.
The idea of extinction, of any species, was deeply threatening to religious and
teleological views of nature and humanity. Jean-Baptiste Lamarck refused to believe in
extinction at all in his theory of evolution, despite his citation of Cuvier’s fossil evidence (45). In
the section “Of the Species Alleged to be Lost” in Zoological Philosophy (1809), he contends,
I am still doubtful whether the means adopted by nature to ensure the preservation of
species or races have been so inadequate that entire races are now extinct or lost. If there
really are lost species, it can doubtless only be among the large animals that live on the
dry parts of the earth; where man exercises absolute sway, and has compassed the
destruction of all the individuals of some species which he has not wished to preserve or
domesticate. (44)
Far from allowing for the possibility of the extinction of humans, Lamarck suggests instead that
humans in fact control the extinction of other animals. Even Charles Darwin struggled to
acknowledge the role of extinction in natural selection, choosing instead to focus on its more
generalized beneficence for nature as a whole.8 In the “Extinction” section of Origin, Darwin
insists “extinction of old forms and the production of new and improved forms are intimately
connected together” (368) implying both a hierarchy and a progression. Darwin likewise tries to
diminish the shock and terror of extinction, noting that it is the same as to “admit that sickness in
the individual is the forerunner of death” (Origin 320). Shelley’s novel takes this connection up

8

For a fuller discussion of this point, see Gillian Beer, “Darwin and the Uses of Extinction.”
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literally, well before Origin and reverses any sense of hierarchy or progression that would save
humans from extinction.
With this general background in mind, this chapter explores how The Last Man responds
to the growing body of evidence for extinction drawn from geology and paleontology. Rather
than view humans as exceptions from possible extinction, Shelley imagines the extinction of her
own species. This violates teleological theories of species at the time, in which humanity was
seen as the pinnacle of a progressive form of development that spans organic life. In this way,
Shelley deconstructs the very idea of “human,” posing existential questions about the purpose of
human existence, while simultaneously calling attention to failures in human ethics.
Part I. Fossil Mythologies
If we locate The Last Man within its early nineteenth century scientific context, the
unnamed narrator and companion in the introduction to the novel resemble Cuvier as they
discover fossilized remains. In the cave, two kinds of relics are found, one animal, one vegetal:
The only sign that life had been here, was the perfect snow-white skeleton of a goat,
which had probably not perceived the opening as it grazed on the hill above, and had
fallen headlong. Ages perhaps had elapsed since this catastrophe; and the ruin it had
made above, had been repaired by the growth of vegetation during many hundred
summers.
The rest of the furniture of the cavern consisted of piles of leaves, fragments of
bark, and a white filmy substance, resembling the inner part of the green hood which
shelters the grain of the unripe Indian corn. (2–3)
Shelley’s emphasis on the immense lapse of time (“many hundred summers”) calls attention to
the narrator and companion as paleontological as they sift through the layers of leaves as if they
were geologic strata. The goat’s remains likewise suggest the discovery of fossils and are
connected to the leaves and bark as material traces. Shelley alludes to the scientific theory of
catastrophism with the word “catastrophe” as when she notes “the whole of this land had been so
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convulsed by earthquake and volcano” (3). Cuvier located extinction within the broader
framework of catastrophism, a theory developed by geologists like Buffon and William Smith
(1769–1839) that suggested singular catastrophes could eliminate a wide range of species
simultaneously.10 Simultaneously, the use of “catastrophe” (instead of “accident” for example)
signals a deeply empathetic perspective for the individual animal that extends affectively
throughout the novel. The double entendre in “ruin” amplifies the affect of devastation in
“catastrophe” and figures the opening as a kind of wound in the landscape that becomes a hidden
scar. Between “headlong” and “ages,” we are left to imagine the goat’s sudden and violent death
on impact, followed by its gradual decomposition to its skeletal frame.
Shelley’s repeated use of the past perfect reports the prior event literally step by step with
each “had” further dooming the goat to its death. The sudden separation of the goat from its
pastoral landscape is illustrated in the abrupt clauses “, and had fallen headlong” and “; and the
ruin it had made above” where the punctuation separates the time before and after these ruptures.
The catastrophic event is juxtaposed to the continuity of the conjunction “and” in both cases,
which mirrors nature’s covering over of the fall and the ruin. Through the animal’s literal and
figurative fall, Shelley subtly rewrites the Edenic myth of a post-lapsarian world. If the Sybil’s
cave is a shadow garden of sorts, the narrator finds there neither the Tree of Knowledge (of Good
and Evil) nor The Tree of Life (which promises immortality), but rather only fragments of leaves

9

The opposing view, uniformitarianism, claimed that extinctions happen gradually in tandem
with environmental changes, a theory developed by James Hutton (1726–1797) that both Charles
Lyell and Charles Darwin espoused. Shelley’s reference to the volcano may allude to Hutton’s
theory, which centered on the upheaval caused by volcanic eruptions in what is known as
vulcanism.
10
Cuvier was able to provide empirical evidence for some of the more abstract claims that
Buffon had made (Coleman 109). While Buffon is associated with the study of the individual,
Cuvier focused on the species and genus (101).
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and bark that tell a Babel-like tale of human extinction. All that survives there are fragments (the
skeleton, the leaves, the bark), like shadows, that the narrator cannot shore against ruin. This
fragmentation–often noted critically in relation to the “Sybilline leaves” as symbolic of writing
as a form of deconstruction–likewise applies to bodies and identities, to which the goat calls
attention. The goat’s tragedy demonstrates that humanity, whether individual or species, as an
idea or as corporeality, is as fragile and contingent as language and meaning.
The unsuspecting goat largely has been ignored in critical discussion of the novel and
subordinated in symbolic import to the Sybilline leaves that the narrator must then assemble and
translate into the form the novel will take. While the leaves literally contain the prophecy, the
goat’s skeleton is likewise a revelatory fragment, even if more subtly, of the novel-to-be and
even Shelley’s first sentence names the goat’s skeleton as a “sign.” Most directly, the goat’s
death foreshadows the many individuals who die in the novel as they fall unsuspecting into the
abyss of the plague, but this opening image is also part of Shelley’s broader project in the novel
to link humans to other animals and plants in their shared corporeal vulnerability.
It is not coincidental that the monster and the fossil each feature respectively in Shelley’s
Frankenstein and The Last Man. As Foucault suggests, both categories raise questions of identity
based on difference and similarity, and particularly in Shelley’s novels, they raise questions
about the relations and distinctions between human/nonhuman and human/animal. In his section,
“Monsters and Fossils” in The Order of Things, Foucault argues that “the monster ensures the
emergence of difference. This difference is still without law and without any well-defined
structure; the monster is the root-stock of specification, but it is only a sub-species itself … The
fossil is what permits resemblances to subsist throughout all the deviations traversed by nature; it
functions as a distant and approximate form of identity; it marks a quasi-character in the shift of
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time” (157). Foucault sets these two categories almost in opposition “against the background of
the continuum, the monster provides an account, as though in caricature, of the genesis of
differences, and the fossil recalls, in the uncertainty of its resemblances, the first buddings of
identity” (157). Foucault theorizes the fossil as a disruption in both time and identity, “whereas
for eighteenth century thought the fossil was a prefiguration of existing forms … it has broken
the supposed continuity of time” (270). Rather than proving a linear progression of forms, the
fossil, following Cuvier and Darwin, became a memento mori of possible extinction. In this way,
it functions similarly to monstrosity, which likewise marks a chance deviation; thus, nature could
no longer be perceived as an ordered plan directed by a benevolent creator or designer.
That Shelley’s introduction frames the fossilized goat skeleton in a geologic and
paleontological context heightens its association with a type of knowledge that brings death, as
in the Garden of Eden and the Cumaean Sibyl’s prophecy. Virgil, invoked as the author of the
tale of the Cumaean Sibyl in Shelley’s introduction, is also Dante’s guide through the protogeologic circles of hell leading to Lucifer’s cave where he is half-fossilized in ice. The
association of Lucifer with geology and paleontology appears in Act II, scene ii of Byron’s Cain
(1821), where exposure to this new form of knowledge leads Cain to ruin. Bryon specifically
names Cuvier as the scientific analogue on which Satan’s knowledge of geology and
paleontology is based, though he is careful to suggest that the fossil record does not support any
claims of human extinction nor Satan’s assertion about a different species of “rational beings”
now extinct.11 Though natural history often aligned with theology in Shelley’s time, its exposure
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Byron makes this connection explicit in a note added after the original manuscript: “The
reader will perceive that the author has partly adopted in this poem the notion of Cuvier, that the
world had been destroyed several times before the creation of man. This speculation, derived
from the different strata and the bones of enormous and unknown animals found in them, is not
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of the age of the earth and the interconnections between all forms of life began to raise questions
about the Biblical hexameral creation story. Shelley takes up these questions in her novel,
extrapolating from the science of her time to rewrite Biblical mythology.
The introduction to The Last Man functions similarly to the opening epistolary frame in
Frankenstein to suggest the novel’s central themes. The dead goat invokes the Greek association
of goats with tragedy, which is thought to stem from the prize or sacrifice of a goat during a
theatrical performance and/or the tradition of the tragôidia (goat-song) chorus (Howatson 574).
Thus, in the Greek tradition, Shelley offers a sacrificed goat in the introduction before the
staging of the tragedy that the novel unfolds. In this same vein, the novel’s goat may allude
indirectly to Pan, the Greek goat-god, who appears in the same texts by Ovid and Virgil as the
Cumaean Sibyl referenced in the novel’s introduction.12 Etymologically, Pan means “all” and is
the root of both “pandemic” and “panic.” Pan is the figure of nature, but also of mischief. Shelley
thus transforms the figure of Pan into Plague and her repeated use of “panic” and “panic-struck”
throughout the novel, as in “panic seized on all” (237), suggests the dual meaning of Pan as
powerful nature gone awry. Lionel makes this kind of claim repeatedly in the novel: “Some
disorder had surely crept into the course of the elements, destroying their benignant influence”
(183).

contrary to the Mosaic account, but rather confirms it; as no human bones have yet been
discovered in those strata, although those of many known animals are found near the remains of
the unknown. The assertion of Lucifer, that the pre-adamite world was also peopled by rational
beings much more intelligent than man, and proportionably powerful to the mammoth, &c. &c.
is, of course, a poetical fiction to help him to make out his case” (Byron 157).
12
Pan is invoked throughout Virgil’s Eclogues (II, IV, V, VIII, X) and Ovid’s story of Midas is
the basis for Virgil’s second eclogue (Merivale 19).
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In this way, the death of the goat in the novel may be suggestive of the tension between
pagan and Christian histories related to the figure of Pan.13 Each of these traditions, along with
natural history, claimed a different definition of nature and humans’ place within it. Pan appears
as a central character in Mary Shelley’s play Midas (1820), to which Percy Shelley wrote the
accompanying “Ode to Pan.”14 Pan’s mythology evolved over time, beginning with “Greek,
Alexandrian and Roman images of the 'Arcadian goat-god,” followed by “The Orphic Hymn to
Pan” which imbues the figure with pantheism as ‘universal Nature’” (Merivale 9). Following
from these definitions, Pan came to represent paganism and a pantheism in the vein of Spinoza,15
both of which were important alternatives to Christianity for the later Romantics.16 In the novel,
the plague becomes nature (plague and/or nature) as an all-encompassing totality, what Percy
Shelley calls “universal Pan” (“The Witch of Atlas” line 113). This conception of Pan is found in
Thomas Taylor’s famous translation of the Orphic Hymn, which intermixes the benevolent and
violent powers of Pan17 and this duality has clear parallels to Mary Shelley’s figuration of the
plague in the novel. The hymn begins “To Pan, Fumigation from Odours. Strong pastoral Pan,
13

In the nineteenth century, Pan and Christ were viewed increasingly as oppositional, despite
their shared associations with shepherds, and the supposed death of Pan was an important
mythological event that resurged in literature of the nineteenth century (Merivale 15).
14
“Ode to Pan” was first published by Mary Shelley in her edition of Percy Shelley’s
Posthumous Poems (1824) (Koszul xi).
15
For a study of Romantic pantheism in the earlier Romantics, see the classic study by H.W.
Piper, The Active Universe: Pantheism and the Concept of Imagination in the English Romantic
Poets.
16
In his introduction to Mary Shelley’s Midas, Alfred Koszul notes a fragment in Mary’s journal
in which Percy argues for “The necessity of a Belief in the Heathen Mythology to a Christian” in
“a little draft of an Essay, which occurs, in Mrs. Shelley’s handwriting, as an insertion in her
Journal for the Italian period” (Koszul xxiii–xxvi).
17
Thomas Taylor’s translation of the Orphic Hymn (1787) is a likely source text for Romantics
about Pan (Merivale 49), especially given that Percy’s close friend Thomas Love Peacock
“‘Greeky Peaky’, was a personal acquaintance of Thomas Taylor ‘the Platonist’, alias ‘Pagan
Taylor’. And Taylor’s translations and commentaries of Plato had been favourites of [Percy]
Shelley in his college days” (Koszul xxiii).
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with suppliant voice I call, heaven, sea, and earth, the mighty queen of all, immortal fire; for all
the world is thine, and all parts of thee, o power divine” (Taylor 34). It then attributes to Pan
power over fertility and the ocean, as well as control of all the elements and matter. The hymn is
a supplication to Pan not to turn to “dreadful rage,” which, “when roused, ‘tis hard for mortals to
assuage” (Taylor 35) since “[a]ll natures change through thy protecting are, and all mankind thy
liberal bounties share; for these, wherever dispersed through boundless space, still find thy
providence support their race” (Taylor 36).18
Lionel echoes these words repeatedly in the novel, where Pan as nature has turned on
humanity as plague. Toward the end of the novel Lionel proclaims:
No, no, I will not live among the wild scenes of nature, the enemy of all that lives. I will
seek the towns—Rome, the capital of the world, the crown of man's achievements.
Among its storied streets, hallowed ruins, and stupendous remains of human exertion, I
shall not, as here, find every thing forgetful of man; trampling on his memory, defacing
his works, proclaiming from hill to hill, and vale to vale,—by the torrents freed from the
boundaries which he imposed—by the vegetation liberated from the laws which he
enforced—by his habitation abandoned to mildew and weeds, that his power is lost, his
race annihilated for ever. (366–7)
Here we see Lionel’s immense resistance to nature, rejecting it wholly, as it erases humans as a
species from existence through the metaphor of defacement. Lionel abhors nature’s wildness, its
“vegetation liberated,” when humanity has been “lost” and “annihilated.” Like the Creature in
Frankenstein, humanity is “trampled on.” Lionel can find no reconciliation with a nature that
outstrips human law and custom.
Because of this annihilation of the human species, Shelley’s novel has been read as a
secular version of Biblical apocalypse, particularly given the direct allusions to Moses and exile,
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Milton built on this idea of “an Orphic Pan … (of particular interest to the Romantic poets), a
Pan both ‘universal’ and beneficent” (Merivale 34). In Paradise Lost, Milton “enriched the idea
of Pan as a universal deity” (Merivale 26) and this influence carried to both the Shelleys.
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as well as Noah, the ark and the flood, in which no god or messiah offers salvation. In this
context, the goat is perhaps an apt, if covert, figure to signal the text’s departure from Christian
eschatology. The association of goats with paganism likewise indicates the novel’s rejection of
Christian soteriology through a material rather than spiritual apocalypse. Given the novel’s other
Biblical allusions, the goat should be read in light of both Jewish and Christian mythologies. In
this sense, the goat likely alludes to Leviticus 16, in which the “scapegoat” is cast out into the
wilderness, symbolically bearing the sins of the community as part of the ancient Hebrew
atonement rituals associated with Yom Kippur.19 In this way, the lone goat figure amid the
Sibylline leaves in the novel’s introduction mirrors Lionel at the end of the text amid the Roman
ruins. If the lone goat skeleton is meant to allude to the Biblical scapegoat, its foreshadowing of
Lionel is heightened as Lionel wanders alone, outcast from England and finally from humanity
itself by the plague.
The scapegoat then is a figure of exile, who, like Adam and Eve, is expelled for a
symbolic impurity. In this way, there are clear parallels with the lonely, wandering figures of
both the Creature in Frankenstein and Lionel in The Last Man who experiences his own
humanity as monstrous in the absence of his species. In the original Biblical text, two goats are
chosen by the casting of lots: one is killed immediately as a blood sacrifice, while the other is
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Calvin, in his exegesis on the scapegoat, studies St. Paul’s use of the Greek word for filth
(perikatharmata) and these connections are taken up by both James Frazer and René Girard in
their later influential studies of the scapegoat (Dawson 46). The scapegoat is associated with a
kind of filth that must be expelled, a sentiment that Victor repeats about the Creature throughout
Frankenstein and which Lionel’s transformation from “savage” to “civilized” under the guidance
of Adrian subtly echoes. The Leviticus text gives detailed instructions regarding avoiding
contamination from both types of goat sacrifices, which have been linked to Greek purification
rituals, particularly pharmakos, which involved the expulsion and sometimes execution of an
abject human subject to symbolically cleanse the community. For more on this issue, see
Derrida’s analysis of pharmakos in Dissemination.

133
symbolically endowed with sin and cast out into the wilderness. Over time, the two sacrificial
goats became compressed into a single symbolic meaning of the scapegoat as the innocent
unfairly blamed. In the novel, Lionel consistently casts humanity as an innocent scapegoat of the
plague (even without using the term directly), unsure of the reason why nature has turned its
vengeance on his species. That the goats are chosen by lots in the Biblical story suggests the
possibility of either providence or chance, and Shelley’s novel calls this debate into question
frequently as it becomes clear that the plague operates seemingly at random and that victims are
the subjects of chance rather than divine providence. In the novel, there is no divine or sacerdotal
pardon even as the characters attempt, like the scapegoat, to flee into the wilderness. The
metaphor of innocent victims of plagues as akin to the Biblical scapegoat was invoked in
writings about both the Plague of London in 1655 and the Plague of Marseilles in 1721 (Dawson
94). Shelley likely intends this same association of innocent victimhood with the goat in the
opening of her novel.
The term “scapegoat” was introduced in English in 1530 in William Tyndale’s translation
of the Bible. There is much scholarly debate over the Hebrew word used for the scapegoat
()אזאזל, ‘aza’zel (only used in Leviticus 16 verses 8, 10, 26) where ‘Ez means goat and ’azal
means “to go away” (Dawson 1). But Azazel also is “the name of a Canaanite demon connected
with the chthonian power expressed by goats” who is associated with the wilderness as a symbol
of the underworld (8). In her discussion of Milton’s use of Azazel as a demonic figure, Kitty
Cohen argues that Milton is interested in the character primarily as a “prototype of Satan” taken
from Jewish mysticism (Cohen 248). Andrei Orlov examines this particular interpretation of the
scapegoat as demonic in the Slavonic Pseudepigrapha (3). A notable aspect of Jewish
apocalyptic mysticism in relation to The Last Man is the link between the original scapegoat
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narrative and apocalypse. In the Jewish texts, the Yom Kippur goats are given “an eschatological
reinterpretation” in an apocalyptic setting in which the two lots cast for the goats become that of
the demonic (left) versus God (right) (2). This returns us to the possibility that the goat in the
novel may signal the story’s departure from any form of Christian salvation.
The Christian association of goats with the demonic or evil is the likely origin of
Matthew 25, in which Christ returns to pronounce judgment on the good and wicked
symbolically cast as sheep (right) and goats (left) respectively: “Before him will be gathered all
the nations, and he will separate them one from another as a shepherd separates the sheep from
the goats, and he will place the sheep at his right hand, but the goats at the left … Then he will
say to those at his left hand, ‘Depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the
devil and his angels” (Matthew 25: 32–3, 41 RSV). In this sense, Shelley’s choice of a goat as
the novel’s opening figure continues to indicate covertly the turn away from a Christian
framework toward both an older Greek mythology and newer scientific discoveries in which
humans are cruelly victimized by powers beyond their control without purpose or salvation. All
of humanity becomes the cursed goat, subject to the power of nature’s violence, which replaces
the figure of an angry god with a pantheistic nature turned violent in the form of plague. In
Shelley’s novel, goodness cannot save humanity. The “good” and the “wicked” are equally
subject to the same fate. Shelley’s goat figure then undoes this traditional Christian distinction
between the saved and the damned.
Tellingly, a family of goats reappears toward the end of the novel, set in 2099, recalling
the victim from the introduction set in 1818. The scene reveals the state of the narrator, Lionel,
and his relationship to his own species. Only after the plague has wiped out humanity does
Lionel fully acknowledge his kinship with other animals and recognizes their bodies and
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behaviors as similar to those of humans: “Live on, ye innocents, nature's selected darlings; I am
not much unlike to you. Nerves, pulse, brain, joint, and flesh, of such am I composed, and ye are
organized by the same laws. I have something beyond this, but I will call it a defect, not an
endowment, if it leads me to misery, while ye are happy” (366). Lionel replaces humans with
animals as nature’s “favored children”—something he struggles with throughout the text. Even
as Lionel identifies his difference from other animals, he asserts a shared corporeality and
materiality, and the specificity of these homologies suggests an undercurrent of animal and
human physiology drawn from comparative anatomy.20
After this peaceful pronouncement, however, Lionel’s jealousy for all that he has lost at
this point in the novel leads him to consider killing the male goat who attempts to protect his
family in a scene reminiscent of the Creature’s desire and refusal to kill Felix when he defends
the DeLacey family in Frankenstein (94). Indeed, the Creature describes this moment as
animalized and in relation to a lion specifically, “I could have torn him limb from limb, as the
lion rends the antelope,” (94) which relates to Lionel’s naming (lion) in The Last Man.21 This
scene of potential human violence against the natural world is part of the novel’s larger critique
of the human attempt to dominate nature, which can be read in relation to the critique in
Frankenstein of the Genesis story in which Adam is granted “dominion” over the earth. In The
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By 1809, Cuvier had catalogued the “skeletal members, muscles, tendons, and associated
nerves for the majority of the relevant animal groups” and he concluded that the nervous system
was the most relevant to the “organs of motion” (Coleman 91).
21
Hutchings reads the narrator’s full name, Lionel Verney, as symbolic of “a profound psychic
disunity, suggesting that he will be capable of accessing a harmonized, reintegrated sense of self
only by attaining the impossible perfection that is the ideal telos of millenarian desire, by
realizing within himself Isaiah's promised millennial scenario in which the predatory beast and
the docile lamb will lie down together, each harmoniously reconciled with the other” (233).
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Last Man, Shelley never allows Lionel to fully endorse or abandon human exceptionalism, but
the plague itself tips the scale decisively away from any human mastery of nature.

Part II. “Mad Mother” Nature and the Posthuman World
The plague in The Last Man can be read as an expansion of Victor’s fear of the biological
threat of the female creature leading to human extinction. Whether through fecundity or
mortality, the forces of nature gendered female place the human species at risk of death.
Shelley’s foreshadows this female force of destruction in the opening scene of the introduction
through the remnants of the cave of the Cumaean Sybil whose prophecy states that humanity will
disappear from the earth in the year 2100. The novel’s introduction recalls Plato’s famous
allegory of the cave.22 If we take this allusion as an entry point to read the novel as about
representation,23 it is evident that Shelley is interested in how meaning is made when the narrator
must become the “decipherer” who “translates and adapts” the Sibylline leaves found in the
cave: “Scattered and unconnected as they were, I have been able to add links, and model the
work into a consistent form” (4). Critics have read this moment, just as the creation of the
Creature in Frankenstein, as symbolic of Shelley’s proto-deconstructionist approach to language
and literary texts.24 These leaves correspond to the messages left by the Creature for Victor in
Vol. III of Frankenstein where “he left marks in writing on the barks of the trees, or cut in stone,
that guided me” (147). But this novel is about more than the general deconstruction of meaning
22

Without reference to this particular passage, Fuson Wang notes that, “Most of the novel’s 37
occurrences of the word “reflection” stage in some way or another the conflict between the
viability of human social constructions and natural decay, disease, and disaster (242).
23
Wagner-Lawlor reads the novel as about the “vulnerability” of representation itself,
specifically through references to the theater that call attention to the tension between reality and
fantasy (753).
24
See, for example, Audrey Fisch, “Plauging Politics: AIDS, Deconstruction and The Last Man.”
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and language; it centers on the representation and deconstruction of the human. That this
concept is central to the novel’s project is evident in the nature of the Sibyl’s prophecy as the end
of humanity, just as the Creature leads Victor toward death and further into a posthuman
environment.
The Cumaean Sibyl, a symbolic figure in Classical Greek and Roman mythology, has
multiple resonances in The Last Man. We can speculate that Shelley identifies with the figure of
the Sibyl, who in Ovid’s Metamorphoses, is a mortal who must live for 1000 years until her body
decays because she denies her virginity to Apollo.26 At the time that Shelley is writing The Last
Man, as her journal entry indicates, she feels herself to be the last alive of her close family and
friends. Further, as Fuson Wang argues, Shelley claims female prophecy as a form of female
authorship through the figure of the Sibyl. This is likewise reinforced by her opening references
to Galatea and Cleopatra (1). The Cumaean Sibyl in Virgil’s fourth eclogue prophesies a savior
who was interpreted in early Christianity to be Christ, though the Sibyl was primarily known for
prophecies of destruction. Shelley’s novel offers no such savior; instead it undermines both the
valiant and spurious acts of those claiming to be saviors as with Adrian and the false prophet. In
this way, Shelley’s Sibyl corresponds more to that of Virgil’s Æneid in which she is positioned
between the worlds of the living and the dead as a guide to the underworld. The novel debunks
the idea that humanity can save itself and instead argues that humanity must acknowledge its
place within nature rather than attempt to transcend it.
The Plague follows the figure of the Cumaean Sibyl as a female prophet of destruction,
which is personified as a dark mother nature that has been transformed from health to sickness,
25

The novel is consistently read as a deconstruction of boundaries of all kinds (genre, time, etc.).
See Wagner-Lawlor (772n4) for a list of various deconstructionist readings of the novel.
26
Shelley began reading Metamorphoses in 1815 (Morrison and Stone 316).
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much like the victims of the plague itself. The narrator laments, “Some disorder had surely crept
into the course of the elements, destroying their benignant influence” (183) [...] O, for some
medicinal vial to purge unwholesome nature, and bring back the earth to its accustomed health!”
(187). From this sickness comes the image of a mad mother nature that has turned on her child:
“Nature, our mother, and our friend, had turned on us a brow of menace” (185). The narrator’s
views here suggest a shift away from a Romantic mother nature as nurturing, even as he
maintains his belief in a “natural” form of goodness in nature via anthropomorphized terms.
Rather than Wordsworth’s “the nurse, / the guide, the guardian of my heart,” here mother nature
seems to turn against her “favored child,” humanity (“Tintern Abbey” lines 110-11).27 Shelley’s
images likewise recall Wordsworth’s “The Mad Mother” (and other “mad” female figures such
as Martha Ray in “The Thorn”).28 The mothers’ symbolic function is key in the complex social
and artistic interweaving of environmental, filial and political concerns. Mothers represent both
nature and the state in the values of care and order upon which families and nations are thought
to be built. In this series of symbolic intersections in which women, ecology and polity unite,
Mother Nature also becomes mother tongue and mother country (Mother England), a locus of
both potential for and the loss of natural, familial, and political harmony. As Stephanie Smith
recounts in a study of America's disavowal of the mother figure in its independence from
England, the mother was a “sacred, natural symbol of perfect, reciprocal relations” that “served
as a self-regulating model for social and familial harmony […] emphasizing maternity as the
stabilizing icon of continuity” (3). In this same vein, Mary Wollstonecraft's criticism of
capricious mothers reveals her sense of the ideal woman who is the moral center not only of
27

Hutchings reads the narrator, Lionel, as offering a “critique of Wordsworthian pastoral” (229).
See also Wordsworth’s poems in Lyrical Ballads, “The Complaint of a forsaken Indian
Woman” and “The Female Vagrant.”
28
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family but society: “Justice, truth, every thing is sacrificed by these Rebekah's, and for the sake
of their own children they violate the most sacred duties, forgetting the common relationship that
binds the whole family on earth together” (226).
The collapse of mother nature thus causes the collapse of her “child,” humanity. The
narrator thus casts humanity as the abandoned child of a mad mother. Most telling is the
narrator’s inability to accept a change in humanity that is not reflected in nature itself. The
narrator thus resents the independent agency of the female mother nature:
Nature was the same, as when she was the kind mother of the human race; now,
childless and forlorn, her fertility was a mockery; her loveliness a mask for
deformity. Why should the breeze gently stir the trees, man felt not its
refreshment? Why did dark night adorn herself with stars—man saw them not?
Why are there fruits, or flowers, or streams, man is not here to enjoy them? (262)
The explicit anthropocentrism of this passage results from the narrator’s inability to find purpose
or meaning in nature’s beauty or sustenance if not for human use. As soon as a feminized nature
withholds her affection, she is labeled deformed and becomes a monstrous figure akin to the
Creature in Frankenstein or even Lionel himself by the end of the novel.29 Nature’s fertility
becomes a mockery if humanity is no longer her child. If fertility is the basis of human life, its
inverse is a “dark” fecundity of pestilence that becomes an agent of death
The narrator continues his struggle to accept the reversal and authority of a once
benevolent mother nature:
Nature … shewed us plainly, that, though she permitted us to assign her laws and
subdue her apparent powers, yet, if she put forth but a finger, we must quake. She
could take our globe, fringed with mountains, girded by the atmosphere,
containing the condition of our being, and all that man's mind could invent or his
29

The narrator continues this description of the dual roles of nature as a mother: “Surely, if, in
those countries where earth was wont, like a tender mother, to nourish her children, we had
found her a destroyer, we need not seek it here, where stricken by keen penury she seems to
shudder through her stony veins” (328).
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force achieve; she could take the ball in her hand, and cast it into space, where life
would be drunk up, and man and all his efforts for ever annihilated. (183)
The narrator is never able to step outside of an anthropomorphism that casts nature as either a
nurturing or negligent mother, but this passage suggests a recognition that nature is a superior
force to humanity, far greater in scale, which is something that Raymond never entertains
throughout the novel. Shelley calls attention to scientific attempts to the Enlightenment’s
emphasis on assigning laws and creating classifications, but recognizes these as representations
that are meaningless in the face of materiality itself. Shelley calls attention to the overwhelming
scale of nature: “Shelley deploys grand, magnificent geographical images to convey the Gothic
vertigo her characters experience. The sheer ‘immensity’ and ‘geographic scale’ of the novel’s
global, imperial reach writes a dizzying physical vastness on their senses and consciousnesses”
(Cove 23), but Shelley’s novel goes even beyond the gothic and geographic toward the
posthuman and cosmic. As Charles Lyell explained of his own reaction to Sir Isaac Newton’s
cosmology, “Such views of the immensity of past time [...] were too vast to awaken ideas of
sublimity unmixed with a painful sense of our incapacity to conceive a plan of such infinite
extent. Worlds are seen beyond worlds immeasurably distant” (I:76). Lyell’s own discovery of
geologic time provided Darwin with the necessary timescale for speciation to occur.
Though the plague is frequently gendered female as a dark mother nature, it ultimately
creates a posthuman world.30 The plague has been read by feminist critics as representative of the
repressed female who takes revenge against her patriarchal oppression: “Plague had become
Queen of the World” (276). This is similar to how Mellor and Bate read the Creature in
Frankenstein as a dark mother nature that exacts her revenge on Victor for his violations of

30

For a reading of race in the novel within a posthuman framework, see Young-Ok An.

141
natural law (Poovey 150). These feminist readings of both of Shelley’s novels are insightful, but
I want to extend them into a critique of a larger anthropocentric mentality that Shelley locates
within patriarchal domination.31 While the plague is gendered female often but not always,32 it is
consistently rendered as an adversary, as is evident in the use of “Queen” and other statements of
hierarchy, such as “Plague sat paramount the while, and laughed us to scorn” (252). Even though
this battle is anthropomorphized, there are moments of recognition from the narrator that this
adversary is in fact nonhuman: “our sightless enemy” (221), “the impalpable, invisible foe,” and
“the grim Unreality (153). This impossibility of perception is echoed in the phrase “blank
reality,” to which Lionel is forced to return from his imaginings amid the destruction of
Stamboul (160). The plague “is neither an instrument of providence nor an object of human
control: it is, rather, ultimately inscrutable and entirely ungovernable” (Hutchings 239). The
battle of the plague becomes unrecognizable to humans, who cannot comprehend its nature or
meaning.33 This suggests a relation to the God-figure of the Hebrew scriptures who is at once
unknowable and because so, is often anthropomorphized, and Shelley’s narrator makes several
direct allusions to the parting of the Red Sea and the plagues in Exodus and the Genesis flood
narrative.34 Yet, as has already been established, Shelley’s plague is not presented in the style or
tradition of Biblical apocalypse, but is rather portrayed as a mystery without a definitive cause or
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See Gilbert and Gubar’s reading of the cave as a feminine space (95-99).
The Plague is gendered differently throughout the novel: for example as male (195), as female
(339-40) and sometimes neutral (219), but as Ranita Chatterjee notes, “Opposed to the more
traditional personification of an active and masculine Death (in this case, as hunter), the Plague
is depicted as an insidious feminine sovereign” (38).
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Indeed, Steve Vine describes the plague as operating entirely outside of discourse (153).
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reads Lionel’s taking hope in the sign of the rainbow at the very end of the story as his failure to
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agent. As Morton Paley argues, Shelley resists the tie between apocalypse and millennium
eschatology; instead there is “no sovereign God nor supernatural agency” [but rather] only the
“arbitrary” plague (110).
In these ways, Shelley’s plague moves toward a proto-evolutionary perspective that
anticipates Darwin’s own struggle to incorporate chance and extinction into the theory of natural
selection. In 1838, in his journal, Darwin suggested that extinction was part of Providence “since
rocks and mountains are composed of the remains of dead and extinct forms” (Ospovat 69). This
idea of a harmony in nature is one Darwin would struggle with up through the publication of
Origin in 1859 (72). Following Lyell, Darwin initially thought that extinction came about only
when the conditions of existence altered so that organisms were no longer well adapted to their
environments (54): “In constructing a theory to preserve harmony, Darwin, like Lamarck, almost
made impossible such a disharmonious event as extinction” (54).35 But this early theory was not
a sufficient explanation for the extinction of entire species. It was only after reading Malthus that
Darwin would rethink his understanding of extinction in relation to adaptation and accept the
role of chance, rather than Providence (59, 249n31). But even in the famous conclusion to
Origin, Darwin (understandably) still seeks to show a kind of beneficence in nature:
Thus, from the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted object
which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher
animals, directly follows. There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several
powers, having been originally breathed into a few forms or into one; and that,
whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from
so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have
been, and are being, evolved. (490)
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For a full study of Darwin’s struggle with extinction in the development of his theory, see
Gillian Beer, “Darwin and the Uses of Extinction.”
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We find this same image of nature as a nurturing mother earlier in Origin: “Man selects only for
his own good: Nature only for that of the being which she tends” (84). As we have seen,
Shelley’s novel offer us no such nurturing mother nor solace to the “war of nature, from famine
and death” (490) but rather catalogues the struggle of humans to accept their place within nature
from which there is no exemption.
Lionel’s struggle with this “grim Unreality” that he must confront leads him to imagine
future races/species who will arise after the extinction of humanity, what he calls the “postpestilential race” (309). These creatures are not necessarily human, but they do fulfill Lionel’s
idea of humans as the “perceiver and recorder” of nature: “We talked of what was beyond the
tomb; and, man in his human shape being nearly extinct, we felt with certainty of faith, that other
spirits, other minds, other perceptive beings, sightless to us, must people with thought and love
this beauteous and imperishable universe” (272). Nonetheless, this imaging of a future of
nonhuman species, is startling for the time period. It would not be until 1855 that Alfred Russel
Wallace, Darwin’s contemporary, would make the same kind of claim within an explicitly
evolutionary framework, noting “whatever race of intelligent beings may then have succeeded
us” (“Law” 195).

Part III. Malthusian Animals and Insects
The anxiety over species that leads to Victor’s fears of human extinction in
Frankenstein36 is expanded in The Last Man where Shelley focuses more explicitly on the idea
of predator and prey that she develops in Vol. III of Frankenstein. Predator-prey relationships are
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Victor fears that the female creature “might make the very existence of the species of man a
condition precarious and full of terror” (128).
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a cornerstone of ecology based on populations and systems, rather than individuals. Shelley’s
novel attempts to balance both the systemic and the individual in relation to death, recognizing
the predator-prey model as fundamental to nature’s processes. Shelley’s novel subverts modern
ecology’s trophic period in which humans are apex predators. Instead, the plague and death are
consistently described as predatory, to which humanity becomes “prey” (152): “Plague “came on
us [...] like a thousand packs of wolves, howling through the winter night, gaunt and fierce”
(213). This passage echoes Ryland’s fears about the plague as wolf-like (146) in which humanity
becomes the hunted animal rather than the hunter.
With humanity become prey to material forces beyond its control, death becomes a form
of dehumanization represented by defacement, as we saw earlier, again calling attention to
Shelley’s emphasis on faciality in Frankenstein. Raymond refers to Stamboul as like “ready
prey” (196) for his imperial war, but then is killed and defaced by the falling ruins of the plagueridden city, asserting a powerful material agency in both the diseased air and the building
materials that collapse onto him. Just at the moment that Raymond is poised to claim the East for
the West in a direct historical parallel to Napoleon,37 his victory is rendered Pyrrhic by the
plague as a nonhuman power that subjugates all of humanity regardless of national identity: “A
murmur arose, the city was the prey of pestilence; already had a mighty power subjugated the
inhabitants; Death had become lord of Constantinople”38 (149-159). This subjugation of the
human to the nonhuman becomes the novel’s main theme.
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Shelley extensively researched the geography of Constantinople for the novel (Bickley
383n68).
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The scene following Raymond’s death develops the idea of the plague as a “defacement”
of humanity. Lionel searches for Raymond amid the city scattered with “defaced human forms”
(159). When Lionel discovers Raymond’s body, he repeats Raymond’s “defacement” twice,
setting up a division between the human and nonhuman worlds. While Raymond’s dog and horse
are mentioned in association with his death, they function only as extensions of himself and his
warlike conquest.39 This recalls the death of Victor’s sled dogs in Frankenstein and the men
aboard Walton’s ship who fear dying like the dogs in one man’s quest for fame or revenge. The
soldiers in The Last Man similarly tell Raymond that they refuse to “die in heaps, like dogs”
(153) in the plague-infested city. In a telling scene, the soldiers try to discern whether cries
coming from the ruins of the city are human or animal: “We found a party of soldiers gathered
round it. They were listening. ‘They are human cries,’ said one: ‘More like the howling of a
dog,’ replied another” (164). In these ways, Shelley links the suffering of animals, particularly
those used in hunting, such as dogs and horses, to further illustrate her critique of war and its
consequences. This shared exposure to materiality for humans and animals is part of the novel’s
broader sense of proto-ecology, in which humans are consistently likened to plants, trees, and
birds with the home as a nest and importance of the soil as primary metaphors that show the
interconnection between humans and their environment. In another telling passage, the narrator
describes humans as vulnerable to the elements just like plants and other animals:
Like a few furrows of unreaped corn, which, left standing on a wide field after the rest is
gathered to the garner, are swiftly borne down by the winter storm. Like a few straggling
swallows, which, remaining after their fellows had, on the first unkind breath of passing
autumn, migrated to genial climes, were struck to earth by the first frost of November.
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Notably, early on Lionel refuses to forgive the injustices done against his family by Adrian’s
by refusing to serve like a dog to its master: “I will not suffer like a spaniel! [...] I will not tamely
submit to injury” (17).
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Like a stray sheep that wanders over the sleet-beaten hill-side, while the flock is in the
pen, and dies before morning-dawn. (338)
Humans, like corn, swallows, and sheep, are subject to what Darwin would recognize as natural
selection, in which some members of a species die either from weakness or chance or both.
Shelley’s passage deconstructs hierarchies of animacy and instead shows the shared vulnerability
of all life to its environment.
Shelley builds on the idea of this precariousness of humans as individuals and as a
species through recurrent images of humanity’s likeness to insects.40 Following the
aforementioned passage, the narrator shifts scale dramatically (as when he personified mother
nature with earth as a ball) in imagining an anthill. While this recalls Victor’s attempt to belittle
the Creature as a “vile insect,” (74) here the insect imagery becomes part of the narrator’s
imaginative shift in perspective away from anthropocentrism:
Have any of you, my readers, observed the ruins of an anthill immediately after its
destruction? At first it appears entirely deserted of its former inhabitants; in a little time
you see an ant struggling through the upturned mould; they reappear by twos and threes,
running hither and thither in search of their lost companions. Such were we upon earth,
wondering aghast at the effects of pestilence. (252)
“Such were we” suggests that the parallel is more literal than metaphoric, as does the detailed
description of the ants’ behavior. Shelley’s image functions as a microcosm for the novel as a
whole as organized human society breaks down in crisis.
Shelley uses a similar image later in the text that likewise miniaturizes the human world
to that of flies, looking at them as populations:
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There are several other instances that follow a similar theme: that of flies in a spider web,
often in relation to issues of class (41, 65); Parliament is described as having “an hum, like that
of ten thousand hives of swarming bees” (45); and the crowd as “As summer-flies are scattered
by rain” (195). For an interesting study of the symbolism of insects, particularly in relation to
forms of government, see Joseph Campana’s “The Bee and the Sovereign.”
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We who, like flies that congregate upon a dry rock at the ebbing of the tide, had played
wantonly with time, allowing our passions, our hopes, and our mad desires to rule us,
now heard the approaching roar of the ocean of destruction, and would have fled to some
sheltered crevice, before the first wave broke over us. (306)
Though this passage is a simile, the image is as striking as the anthill in its consideration of
humanity in aggregate within its environment. Here again, Shelley relates humans directly to
their environment, conceiving of the earth as a “dry rock” that is habitable for life. This again
recalls the figure of dark mother nature holding the earth as a ball as the rock here reads as a
microcosm of the earth. Water represents both nature, and death as an absorption back into
nature. This corresponds to the theory of catastrophism, in which Cuvier had suggested that the
continents were subjected to massive inundations that resulted in extinctions (Coleman 131).
Similarly to the grave-worms in Frankenstein that “dethrone” humanity by eating our
deceased flesh, insects are linked to death and consumption in one of the more gruesome deaths
in the novel. As with Raymond, Ryland abandons his protectorship of England. His
abandonment comes out of a fear of contagion, which the novel indicts him for as selfish and
cowardly. He is found, tragically and ironically, amid a “useless superfluity” of food, “halfdevoured by insects” (254). The novel draws this contrast between Ryland’s status as predator
and prey, human and animal, eater and eaten.
These shifts in perspective on humanity are strangely Malthusian, as Shelley looks at the
human species as a population. The influence of Malthus on the novel has been noted by many
critics.41 Most recently, Lauren Cameron has given sustained attention to the novel as Malthusian
and argues that the novel adopts a Malthusian stance that “humans are subject to the whims of
nature, which behaves blindly and randomly [and] that disease is the most significant limiting
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factor on populations” (Cameron 178). Shelley was familiar with Malthus through her father’s
long-running debates with him, which Percy Shelley continued.42 Malthus’s work was part of a
longer tradition of natural theology, especially William Paley’s, which attempted to show that
the law of population does not counteract a divine plan for humanity despite the individual
suffering it causes (Ospovat 66).
Malthus significantly altered Darwin’s conception of evolution and is often credited as
one of the primary influences for Darwin’s theorizing of natural selection. Darwin wrote in his
journal upon reading Malthus in 1838 that “until the one sentence of Malthus no one clearly
perceived the great check against men [...] One may say there is a force like a hundred thousand
wedges trying [to] force every kind of adapted structure into the gaps in the oeconomy of nature
of nature, or rather forming gaps by thrusting out weaker ones” (Darwin, D notebook 134–5;
Ospovat 62). Dov Ospovat’s important study of how Darwin’s thinking about evolution itself
evolved over time divides Darwin’s work into pre- and post-Malthus to stress this influence (39).
Ospovat argues cogently that Darwin’s concept of wedging from Malthus eventually became the
concept of natural selection.
Lionel himself echoes a Malthusian stance that moral restraint will provide a preventive
check against disease, but this idea is quickly dismissed in the novel as the moral and immoral
alike are subjected to the plague.43 The novel likewise dismisses Lionel’s earlier assertions that
either rationality or nationality can save humanity: “Plague shall not find us a ready prey; we will
dispute every inch of ground; and, by methodical and inflexible laws, pile invincible barriers to
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the progress of our foe. Perhaps in no part of the world has she met with so systematic and
determined an opposition. Perhaps no country is naturally so well protected against our invader”
(196). By the end of the novel, Shelley deconstructs both these positions, exposing humans as
prey and the irrelevance of their behaviors in relation to the plague.
The narrator always maintains an explicitly anti-materialist position (347) (like Percy
Shelley in “On Life,” which Raymond echoes (135), believing in a type of spirit separate from
the material, yet the novel ruthlessly reduces humanity to its material existence as the narrator
mourns the loss of everything once valued as human: art and culture, politics, commerce, and
dominion over nature. The narrator attempts to hold onto some sense of divinity for humanity
over and against the animal or mechanistic body, but the plague consistently draws attention to
the vulnerability of the human body in its exposure to the material world. Toward the end of the
novel, Lionel becomes increasingly desperate to hold onto his worldview:
But the game is up! We must all die; nor leave survivor nor heir to the wide inheritance
of earth. We must all die! The species of man must perish; his frame of exquisite
workmanship; the wondrous mechanism of his senses; the noble proportion of his godlike
limbs; his mind, the throned king of these; must perish. Will the earth still keep her place
among the planets; will she still journey with unmarked regularity round the sun; will the
seasons change, the trees adorn themselves with leaves, and flowers shed their fragrance,
in solitude? Will the mountains remain unmoved, and streams still keep a downward
course towards the vast abyss; will the tides rise and fall, and the winds fan universal
nature; will beasts pasture, birds fly, and fishes swim, when man, the lord, possessor,
perceiver, and recorder of all these things, has passed away, as though he had never been?
O, what mockery is this! Surely death is not death, and humanity is not extinct; but
merely passed into other shapes, unsubjected to our perceptions. (330)
Conceiving of earth as an “inheritance,” Lionel views humanity as the reigning king of nature,
solidifying his anthropocentric views. His catalogue of nature suggests that there is no separate
purpose for nature outside of humanity’s ability to both control and appreciate it, as with his
figure of mother nature. As Wagner-Lawlor argues, “For Verney, the tragic element clearly lies
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in the irreconcilable collision of the ideal and the real, fantasy and action, in the fall from futureoriented utopian images to desperate delusions of survival” (761). In order to maintain this
anthropocentrism in the face of a plague that leaves nonhuman nature intact, Lionel must
question the very definitions of “human” and “death.” Notably here, Lionel returns the rhetoric
of prey and extinction.
Earlier in the novel, however, Lionel tries to accept the material reality for his species,
recognizing that the divinity of man is an illusion:
Once man was a favourite of the Creator, as the royal psalmist sang, "God had made him
a little lower than the angels, and had crowned him with glory and honour. God made
him to have dominion over the works of his hands, and put all things under his feet."
Once it was so; now is man lord of the creation? Look at him—ha! I see plague! She has
invested his form, is incarnate in his flesh, has entwined herself with his being, and blinds
his heaven-seeking eyes. Lie down, O man, on the flower-strown earth; give up all claim
to your inheritance, all you can ever possess of it is the small cell which the dead require.
(251)
Here, the body becomes subject to materiality through penetrating terms, “invested,” “incarnate,”
“entwined,” as it is literally and metaphorically pulled from a vertical to a horizontal relation
with its environment.44 Lionel repeats the terms “inheritance,” and “possess” suggesting that
there is no possibility to “own” nature the way an anthropocentric view demands. The image of
blinding is a violent one, 45as the body is forced from its attempts toward divinity down to the
grave.46
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This figuring echoes Vine’s concept of “Female Romanticism”: “In opposition to what
Christine Battersby calls Kant’s ‘mind-constructed nature’ (75), female Romanticism recognised
the demands of a materiality that exceeded the constructions of the Mind. Narrative trope
plunges the idealities of mind into the exorbitancies of matter” (Vine 142).
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The imagery in this scene recalls Keats in “Ode to a Nightingale”: “I cannot see what flowers
are at my feet, / Nor what soft incense hangs upon the boughs, / But, in embalmèd darkness,
guess each sweet / Wherewith the seasonable month endows / The grass, the thicket, and the
fruit-tree wild; / White hawthorn, and the pastoral eglantine; / Fast-fading violets cover'd up in
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Lionel likewise shows that it is through the body’s vulnerability to the material world that
the assertion of human mastery of the material world becomes an untenable position:
What are we, the inhabitants of this globe, least among the many that people
infinite space? Our minds embrace infinity; the visible mechanism of our being is
subject to merest accident. Day by day we are forced to believe this. He whom a
scratch has disorganized, he who disappears from apparent life under the
influence of the hostile agency at work around us, had the same powers as I—I
also am subject to the same laws. In the face of all this we call ourselves lords of
the creation, wielders of the elements, masters of life and death, and we allege in
excuse of this arrogance, that though the individual is destroyed, man continues
for ever. (184)
Here again, Shelley emphasizes the vulnerability of the body—despite the many capacities of
humans as a species, a mere scratch can lead to death.47 This material interconnection to the
environment through the porous body makes humans vulnerable to disease and death. This
makes dominion, in the form of patriarchal aggression, “lords, wielders, masters,” impossible.
Shelley further operates on the principle of population, noting that individual and species
survival are interrelated.

Part IV. Colonialism as Plague
The plague is figured as monstrous in the novel, particularly in relation to colonial war
and violence. Shelley recognizes that British colonialism was an attempt to control both people
leaves; / And mid-May's eldest child,/ The coming musk-rose, full of dewy wine,/ The
murmurous haunt of flies on summer eves” (lines 41-50). We know from her letters that Shelley
is reading Keats while writing the novel (Bickley 386n108).
47
This line recalls Mercutio’s in Romeo & Juliet: “Ay, ay, a scratch, a scratch; marry, 'tis
enough” (3.1.64) followed by “No, 'tis not so deep as a well, nor so wide as a / church-door; but
'tis enough, 'twill serve: ask for / me to-morrow, and you shall find me a grave man. I /
[...]'Zounds, a dog, a rat, a mouse, a / cat, to scratch a man to death!” (3.1.67-70). While bacteria
had been discovered in 1676 through the use of the microscope, it was not until after Shelley’s
novel in the 1830s that bacteria were more fully understood, which would lead to the germ
theory of disease in the 1850s. Thus, while the science behind how a wound could cause
infection was not understood, its effects were immediately evident.
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and natural resources, hence she imagines the plague as a kind of revenge by nature, as with the
Creature in Frankenstein, in forcing the British characters into a radical form of becominganimal. Shelley plays with the colonial discourse of “wild” and “savage” as she transforms
England into an uninhabited wilderness. By the end of the novel, when Lionel is the last human
alive, he comes to find his own humanity monstrous. Lionel has been forced to acknowledge
humans’ position within nature by the plague, similarly to how the Creature forces Victor to
undergo his suffering. Just as he earlier characterized mother nature as monstrous, Lionel
becomes monstrous to himself: “My person, with its human powers and features, seem to me a
monstrous excrescence of nature” (372). This is a rejection of his earlier “civilized” self imbued
by Adrian (discussed later in this chapter). The term “excrescence” is particularly revealing in its
meaning, “An abnormal, morbid, or disfiguring outgrowth; a disfiguring protuberance or
swelling on an animal or vegetable body” (“excrescence”). This reduction to his corporeality and
its seeming monstrosity recalls the Creature’s perception of himself48 and his enforcement of this
same state onto Victor. These references to the mirror as form of representation and self-identity
reflect the construction of “human” as a category, which in both novels functions via visual
perception.
The novel chronicles Lionel’s journey to this acceptance of the “monstrous” materiality
within nature and humanity. Shelley takes fire as a primary symbol in this novel, just as in
Frankenstein and its Promethean mythology. In The Last Man, she extends its philosophical
import to political and even ecological implications. In Frankenstein, the Creature learns, “In my
joy I thrust my hand into the live embers, but quickly drew it out again with a cry of pain. How
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the end of the novel startles him (352).
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strange, I thought, that the same cause should produce such opposite effects!” (77-78). Here, the
fire seems to symbolize human nature in its capacity for both positive and negative outcomes. In
The Last Man, Shelley describes fire as a site of trauma that represents material nature:
I remember, after having witnessed the destructive effects of a fire, I could not even
behold a small one in a stove, without a sensation of fear. The mounting flames had
curled round the building, as it fell, and was destroyed. They insinuated themselves into
the substances about them, and the impediments to their progress yielded at their touch.
Could we take integral parts of this power, and not be subject to its operation? Could we
domesticate a cub of this wild beast, and not fear its growth and maturity?” (italics added
184)
Here, Shelley presents a clear critique of science, particularly the experiments with electricity by
Franklin, Priestly, and Galvani, and its potential destructive power already suggested in
Frankenstein. The fire is linked directly to the powerful agency of materiality, as it strips away
human culture. The vivid description of the flames presents them as unstoppable invaders,
permeating every substance and body; hence, the fire prefigures the plague itself, which becomes
“entwined” with the porous human body. Further, the plague is associated with a dark cloud
from the burning city of Stamboul. This calls attention to issues of industrialization that began
with the mining and burning of coal.
The ecological implications of fire are further underscored by the animal metaphor, in
which the “wild” becomes “domesticated.” This process is exactly that which Lionel himself
undergoes, as a “cub” of the wild, who is then acculturated through Adrian. Lionel begins as an
uneducated, poor shepherd who commits petty crimes until he meets the ethereal and
philosophical Adrian who transforms him from animal-like to “human.” Lionel describes himself
as like the material world of which he is part, “I was rough as the elements, and unlearned as the
animals I tended” (9). In a way resembling the animalized Creature in Frankenstein, Lionel
states that he “continued my war against civilization, and yet entertained a wish to belong to it”
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(13). Lionel’s violence, like the Creature’s, comes from his exclusion from humanity. Lionel
makes this point explicitly: “I now began to be human. I was admitted within that sacred
boundary which divides the intellectual and moral nature of man from that which characterizes
animals” (21). Only under the influence of Adrian does Lionel come to define himself as
“human,” one who is able to cross the “sacred boundary” that divides humans from other
animals. It is this same boundary line that the Creature in Frankenstein attempts to cross, yet is
not admitted.
As Lionel follows this journey from “savage” to “civilized,”49 his “civilizing” is in part
measured by his treatment of animals, which turns from violent to peaceful under the guidance of
Adrian and later Idris.50 Lionel’s “animalized” nature is epitomized in the scene where he is
caught hunting birds in Adrian’s aviary: “My garments were torn, and they, as well as my hands,
were stained with the blood of the man I had wounded; one hand grasped the dead birds—my
hard-earned prey, the other held the knife” (23). Lionel’s dual violence against animals and
humans is linked to his physicality and appearance. Shelley develops this contrast in the first
meeting between Lionel and Adrian that immediately follows the preceding passage in the novel:
He [Adrian] came up the while; and his appearance blew aside, with gentle western
breath, my cloudy wrath: a tall, slim, fair boy, with a physiognomy expressive of the
excess of sensibility and refinement stood before me; the morning sunbeams tinged with
gold his silken hair, and spread light and glory over his beaming countenance. [...] As he
spoke, his earnest eyes, fixed on me, seemed to read my very soul: my heart, my savage
revengeful heart, felt the influence of sweet benignity sink upon it; while his thrilling
voice, like sweetest melody, awoke a mute echo within me, stirring to its depths the lifeblood in my frame. I desired to reply, to acknowledge his goodness, accept his proffered
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For more on this, see Bewell’s discussion of “savageness” in the novel as part of colonial
rhetoric (302).
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Chatterjee reads Lionel’s transformation as “not a teleological narrative of progress, but rather
[one that] addresses the fundamental separation that constitutes political life (that between zoe
and bios and which fails in modernity) (43).
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friendship; but words, fitting words, were not afforded to the rough mountaineer; I would
have held out my hand, but its guilty stain restrained me. (23-4)
Adrian is explicitly configured as a “western” influence in the form of breath and wind, which
the novel will later complicate in important ways. His appearance, in contrast to Lionel’s, is
quintessentially English. Further, the stamp of Adrian’s character onto Lionel is conceived as
both a spiritual and physical process as Adrian enters Lionel’s soul and blood, like the power of
the fire.51 Lionel’s physical markings of animality in his appearance and his loss for words recall
the Creature’s first encounter with Victor in which Victor flees from him. The attention to
Lionel’s blood-stained hands in both passages recalls the moment when the Creature hides
himself from Victor’s sight with his own guilty hands. Further underscoring Lionel’s
animalization is his inability to communicate in language. Here, however, Shelley rewrites the
scene between the “savage” and the “civilized” figures that she complicates throughout
Frankenstein, in which Adrian offers Lionel exactly what the Creature desires: an entrance into
human ethics and a mate—the female version of Adrian, his nearly identical sister Idris.52
Likewise evident in this passage from The Last Man is Adrian’s association with the
Cartesian division between body and mind, in which the body is linked to both the animal and
the mechanical, while the mind is tied to the spirit as something transcendent. Lionel conceives
of his “cultivation” (23) as a transition from material to intellectual life: “in valley and over hill,
my crook thrown aside, a nobler flock to tend than silly sheep, even a flock of new-born ideas, I
51

Hutchings reads Adrian’s character as a critique of Percy Shelley’s anti-materialism (232).
Notably, both Adrian and Idris have similar descriptions to Elizabeth Lavenza in the revised
edition of Frankenstein (1831) in which her hazel eyes become blue and there is a much longer
description of her Aryan characteristics and parentage: “She appeared of different stock. The
four others were dark-eyed, hardy little vagrants; this child was thin, and very fair. Her hair was
the brightest living gold, and [...] seemed to set a crown of distinction on her head. Her brow was
clear and ample, her blue eyes cloudless [...] a being heaven-sent, and bearing a celestial stamp
in all her features” (191). For a detailed study on faciality and race in Frankenstein, see Dutoit.
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read or listened to Adrian” (27). Adrian takes on a Christological significance to Lionel,
transforming him from a literal to a metaphoric shepherd through a conversion experience that
Lionel feels is his salvation. Lionel’s diction echoes Christ’s call to his disciples who are literal
fishermen to become “fishers of men”53 (Matthew 4:19 RSV). Shelley also figures Lionel’s newfound identity as akin to colonial conquest54, “I [Lionel] felt as the sailor, who from the topmast
first discovered the shore of America; and like him I hastened to tell my companions of my
discoveries in unknown regions” (27). Lionel’s sentiment is quite different than the Creature’s in
Frankenstein who “heard of the discovery of the American hemisphere, and wept with Safie over
the hapless fate of its original inhabitants” (89). While Adrian is cast as a potential savior-figure,
the novel never allows Adrian to transcend mortality; rather, he is frequently incapacitated
physically by sickness and fatigue.
The novel amplifies Adrian’s “western breath” as the West Wind, which Lionel
associates as part of colonial power, portraying his views on nature as a battle for power: “Then
mighty art thou, O wind, to be throned above all other vicegerents of nature's power; whether
thou comest destroying from the east, or pregnant with elementary life from the west; thee the
clouds obey; the sun is subservient to thee; the shoreless ocean is thy slave!” (183). By
conceiving of nature as male and hierarchical here, Lionel’s passage exposes the connections
between the wind and colonial power, which for the British navy was necessary for sailing.
Shelley is clearly alluding to Percy Shelley’s “Ode to the West Wind” in which the wind, like the
fire in Frankenstein, can be both “Destroyer and preserver” (lines 13-14).
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In the tradition of Biblical typology, King David is read as a type of Christ. Adrian’s
description may also be an allusion to David who was a literal shepherd who then becomes the
“shepherd” of Israel (2 Samuel 5:2 RSV).
54
Shelley is likely alluding to colonial justifications of religion for converting “savages” to
Christianity. See Richard Hakluyt’s disturbing treatise from 1585, “Reasons for Colonization.”
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Shelley complicates Adrian’s “western” identity by creating a parallel image
(characteristic of Shelley in Frankenstein) to the meeting between Lionel and Adrian. In this
scene, the breath that penetrates Lionel’s core is literal rather than metaphoric and definitively
non-Western, figured as noxious, dangerous, and Other:
It was quite dark; but, as I stept within, a pernicious scent assailed my senses,
producing sickening qualms, which made their way to my very heart, while I felt
my leg clasped, and a groan repeated by the person that held me. I lowered my
lamp, and saw a negro half clad, writhing under the agony of disease, while he
held me with a convulsive grasp. With mixed horror and impatience I strove to
disengage myself, and fell on the sufferer; he wound his naked festering arms
round me, his face was close to mine, and his breath, death-laden, entered my
vitals. For a moment I was overcome, my head was bowed by aching nausea; till,
reflection returning, I sprung up, threw the wretch from me, and darting up the
staircase, entered the chamber usually inhabited by my family. A dim light
shewed me Alfred on a couch; Clara trembling, and paler than whitest snow, had
raised him on her arm, holding a cup of water to his lips. (263)
The alternation between light and dark (“dark”/“lamp,” “negro”/”dim light” “paler,” “whitest”)
intermixes, just as the breath of the Other becomes the breath of Lionel. Further, the figure of
Alfred parallels the negro figure as both are suffering from the effects of the plague,
but55whereas Clara comforts Alfred, no one, not even Lionel, attends to the character reduced
only to his suffering black body.56 This recalls the Creature’s attempts to grasp Victor upon his
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See Wang on this moment in the novel and “The central metaphor of inoculation […] through
its invocation of a long material history of medical science, from Montagu’s Turkish inoculation
to Jenner’s cowpox vaccine” (235).
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This scene with the “half-clad negro” is one of contention in criticism in part because it does
not develop this lone black character amid a host of minor British characters whose backstories
add Dickensian subplots to the novel. Mellor attempts to read the scene within the novel’s
broader critique of nationalism, in which the intermixture of breath actually inoculates rather
than poisons, saves rather than kills. As Melville points out, many critics have adopted this
interpretation, but Melville and An call attention to the fact that this scene is peculiar as the novel
suggests that the plague is not transmitted directly by person-to-person contact, but rather by
noxious air. These were the two prevailing theories of disease transmission at the time (see
McWhir). This leaves this particular scene in the novel difficult to read. For a fuller study of this
question, see Melville.
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animation and the vast inequities between Victor’s and the Creature’s suffering, in which Victor,
like Alfred, is always attended with care, while the Creature, like the “negro” figure, suffers
alone.
This scene is part of the novel’s more broadly problematic English exotification of the
East and South, but it does not negate the text’s broader critique of colonialism which is linked
directly to the plague. The violence of war that the plague partially represents is literalized in the
novel when the narrator discusses the effects of war on the landscape, the role of the weather in
warfare (as was important in Napoleon's losses), and the poor living conditions within cities:
The whole of this part of Thrace had been so long a scene of contest, that it had remained
uncultivated, and presented a dreary, barren appearance. [...] All was serene, burning,
annihilating. We the besiegers were in the comparison little affected by these evils. The
woods around afforded us shade,—the river secured to us a constant supply of water; [...]
But in the city things wore a different face. The sun's rays were refracted from the
pavement and buildings—the stoppage of the public fountains—the bad quality of the
food, and scarcity even of that, produced a state of suffering, which was aggravated by
the scourge of disease; while the garrison arrogated every superfluity to themselves,
adding by waste and riot to the necessary evils of the time. (143)
Shelley describes the site of warfare as barren and the land as ravaged by drought. There is an
eerie contrast in the movement from peacefulness to destruction in “serene, burning,
annihilating.” This is interrupted briefly by the safe haven of the woods, recalling Perdita’s
idealized cottage before its abandonment, in which nature is plentiful and provides. Shelley then
contrasts this more natural setting with the city where humans in their selfishness are unable to
provide for one another. Shelley again uses the word “superfluity” as with Ryland to indict
human selfishness. Shelley links the violence of war to the land and to humans as a species: “I
turned to the corpse-strewn earth; and felt ashamed of my species” (144). Here, humans force
each other to the earth in constant warfare rather than through the more abstract figure of Death.
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The association of the plague with colonial warfare is reinforced by Lionel’s dream
following Raymond’s death.57 Like Victor’s dreams in Frankenstein, the dream’s uncanny nature
speaks to the repressed reality beneath it.58 In Lionel’s dream, Raymond, the warring conqueror
who wishes to outdo even Napoleon, is figured as the plague:
I awoke from disturbed dreams. Methought I had been invited to Timon's last feast; I
came with keen appetite, the covers were removed, the hot water sent up its unsatisfying
steams, while I fled before the anger of the host, who assumed the form of Raymond;
while to my diseased fancy, the vessels hurled by him after me, were surcharged with
fetid vapour, and my friend's shape, altered by a thousand distortions, expanded into a
gigantic phantom, bearing on its brow the sign of pestilence. The growing shadow rose
and rose, filling, and then seeming to endeavour to burst beyond, the adamantine vault
that bent over, sustaining and enclosing the world. The night-mare became torture. (161)
Shelley alludes to Shakespeare's Timon of Athens, in which Timon confronts those who have
betrayed his generosity and curses a plague on society for its greed. This dream echoes the curse
of the Greek princess Evadne onto Raymond for his abandonment of her in which she twice links
“war, fire and the plague” (145) in her dying speech.59 Evadne comes between Perdita and
Raymond’s marriage. Her “easternizing” influence on Raymond, as seen in her architectural
designs, her Turkish slippers, etc. draw Raymond away from his filial and nationalistic roles as
the Protector of England (Wang 240-1). Evadne is cast as a destabilizing force in her ability to
transcend borders: Evadne’s ambition to be princess of Wallachia (now Romania) causes her
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See Sterrenburg for the argument that the figure of the monster as a political metaphor arose
during the time of the French Revolution. He reads the dream in The Last Man as related to
Burke’s “gigantic phantom” of the deceased monarchy and in relation to the Creature since all
three monstrous figures arise out of death, though he sharply contrasts the creature and the
plague (339-340).
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As discussed in the previous chapter, Victor’s dream of himself being tortured by animals is a
reversal of his own guilt for his creation of the Creature and the dream in which his mother and
Elizabeth merge likewise reinforces their shared role and Caroline’s willingness to die in order to
take care of Elizabeth.
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See Sterrenburg for a discussion of the novel’s engagement with the Greek revolution on the
1820s, of great importance to both Byron and Percy Shelley (344).
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husband’s downfall and eventual suicide and plummets her into poverty, which is where
Raymond finds her and rekindles their relationship (90).60
Raymond represents the link between war and patriarchal aggression. Both Perdita and
Evadne view themselves as Raymond’s victims. Unable to accept his severance from them, they
both pledge themselves to reunite with him in death even to the point that Perdita commits
suicide when Lionel tries to take her away from Raymond’s grave and abandons her only child.
Lionel describes Raymond’s downfall: “Thus, while Raymond had been wrapt in visions of
power and fame, while he looked forward to entire dominion over the elements and the mind of
man, the territory of his own heart escaped his notice; and from that unthought of source arose
the mighty torrent that overwhelmed his will, and carried to the oblivious sea, fame, hope, and
happiness” (italics added 92). Like Victor Frankenstein, Raymond is brought down by his own
faults, particularly his desire to control nature, recalling the passage that the glory of humanity is
subject to a scratch. Victor himself does not heed his own lessons as a child; when reading
history, he realizes “if no man allowed any pursuit whatsoever to interfere with the tranquility of
his domestic affections, Greece had not been enslaved; Cæsar would have spared his country;
America would have been discovered more gradually; and the empires of Mexico and Peru had
not been destroyed” (38). In The Last Man, Shelley ties patriarchal abandonment of the family to
colonial expansion.
This conviction is likewise evident in the figure of the ruined cottage that stands at the
center of The Last Man. Perdita’s cottage in the novel is based on the one that the Shelleys and
their circle spend time in at Bishopsgate in 1815-16 (Bickley 379n24). As in Wordsworth’s “The
Ruined Cottage,” the scene of domestic bliss is blighted by crop-failure and “the plague of war”
60

For an important recuperative reading of Evadne, see Wang (240-1).
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that causes the departure of the husband-turned-soldier. When Lionel comes upon Perdita’s
cottage, it has been overtaken by nature, erasing the humanity that once resided there:
Perdita had adorned her cottage with every aid art might bring, to that which
nature had selected to favour. In the same spirit of exaggeration she had, on the
event of her separation from Raymond, caused it to be entirely neglected. It was
now in ruin: the deer had climbed the broken palings, and reposed among the
flowers; grass grew on the threshold, and the swinging lattice creaking to the
wind, gave signal of utter desertion. The sky was blue above, and the air
impregnated with fragrance by the rare flowers that grew among the weeds. The
trees moved overhead, awakening nature's favourite melody—but the melancholy
appearance of the choked paths, and weed-grown flower-beds, dimmed even this
gay summer scene. The time when in proud and happy security we assembled at
this cottage, was gone. (201)
In The Last Man, this scene is foreshadowing, as the erasure of domestic bliss and space is writ
large by the plague, which leaves every house unoccupied by humans and invaded by “wild”
nature and animals and Lionel repeatedly describes the eeriness of entering empty houses with
all the remnants of life in them, leaving only relics of a now nearly extinct species.
Though in the novel the plague is chronologically simultaneous with the dissolution of
Raymond’s marriage to Perdita through Evadne and consequently his protectorship of England,
it exceeds both the domestic and national frame until it becomes a posthuman materiality that
engulfs the international world. The plague undoes all notions of rank, wealth, and class—what
the French Revolution tried and failed to do, even through the immense violence of the Reign of
Terror.61 The “nurslings of luxury” (186) are reduced to utter poverty and the poor inhabit the
palaces, but at the cost of all human life. The plague’s reign of terror is the only form of
“governance” that brings about true equality as all of humanity is subjected to the same type of
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That the French Revolution is on Shelley’s mind during the novel is unquestionable, especially
given the relation of Raymond to Napoleon and numerous allusions to Burke’s Reflections on the
Revolutions in France.
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death. This is the novel’s deepest indictment of humanity’s inability to solve its own created
problems; thus, the price of equality becomes death.
Shelley’s primary symbol for England in the novel is a ship, recalling England’s
aggressive colonial expansion through its navy, in which “the sun never sets on the British
empire” and she makes direct allusions to The Tempest and Robinson Crusoe. Throughout the
novel, Shelley deconstructs England’s nationalism until it is reduced to three survivors on a boat
that is then shipwrecked, thereby leaving only “the last man” bereft of any nation.62 Ironically,
the plague, which is associated with colonial expansion, becomes the means by which nationality
is dismantled (just as in Frankenstein the Creature is designed to overcome death, but rather
becomes a murderer). Lionel states, “England is in her shroud,—we may not enchain ourselves
to a corpse. Let us go—the world is our country now” (260).63 This is a repeated image in which
England is a body that dies: “The overgrown metropolis, the great heart of mighty Britain, was
pulseless. Commerce had ceased. All resort for ambition or pleasure was cut off—the streets
were grass-grown—the houses empty” (208). Here, nature retakes the city, dissolving its borders,
as with Perdita’s cottage on a smaller scale. The plague dissolves all national borders, revealing
them as human constructions: “Summer advanced, and, crowned with the sun's potent rays,
plague shot her unerring shafts over the earth. The nations beneath their influence bowed their
heads, and died” (220).
Under this radical equality, all of humanity perishes. The plague eradicates boundaries of
class, just as those of nationhood: “We were all equal now but near at hand was an equality still
more levelling [...] The grave yawned beneath us all” (153), which Lionel reiterates later in the
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Paul A. Cantor suggests the novel follows a “reverse colonialism” as it progresses from east to
west (198).
63

163
novel, “Death and disease level all men” (195). With this radical form of leveling, Shelley shows
the transformation of formerly private aristocratic spaces: “Where late the busy multitudes
assembled for pleasure or profit, now only the sound of wailing and misery is heard” (186).
Shelley not only deconstructs class barriers through the change in previously restricted spaces,
but shows how animals “inherit” human habitation. While humans cannot benefit from this
newfound equality through suffering, it frees animals from human dominion. Now, “the cow
stalled in the hall of pleasure,” (250) while “the animals, in new found liberty, rambled through
the gorgeous palaces, and hardly feared our forgotten aspect” (333). That animals take over
formerly aristocratic spaces suggests that the world has become not only free of class and
national barriers, but also of the human architects of those flawed concepts.
Shelley’s novel then synthesizes her own experiences of death and loss, both personal
and national. She interweaves this with the science of her time, particularly Cuvier’s work on
fossils and catastrophism. She anticipates the conclusions of both Darwin and Wallace in her
imagining of the end of the human species. Through a focus on humans’ shared vulnerability
with all other organic life, including plants, animals, and insects, she mourns a “mad mother”
nature that acts outside of any human, patriarchal, or colonial attempts at control.
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Chapter 4. “Perpetual Analogies” and “Occult Harmonies”: Ralph Waldo Emerson’s
Naturalized Typology
“All relation supposes a certain analogy” (Baron d’Holbach, The System of Nature 118).
Introduction: Typology as Rhetoric
Ralph Waldo Emerson harnessed the rhetorical power of the “type” from both theology
and natural history in his own theory of nature. Historically, typology derives from the Messianic
prophecy in Judaism as well as earlier Jewish and Greek allegorical traditions. It was
appropriated by the early Christian church as a means to recast the Hebrew scriptures as
prophecies of Christ in which people and events became images of Christ and his redemption in
the New Testament. By the nineteenth century, the idea of different animal and plant “types” that
were related across species had become part of the burgeoning field of natural history. This sense
of type became popular in natural theology, which merged Christian theology with natural
history, to discern a divine plan and order in God’s creation of natural forms. A similar concept
of type is likewise present in the German Naturphilosophie tradition, most directly in Goethe’s
morphology in both botany and comparative anatomy.1 Each of these formulations of type
undergird one of Emerson's defining artistic and philosophical maxims: “Man is an analogist,
and studies relations in all objects” (Nature 36). For Emerson, types became a powerful tool for
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While the term “typology” did not come into use until the mid-nineteenth century in English,
the practice of reading “types” from the Hebrew scriptures into the Christian scriptures is found
in the Christian scriptures themselves. Andrew Delbanco points to Paul’s use of Biblical types,
“typoi,” for example, in the epistles to the Corinthians and Romans (11). The use of the term
“type” in theology begins in works in English dating from the 1600s (“typology” and “type”).
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classification and unification in his quest to understand the deep structure of the natural world.
Because of their use across the very spheres Emerson sought to unite, types were uniquely suited
to demonstrate his perception of the shared principles of spirit and matter, and the scientific and
spiritual study of nature. For Emerson, types became a rhetorical device, always resonant with
the original Biblical practice, but never limited by its stricter formulations.2 It is perhaps not
surprising that Emerson would be attracted to the underlying principles of typology, with its
emphasis on patterns and unity, as well its correspondence to visual imagery and literary tropes,
such as foreshadowing and symbolism. Further, Emerson's deep interest in the relation of
religion and science, from which his use of type derives, in part hinged on their shared sense of
interpreting the future, predicting/ prophesying and discovering “truth” or “law.”
Emerson used types creatively to illustrate unexpected connections between seemingly
disparate categories, creating a concept of nature as infinitely interconnected. Emerson’s sense of
these interconnections drove him to alter “the axis of vision” to become “coincident with the axis
of things” (Nature 54). This shifting of axes is part of a larger Romantic reconceptualization of
nature that began across the Atlantic in the British and European traditions from which Emerson
would draw and reform into an American context. Emerson developed his use of the rhetorical
function of types to transform ideas of nature in his philosophy and writing from a rigid
ontological hierarchy into an interwoven ecological web.3 In this way, Emerson’s work
anticipates Darwin’s as Emerson demonstrates in poetic prose how all life shares a common
descent and character.
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For further discussion of typology as a form of rhetoric, see Northrop Frye, The Great Code:
The Bible and Literature.
3
For more on the theorizing of this shift (though not in relation to Emerson), see Jane Bennett’s
Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (10).
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Emerson’s conception of nature and his contributions to ecological thinking have
received significant critical attention in literary study, particularly during the rise of ecocriticism
as a field in the 1990s.4 Despite this, Emerson often is discounted as even a protoenvironmentalist, particularly when compared to Henry David Thoreau, whose study of nature is
considered more scientific. Yet science, as the study of nature, was Emerson’s most passionate
project and informed his philosophy, theology, and writing more than any other subject. The
development of Emerson’s ideas about nature reflects a growing ecological awareness through
his close study of science. For Emerson, this emerging sense of ecology came from discoveries
in comparative anatomy, botany, and geology in particular as these branches of science began to
show empirical relationships between all forms of matter. For Emerson, these empirical relations
were likewise spiritual, drawing a connection between the two that undergirds all of his work. In
“Experience,” he claims, “The physicians say, they are not materialists; but they are:--Spirit is
matter reduced to an extreme thinness: O so thin!--But the definition of spiritual should be, that
which is its own evidence” (201). Thus, for Emerson spirit and matter came to be indissoluble
and matter was evidence of spirit. In his reading of the Scottish anatomist and surgeon Charles
Bell in the 1830s, Emerson found Bell’s words resonant with his own sense of the
interconnectedness of the world: “The mind of the enquirer is carried back, not merely to the
contemplation of animal structure, but by inference, from the system of animal organization to
the structure of the globe itself” (25). While for Bell these material relations were signs of a
divine creator and plan, for Emerson, they inspired a transcendental reconceptualization of the
relationship between humanity, divinity, and nature. Bell, along with several other scientists who
4

Lawrence Buell’s ecocritical focus on the American Renaissance laid important groundwork
for thinking about ecology in the works of Emerson and Thoreau. See Lawrence Buell, The
Environmental Imagination: Thoreau, Nature Writing, and the Formation of American Culture.
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believe in natural theology and influenced both Emerson’s and Charles Darwin’s concepts of
nature, including Louis Agassiz and Richard Owen, unwittingly built up the case for evolution in
their work on comparative anatomy even though they were committed creationists.5 Emerson
drew deeply from the tradition of natural theology that Bell advanced6 as he began to recognize
that science was now the key to philosophy, writing in his journal on March 4, 1831: “The
Religion that is afraid of science dishonours God and commits suicide” (Journals II 362).

Part I. The Theological Origins of Typology
Emerson’s impetus to unify theology and science in his study of nature in the nineteenth
century was as exigent as the early Christian church’s original imperative for typology to form a
cohesive canon. In Christian theology, characters from the Hebrew scriptures are designated
types of Christ, who is the antitype, to which all else must correspond. In addition to merging the
patriarchal lineage of prophets from the Jewish to the Christian tradition, typology casts events
and items such as feasts and offerings as symbolic elements of Christ’s character (i.e., Passover
as a representation of Christ’s blood sacrifice). Tertullian and St. Augustine were significant
proponents of the typological method and expanded it to include various forms of types beyond
Christ, finding connections between figures in the Hebrew scriptures and principles from the
Christian scriptures.7 Emerson’s ministerial training would have provided him with a working
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See Stephen Jay Gould in Time’s Arrow, Time’s Cycle: Myth and Metaphor in the Discovery of
Geologic Time on demythologizing of the modern narrative of scientific progression, in which he
argues for the need to recuperate important scientific work regardless of the fact that it was done
under the auspices of theology.
6
For further discussion of Emerson’s reading of natural theology, see Walls (239, n68 and n72).
7
Auerbach, in his study of the “figura,” cites Tertullian’s own typology: “How is Christ the
Passover, except inasmuch as the Passover is a figure of Christ through the likeness of the saving
blood and of the flock of Christ?” to which Auerbach comments, “Often vague similarities in the
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knowledge of Biblical types (Labriola 126). Moreover, his writings reflect a keen awareness of
the powerful rhetorical possibilities of typology for unification. Typology cast “history as a
series of integrated steps culminating in a grand, triumphant design” (Davis 13). Hence, typology
lent itself well to the emerging field of natural history, which, before Charles Darwin, classified
the biotic world along a trajectory of progressive development culminating in humanity.
The term typology derives originally from Greek meaning “that effected by a blow” (as in
an impression or stamp) (Brumm 26). This presents an image of God as the anti-type (i.e., the
original blow) that creates the impression upon that which then becomes a type. In typology,
there tends to be a slippage between related terms. This intermixture reveals typology’s
participation in a broader rhetorical framework of figurative language. In relation to type, Ursula
Brumm highlights the use of analogous concepts such as allegory, symbol, figure, image, and
emblem (21); while Thomas Davis notes the interchange of pattern, parable, scheme, figure,
picture, and example (13). Additional terms such as mark, model, form, copy, and shadow could
be added to the list.8 This diversity within the linguistic purview of typology is reflected in
Stephen Manning’s observation of typology as “bursting into a riot of meanings which illuminate
human experience” (58). Yet what is central to typology as a specific rhetorical device is the link
between two seemingly disparate elements, transforming the latter into the fulfillment of what is
foreshadowed by the former—the foreshadowing only becomes clear when it is read backward in
light of the new information. While clearly this form of appropriation can be and has been

structure of events or in their attendant circumstances suffice to make the figura recognizable;
one had to be determined to interpret in a certain way.” He likewise notes that to Tertullian the
figura was as real and historical as the literal facts (29-30).
8
Auerbach likewise provides a comprehensive analysis of varied terminology in the original
languages, especially the interchange of figura and typus (48).
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problematic (particularly in Christian interpretations of the Hebrew scriptures) this principle
drives typology’s unique utility to assimilate new information into pre-existing forms.
Accordingly, typology was apt for Emerson’s integration of new scientific information into a
theory of nature freed from doctrinal constraints.
Typology became popular as a form of biblical exegesis in Puritan theology; it was
considered “sanctified” because of several direct comparisons between Christ and figures in the
Hebrew scriptures found in the gospel of Matthew and in the epistle to the Hebrews. As Perry
Miller explains, because typology “supposedly had the sanction of revelation, it could claim
precedence over merely human rhetoric” (6). By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
American Puritan ministers adapted the rhetoric of typology to link their own plight and
subsequent “deliverance” to the “promised land” of America with the experiences of the ancient
Israelites (Bercovitch 36). Brumm attributes the American Puritan attraction to typology directly
to its prophetic nature: “the promise of something yet to come” (27). For Sacvan Bercovitch it
was typology's prophetic element that aided the American Puritans’ core belief and mission to
found a new Jerusalem (Bercovitch 37). Attention to the relations between American Puritan
typology and American Transcendentalism surfaced in the 1940-50s through the groundbreaking
and controversial work of theological historian Perry Miller. Miller's work was continued in
several major studies in the 1970s, but since then few scholars have addressed this particular
connection, in part because of the multifarious influences across disciplines and continents on
American Transcendentalism. Joan Richardson's 2007 A Natural History of Pragmatism reminds
scholars that American theology, philosophy, and literature had to confront the unique habitat of
American wilderness while simultaneously incorporating a barrage of new scientific information.
Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in Emerson's conception of nature.
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According to Miller, “Types were not allegories or emblems or fictitious narratives …
they were preliminary, factual prefigurations of what Christ finally did” (6). Typology's relation
to other forms of figurative language, however, led some like Origen and St. Jerome in the 4th
century B.C.E. to focus more on symbolic or allegorical rather than literal meaning (Davis 23).9
This mode of interpretation often arises when literal instances prove problematic to the reader’s
theology or morality. Such is the case when St. Augustine, following his Greek predecessors,
glosses over Sampson's sexual relationships with women as a form of “prophecy” in order to
reconcile Sampson as a type of Christ (24). One of typology’s key functions is its ability to forge
unlikely or unexpected connections in order to maintain a unified system of belief. The potential
power (or heresy) of typology derives from its creativity and imagination, which can create “an
open license for subjective interpretation” (27). It is precisely this issue that concerned the early
Christian church, whose debates between literal and abstract interpretations of scripture dominate
its early formation, as well as the major revolutions, including those of Martin Luther and John
Calvin. Typology likely has persisted in most forms of Christian theology because of both its
adaptability and eschatology. As Stephen Manning notes, “from its very origins typology
answered the Christian need for relevance” (58). Typology was instrumental in forging the links
that helped to spread Christianity into Europe, just as it was employed by the writer of the epistle
to the Hebrews to convert the Gentiles to a belief in Christ as the fulfillment of the Jewish
Messianic prophecy (Brumm 28).

9

Like his reinvention of typology, Emerson retains this Puritan principle of plain style, but
dramatically reinvigorates it through the unleashing of imagination, especially in forms of
analogy.
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Perry Miller was the first scholar to suggest the influence of the Puritan theologian
Jonathan Edwards on Emerson’s use of typology. In his introduction to Edwards’ Images or
Shadows of Divine Things (1737) Miller traces the religious and literary “habit of finding
symbols of the abstract in the concrete” noting the Puritan's rejection of the Anglican church's
“esthetic … ritual and ornamentation” despite their embrace of typology (“Introduction” 3). In
contrast to the Anglican forms, the Puritans used a plainer style: “The Puritan stylist studiously
held his fancy in check, sought his metaphors and similes in the commonplace, and
remorselessly exacted the last ounce of meaning by a direct translation of the trope into moral so
that nothing would be left to the imagination of the reader” (5). Miller’s relation of Edwards’
typology to Emerson’s Transcendentalism was immediately controversial. Miller credits
Edwards with inventing a new typology grounded in observation of the natural world that broke
away from the plainer form, which helped open the door for Emerson to a personal and “original
relation to the universe” (Emerson Nature 27). To Miller, Edwards’ historical moment
necessitated this new form of rhetoric to “awaken” the masses in “The Great Awakening” (14).
Like Emerson’s, Edwards’ expansion of typology was sparked by the rise of the natural sciences:
theology had to incorporate scientific revelations in order to remain relevant (Brumm 97-8).
Like Emerson’s, Edwards' love for the idea of God was inextricably bound up in his love
of nature even as he professed to view the natural world in Platonic terms as “imperfect
imitations of the higher” (Brumm 96).10 In Miller's terms, this was “a revolution in sensibility” in
which the natural and personal began to overtake religious orthodoxy, though this was not
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As, for example, when Emerson writes in Nature “The world proceeds from the same spirit as
the body of man. It is a remoter and inferior incarnation of God, a projection of God in the
unconscious” (50).
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Edwards' intention (Miller, “Introduction” 36). Brumm concludes that “Edwards weakened …
type … by making it bear a meaning expressed in imagery” (95), reversing typology's trajectory
toward Christ through a focus on images of nature. What perhaps is most revolutionary is that
Edwards' focus on natural imagery locates meaning in his own interpretation of visible nature as
signs of God. Similarly, Edwards' connection of Christ to the soul moves typology inward for the
individual, in a process that Brumm describes as “the more the type approaches the symbol …
The antitype now changes more and more into an inner meaning” (94). In these ways, Edwards
shifted typology away from Biblical literalism and further toward natural and direct revelation—
a significant evolution from even its most allegorical uses that found its way into Emerson’s own
reinvention of past forms in Transcendentalism.
Edwards follows a long history of Biblical scholars' adaptation of typology to their time,
place, and audience. Miller describes the transmission of ideas from Edwards to Emerson as
diffuse rather than direct. Because of typology's continual recombinations to fit new
circumstances, it survived cultural evolution to reach Emerson--not directly--but as part of his
Unitarian upbringing and ministerial training, among other philosophical forms that likewise
employ its core principles. Orthodox Puritan theology maintained that though “God was
presented as the creator and governer of the world, He would always be something other than the
world itself” while “Both mysticism and pantheism … identified Him with nature, made Him
over in the image of man” (Brumm 191). This is precisely the evolution that Miller traces in
“From Edwards to Emerson,” noting the changes from Calvinist to Unitarian to Quaker theology.
Miller casts Edwards as struggling against his mystical and pantheistic tendencies, checked only
by the doctrines of Calvinism, whereas Emerson is “free to celebrate purely and simply the
presence of God in the soul and in nature” (198). To Miller, Emerson is “an Edwards in whom
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the concept of original sin had vanished” (Errand 185). Perhaps nowhere is this point more
clearly manifest than when Emerson rewrites Luke 17:20 at the end of Nature, replacing the
original “the kingdom of God” with “The kingdom of man over nature” (55), or, more simply,
when he asks, “What is a farm but a mute gospel?” (41).
Emerson transformed the religious heritage of typology into his theology, philosophy,
and writing. Brumm argues that “the breakdown of Puritan orthodoxy into Unitarianism” created
American forms of symbolism and allegory that found their way “from theology to literature”
(5). She postulates that “the substance of the Puritan faith had grown outmoded, but some of its
categories and methods of thought found a new use” (18). Brumm expands Miller's initial study,
noting Emerson's extension of typology following Edwards' shift toward the divinity in nature
and she attributes the rise of natural symbolism in American literature directly to Emerson (108).
She cites two passages in which Emerson uses the word “type” (of which there are many):
“Whilst common sense looks at things or visible Nature as real and final facts, poetry, or the
imagination which dictates it, is a second sight, looking through these, and using them as types
or words for thoughts which they signify” (“Poetry and Imagination” 203) and similarly “Nature
offers all her creatures to him as a picture-language. Being used as a type, a second wonderful
value appears in the object, far better than its old value” (“The Poet” 187) (Brumm 106-7). In
both cases, Emerson highlights the connection between the visual and the verbal in his use of
type. Further, in both examples he finds a “second” kind of sight in which nature becomes
philosophically or spiritually significant, similar to what Percy Shelley calls the “vitally
metaphorical” relationship between words and natural objects in the Defence. To Brumm,
Emerson primarily means “type” as “symbol” and interchanges it with “sign” and “emblem;”
hence, nature becomes the signified in Emerson’s constructions. Emerson frequently uses the
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latter term, as well as other terms associated with typology including cipher, shadow, impression,
correspondence, resemblance, image, and numerous variations on “picture.”11 In Nature,
Emerson emphasizes nature's “analogical import” noting “What is true of proverbs, is true of all
fables, parables, and allegories” (38) unifying both nature and literary form as types of a greater
truth. Emerson's use of typology and its corresponding vocabulary clearly illustrates not only his
knowledge of it as a rhetorical methodology, but a deep appreciation for it as a system of
interpretation and revelation – a “second sight.”
As is evident in Emerson’s typological vocabulary, his use of typology corresponds to
several other metaphysical philosophies: Platonic ideas and shadows, Emanuel Swedenborg’s
doctrine of correspondences, and Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s theories of the imagination and
nature (influenced by Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling). Emerson interweaved a vast array of
source material, reading the contemporary science of his time (Davy, Herschel, Lyell, Faraday,
etc.) in relation to “what he already knew of ideal and real forms from Plato, Galileo, Newton,
Kant, Goethe” etc. (J. Richardson 69). This intensive process of intellectual alchemy allowed
Emerson to achieve new and unique possibilities for typology as a form of rhetoric. Emerson’s
sense of nature as system of signs to be read follows a long tradition that includes both Puritan
typology and German Naturphilosophie. Patrick Labriola argues in his brief article from 2002
that although Emerson would never identify himself with Puritan typology, “he firmly holds on
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Robert Richardson notes the influence of Swedenborg's doctrine of correspondences on
Emerson, especially Swedenborg's core tenets: “the avowed search for the soul and the idea that
everything exists on the physical plane—our world of time and space—has a counterpart in the
immaterial world of mind” (98). This theory corresponds to several other Platonic conceptions
that likewise influenced Emerson, including Fichte's declaration that "There is a Divine Idea
pervading the visible universe; which visible universe is indeed but a symbol and sensible
manifestation" (R. Richardson 146).
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to a typological past” (126). Labriola identifies three levels of typology in Emerson’s work:
“first, Emerson believes that nature enables the individual to learn about God through signs of
nature (like Edwards); second, that spirit has changed itself into a natural substance in order to
reveal itself to mankind; and third, conscious human spirit and the unconscious spirit of nature
are united when these two spiritual forces come together” (127). Emerson takes these last two
tenets from Schelling who he may have encountered first through Coleridge and then through the
work of the German scientist John Stallo. From Schelling, Emerson may have drawn the ideas of
a spirit in nature akin to man and a synthesis of man and nature through this shared spirit, what
Schelling called the “world soul” (129-131) (itself likely drawn from Plato’s concept of the
anima mundi). This intermixture of nature, human, and spirit is at the heart of Emerson’s use of
typology as a form of rhetoric. Emerson then adapted Schelling’s work and applied it to his idea
of material language: Near the end of the “Language” chapter of Nature, Emerson writes
“Material objects … are necessarily kinds of scoriae of the substantial thoughts of the Creator,
which must always preserve an exact relation to their first origin; in other words, visible nature
must have a spiritual and moral side” (38-9). Here again, we find Emerson reading nature for a
corresponding significance. Emerson borrows the term “scoriae” from the science of geology to
refer to the process of the cooling of molten lava when exposed to air.12 To Emerson, this is not
simply a scientific metaphor, but rather the material process by which nature and spirit relate.
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Emerson may have encountered this use of the term in J.F.W. Herschel’s 1830 Preliminary
Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy (294) (“scoria”).
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As these past critical studies elucidate, Emerson's expanded use of typology creates
nature as a type of divinity that is found within humanity.13 Two brief notations from Emerson's
journals indicate the beginnings of this definitional principle. In his journal on Nov. 2, 1833,
Emerson writes, “There is more beauty in the morning cloud than the prism can render account
of. There is not a passion in the human soul, perhaps not a shade of thought but has its emblem in
nature” (Journals III 226). Emerson’s critique of the prism here echoes Goethe’s Theory of
Colors (Farbenlehre) in which Goethe offers a critique of Newtonian optics by defining colors
through a prism as an experience rather than an objective reality that the prism reveals.14
Emerson expresses two Romantic sentiments here: first, that nature cannot be contained by
scientific empiricism, as Whitman and Poe likewise affirm in “When I Heard the Learned
Astronomer” and “Sonnet--to Science;”15 and second, that there is a correspondence between
nature and the human mind. Emerson again takes up the idea of the meaning of nature when he
writes in his journal on April 11, 1834: “I saw the clouds … It was Day, that was all Heaven
said. The pines glittered with their innumerable green needles in the light and seemed to
challenge me to read their riddle” (Journals III 271). In both instances, “emblem” and “riddle”
can be read in relation to type as Emerson, like Edwards before him, reads the “Book of Nature”
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A variety of influences on both Edwards and Emerson, notably Greek philosophy and
scientific discoveries, as well as their own physical environment and propensities, shaped their
understanding of nature as spiritual. Christopher Windolph, for example, notes the similarities
between the poet Xenophanes and Emerson (31).
14
Goethe’s work was published in German in 1810 and in English in 1840.
15
Goethe makes similar critiques of science, particularly of Newton, for “modern science’s
disaggregation of nature into discrete and unrelated singularities” rather than “nature’s
overarching unity as self-originating (epigenetic) and self-organizing totality of metamorphoses”
(Pfau 9).
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alongside the Christian Bible for revelation. Indeed, Emerson sounds much like Edwards

particularly in the “Spirit” chapter of Nature when he writes of nature in both Platonic and
Christian terms: “It is a great shadow pointing always to the sun behind us. … Like the figure of
Jesus, she stands with bended head, and hands folded upon the breast … the noblest ministry of
nature is to stand as the apparition of God. It is the organ through which the universal spirit
speaks to the individual” (49). Again, “figure” here serves as a variant for type. Emerson's focus
on specific images, especially the devout pose, as well as the use of “apparition,” (which is
repeated from his opening paragraph in Nature) emphasizes nature's role as a pictorial, material
representation of the divine.
Even with Edwards as a model, Emerson would need to go further in breaking with
orthodoxy altogether to form his own theory of nature outside of doctrinal constraints. Emerson's
first crisis of faith happened during intensive academic study at Cambridge on a paper entitled
“The Unity of God,” which he ultimately abandoned to labor in the fields of his uncle's farm (R.
Richardson 63). The topic of the paper speaks to Emerson's lifelong devotion to the study of
unity amid diversity17, but also to the difficulty of the subject for him. Emerson’s next break with
religion would come in part from his increasing commitment to scientific study, which
crystallized in the Jardin des Plantes. That revelation followed his second major break with
Unitarianism after the death of his young wife Ellen. Emerson had speculated that consciousness
might exist beyond death but found that he could not communicate with Ellen after her death. In
a seemingly strange gesture of closure and even scientific curiosity, Emerson opened Ellen's
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For further discussion of the similarities between Edwards and Emerson, including their
ministerial training in typology, see J. Richardson 64-65.
17
As I will discuss later in this chapter, Emerson drew this concept from both philosophy and
science (namely, Coleridge and Agassiz).
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coffin after many months to view her remains. Ellen's death in 1831 played a significant role in
Emerson's crisis of faith, though he resigned from his position as a minister officially over the
issue of Communion in 1832, citing it as a ritual that does not need to be repeated. In his sermon
“The Last Supper” on the subject of Communion, Emerson reveals his deepening belief in the
moral superiority of individual freedom over institutionalized tradition, a claim made by Percy
Shelley before him in several of his anti-religious tracts and notes to Queen Mab.18 In his
monumental biography of Emerson, Robert Richardson describes this instance as evidence that
“His [Emerson’s] deepest problem was that the church relied heavily, necessarily, on forms and
Emerson was increasingly unable to live within the old inherited forms” (125). As Emerson
himself notes in his journal on July 6, 1832, “Religion in the mind is not credulity and in the
practice is not forms. It is a life. It is the order and soundness of a man. It is not something to be
got, to be added, but is a new life of those faculties you have” (Journals II 492). This statement
itself is an expansion of Christianity's concept of baptism into “new life,” which Emerson
redefines here in terms of human faculties. As this example clarifies, Emerson does not simply
abandon tradition or religion, but instead expands them—he experiments, trimming, adding and
remixing various elements from a wide range of fields to form his own “original relation to the
Universe” (Nature 27). As Neal Dolan observes, though Emerson ultimately eschewed organized
religion, “he never ceased to perform a quasi-ministerial role of cultural-symbolic exposition and
exhortation” (4). Indeed, in his new form of philosophical theology, he continues to serve in the
prophet-poet-philosopher role so familiar to him from both Greek philosophy and the Hebrew
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Irena Makarushka provides a useful overview of Emerson's theological development in her
chapter “Emerson on Religion” (1-25) and in particular on his resignation for the Unitarian
ministry (57-61).
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and Christian scriptures. Richard R. O'Keefe argues that “Emerson metamorphoses himself
from the prophet of John the Baptist, announcing the coming of Jesus, to the prophet Jesus
himself” (106). In this way, divinity became intrinsic in both humanity and nature. Emerson's
new belief system allowed him to find the elusive “unity” of God that eluded him in his formal
ministerial training by expanding the very definition of God to nature, what he calls “the unity of
Nature—the unity in variety—which meets us everywhere” (Nature 41). Emerson borrowed this
idea from Coleridge (and through Coleridge, Schelling) as I will discuss later in this chapter.
This expansion allows him to discover divine methods of revelation in the material world. In this
context, it is clear that Emerson does not jettison Biblical typology with orthodoxy, but instead
reinvents it for his own purposes.
Building on Edwards' framework, Emerson expands typology dramatically and abstractly
beyond theology, intermixing spirituality, philosophy, nature, and science in various
combinations. Perry Miller notes that, for believers in Christian theology, “If the types could
finally be deciphered, history would no longer be a haphazard series of events but the steady
accomplishment of a purpose” (7). Emerson takes up this task by creating new types rather than
relying on past forms. This revolutionary expansion of typology beyond classification, creed,
nationality, and orthodoxy is evident throughout his essays, as in “Fate” from his 1851 lecture
series “The Conduct of Life”:
Dante and Columbus were Italians, in their time: they would be Russians or Americans
to-day. Things ripen, new men come. The adaptation is not capricious. The ulterior aim,
the purpose beyond itself, the correlation by which planets subside and crystallize, then
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In Apostle of Culture: Emerson as Preacher and Lecturer, David Robinson traces the many
stages of Emerson's development from religious to cultural prophecy.
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animate beasts and men, will not stop, but will work into finer particulars, and from finer
to finest. (274)
The numerous links in only these few lines are testament to the extent to which Emerson weaves
together various materials toward his philosophy. In particular, he uses the language of biology,
“adaptation” to argue that the same process of growth in nature applies to planets, crystals,
humans, and animals alike. Emerson merges the moral perfectionism found in the antitype of
Christ with the nineteenth-century conception of biological progression from natural history,
which is the basis for later theories of directional or deterministic evolution. Consequently,
Emerson finds a purposeful, rather than arbitrary (“capricious”), progress (“ripen”) toward
perfection (“finest”) in both biology and history that he then applies to nationality. Given the
lecture's theme, “Fate,” such determinism perhaps is expected, but Emerson is suggesting a fate
that involves the endless unfolding of new life for both humans and the nonhuman world.
Emerson’s idea that different nationalities rise at different times is tempered somewhat by
his recognition that similar ideas exist across nationalities and specialties. A clear example of
Emerson's typological unification of philosophy and theology is found in his journal on
September 8, 1833. While at sea, Emerson writes of his frustration with traditional forms of
sectarian theology, when he finds that “the eminent men of each church, Socrates, à Kempis,
Fénelon, Butler, Penn, Swedenborg, Channing, all say the same thing” (Journals III 200). This
list illustrates Emerson's sentiment of the unity amid plurality by combining radically diverse
philosophers and theologians under the term “church.” To Emerson, the “truth” in each of their
works corresponds to one universal truth of which they are types, which Emerson presents as an
alternate form of the listing rhetoric of the Judeo-Christian patriarchal lineage present in the
Hebrew and Christian scriptures.
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Emerson also applies this same kind of typology, following the Puritan rhetoric, to the
promise of America itself as the fulfillment of a cultural prophecy. Emerson, adapting to his
historical, geographical circumstance and audience, uses this rhetorical device as a means of
inspiration. In “The Poet” Emerson writes, “America is a poem in our eyes; its ample geography
dazzles the imagination, and it will not wait long for metres” (196). Here, Emerson links nature
and language to political purpose in echoes of “The American Scholar.” Emerson's hope is that
America will no longer be only a type that reiterates its European heritage. Emerson's message to
America builds from the principles of typology: “All that Adam had, all the Caesar could, you
have and can do. Adam called his house, heaven and earth; Caesar called his house, Rome; you
perhaps call yours, a cobler's [sic] trade; a hundred acres of ploughed land; or a scholar's garret.
Yet line for line and point for point, your dominion is as great as theirs. … Build therefore, your
own world” (Nature 55). Here, Emerson places the individual in a typological lineage freed from
at least some of its hierarchical and historical bounds. His emphasis on place (“house”) and
description (“called”) reflect the interrelation of language and nature in his message. The use of
lines and points is doubly significant in its interrelation of terms common to both language and
mathematics and in mirroring the conceptual action of typology of making connections between
lines and points, whether textual, physical, or temporal. This sense of projection in Emerson's
typology is prophetic: Emerson now casts America as the antitype, the fulfillment in a long series
of types of the union of the intellectual, spiritual, and active principles: “This confidence in the
unsearched might of man belongs, by all motives, by all prophecy, by all preparation, to the
American Scholar” (68).
Despite Emerson’s nationalistic rhetoric, his expansion of typology blurs the boundaries
between theology and philosophy, and he likewise loosens both from Western dualisms.
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Emerson's readings of the French philosophers Joseph Marie de Gérando and Victor Cousin
helped him to come “for the first time, to the realization that ancient Hindu, Chinese, and Persian
thought was on a philosophical par with Hebrew, Greek, and Christian” (R. Richardson 104).
Similarly, Cousin influenced Emerson in his study of “Great persons,” in Cousin’s terms as
“representations of nations, epochs, of humanity, of nature, and of universal order” (R.
Richardson 115), tracing yet another influence on Emerson's expansive sense of typology. In this
way, Christ becomes not the antitype, but one of many types throughout different religions, all of
which correspond to Emerson's principle of Universal Being which comes to replace both God
and Christ, much like Percy Shelley’s rejection of God and substitution of “a pervading Spirit coeternal with the universe” in Queen Mab (Complete 263). The theme of likeness among
greatness is especially salient in Emerson's Representative Men, in which he proclaims “We run
all our vessels into one mould. Our colossal theologies of Judaism, Christism, Buddhism,
Mahometism are the necessary and structural action of the human mind” (10). By linking the
human mind to the divine, Emerson finds that all religious thought points toward one spiritual
form.
Notably, Perry Miller is critical of Emerson precisely for this kind of Transcendental
ahistoricism: “We are impatient with an undiscriminating eclecticism which merges the
Bhagavad-Gita, Robert Herrick, Saadi, Swedenborg, Plotinus and Confucius into one
monotonous iteration. Emerson found a positive pleasure—which he called the 'most modern
joy'—in extracting all time from the verses of Chaucer, Marvell, and Dryden” (Errand 187).20
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Emerson's own words are “We read the verses of one of the great English poets, of Chaucer, of
Milton, of Dryden, with the most modern joy,--with a pleasure, I mean, which is in great part
caused by the abstraction of all time from their verses. There is some awe mixed with the joy of
our surprise, when this poet, who lived in some past world, two or three hundred years ago, says
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Miller does not link this “joy” to typology, which he views as a historical hermeneutic. Yet as
Erich Auerbach notes in his influential study of typology, the type is always a projection into a
future time (59). Here we find an Emersonian reinvention of typology that allows it to cross a
varied range of texts rather than only between two sets of doctrinal scriptures. Frye describes this
power of typology specifically in terms of time: “Causal thinking tends not to move out of the
same dimension of time … Typology points to future events that are often thought of as
transcending time, so they contain both a vertical lift as well as a horizontal move forward”
(101). Rather than create a linear trajectory in which one past can only prefigure one future, in
Emerson time and place become relative to the observer. As Emerson writes in his journal on
April 11, 1834: “I opened my eyes and let what would pass through them into the soul. I saw no
more my relation how near and petty to Cambridge or Boston, I heeded no more what minute or
hour our Massachusetts clocks might indicate—I saw only the noble earth of which I was born”
(Journals III 122). Amid Emerson's philosophical point on the individual's perception of
universality is a recognition of time's relativity to the individual that allows him to unite
disparate thinkers in his own thinking. Emerson's sense of time is that of the mind's, what he
calls “the necessary and structural action of the human mind.”

Part II. The Science of Types
The primary scientist to introduce “types” into natural history was the French
comparative anatomist Georges Cuvier. In building on a new model of a branching rather than

that which lies close to my own soul” (“American” 60). Miller's critique is symptomatic of
debates within the scholarly community in the 1950s over formalist methodologies that likewise
decentralize historical context.
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linear nature, Cuvier proposed a system of “embranchments” based on “types” that would
provide structural comparison across the animal kingdom (Coleman 1). Emerson read Cuvier’s
1822 catastrophist text Discourse on The Revolutionary Upheavals on the Surface of the Globe
and on the Changes Which They Have Produced in the Animal Kingdom (Walls 65-6). In the
famous Cuvier-Geoffroy debate of 1830, Cuvier argued that his types were based on a range of
possible adaptations to the environment, rather than as Geoffroy suggested that types originated
from an idealist unity (Bowler 118). For Cuvier, “[e]very taxonomic category, from species and
genus to the embranchment, was, he believed, a sharply defined and morphologically stable unit”
(Coleman 74). Cuvier’s original four embranchments were Vertebrata, Mollusca, Articulata, and
Radiata (93) with further subcategories added in his memoir of 1812 (89). Cuvier explained his
theory of types most directly in his 1827 Prospectus based on the concept of Platonic Ideas (98).
“The type species was believed to be the most representative species for each genus” (100); type
could be a species or an embranchment that “brought nature together” (102). Cuvier’s theory of
types was thus a “strange blend of philosophical and practical zoology” (153). In what was
termed “functional anatomy,” prior environmental conditions supposedly determined animals’
forms; thus, in Cuvier’s theory “future ends are offered in explanation of present phenomena”
(40). This concept corresponds directly to Biblical typology’s conception of time. This method
of classification draws from Aristotelian teleology (41), but likewise participates in the futurity
of Biblical types based on the Judeo-Christian Messianic prophecy. In Cuvier’s work on types in
natural history, then, already we find an intermixture of religious, philosophical, and biological
traditions.
Louis Agassiz, who was a friend of Emerson and studied under Cuvier in Paris, further
developed the theory of types in comparative anatomy in America in the mid-nineteenth century.
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By 1847, Agassiz became the most prominent figure in American science and remained so for
approximately twenty-five years (Walls 173). He was an opponent of Charles Darwin and known
for his debates with Darwin’s American colleague, the botanist Asa Gray. Due to his education
in Germany, Agassiz studied Lorenz Oken’s vertebrate archetype (Bowler 106) and integrated
German Idealism’s “unfolding of a rationally ordered pattern aimed at eventual production of
nature’s highest type: man” with William Paley’s natural theology based on a divine creator
(111).21 Agassiz devotes several sections of his Essay on Classification to the role of types,
which begins with his central premise, “There is but one system, and that is to be read in nature,
and was not devised by man. The essential divisions of that system cannot be arbitrary” (xlv).
From this, he argues for “Diversity in unity,” one of his foundational principles: “The greatest
diversity of form and of complication of structure may be found under the same plan of
structure” (xlv). Following this model, Agassiz divided animal types into three categories of
“prophetic, progressive, and synthetic types” (xlvi). The prophetic type most clearly derives from
the theological origins of typology:
We have seen ... how the embryonic conditions of higher representatives of certain types,
called into existence at a later time, are typified, as it were, in representatives of the same
types, which have existed at an earlier period. These relations, now they are satisfactorily
known, may also be considered as exemplifying, as it were, in the diversity of animals of
an earlier period, the pattern upon which the phases of the development of other animals
21

Disturbingly, both Agassiz and Richard Owen applied their scientific theories of development
and differentiation to the pseudoscience of race, leading Agassiz to claim that the human races
were in fact different species that could not interbreed (Walls 182) in what is known as
“polygeny” as we saw in Charles Darwin’s Descent. Agassiz contributed directly to the
advancement and continuation of slavery in America, adding an air of scientific credibility to the
racist theories of works like Types of Mankind (1854).
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of a later period were to be established. They appear now, like a prophecy in those earlier
times, of an order of things not possible with the earlier combinations then prevailing in
the animal kingdom, but exhibiting in a later period, in a striking manner, the antecedent
considerations of every step in the gradation of Animals. (117)
In this passage, Agassiz traces a “pattern” between earlier and later species of the same type. For
him, these similarities are not due to direct descent, but rather to a divine plan, hence his
metaphorical use of the earlier types as “prophetic” of the later forms.
Emerson absorbed these new uses of “type” from natural history into this own work and
likely discussed these ideas with Agassiz directly in their intellectual salon, The Saturday Club.
In the “Discipline” chapter of Nature, Emerson claims that in creatures “the likeness in them is
more than the difference … So intimate is this Unity, it is easily seen, it lies under the undermost
garment of nature, and betrays its source in Universal Spirit” (42). Thus, for Emerson, as for
Agassiz, all of nature is unified, and types becomes merely expressions of a new antitype that he
names as Universal Spirit. In Nature, he writes “[a]ll things with which we deal, preach to us”
(41). This leads Emerson to conclude, “Every animal function from the sponge up to Hercules,
shall hint or thunder to man the laws of right and wrong, and echo the Ten Commandments.
Therefore is nature ever the ally of religion … Prophet and priest, David, Isaiah, Jesus have
drawn deeply from this source” (41).22 Though Nature is less theologically diverse in tone than
some of Emerson's other writings, Christ is no longer the antitype—he is only a type, one of
several seers. The use of “hint” and “echo” calls attention to the rhetoric of types as Emerson
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Emerson repeats this theme in another long catalogue of “examples of the action of man upon
nature with his entire force” in which he includes various forms of religions, politics, science and
ends more mystically on “self-healing and the wisdom of children” (53-4).
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tries to unite comparative biology, Greek mythology, and the Hebrew scriptures in these few
lines. The perception of this moral and unified nature may range from oblique to obvious (“hint”
or “thunder”), yet Emerson casts a multicellular animal and a Greek demigod as equally
representative types of natural moral law. For Emerson, moral law must be consonant with
natural law if both are divinely created, which is central to his stated connection here between
nature and religion.
Emerson’s rhetoric here implies a progressive evolutionary lineage that connects all
forms of life, beginning with sponges. Emerson draws this concept of the progressive
development of organisms from simple to complex from pre-Darwinian classification systems:
Linnaeus misclassified sponges as plants (algae), while Cuvier relegated them to the now defunct
classification of zoophyte, an animal that resembles a plant. In an 1867 Harper’s article arguing
against transmutation entitled “Darwin and Domestication,” S.T. Frost points to the special role
of the sponge as a supposedly intermediary species, much like the mimosa: “the sponge is
claimed sometimes as animal, sometimes as vegetable life, and by compromising by treating it as
a connection between the two, the gradation [of the transmutation of species] is thus continued
on through animals into plants” (59). Charles Darwin reconceptualized this developmental model
through natural selection; rather than posit a linear progression, Darwin chose the metaphor of a
circular, radial web. In Origin of Species (begun in the 1830s but not published until 1859),
Darwin offers that “plants and animals, most remote in the scale of nature, are bound together by
a web of complex relations,” concluding that “the structure of every organic being is related” and
that species go “onwards in ever increasing circles of complexity” (73). Emerson’s work shares
in this rhetoric, even if the science from which he draws predates Darwin, recognizing in his

188
essay “Circles” that “around every circle another can be drawn; that there is no end in nature, but
every end is a beginning … throughout nature this primary figure is repeated without end” (174).
Emerson’s synthesis of religion and science came in part from his reading of Coleridge
whose primary interest was likewise the relation of the mind and nature.23 Coleridge’s concept of
“Unity in multeity” was central to Emerson’s belief in the unification of nature and humanity.
Both adapted the science of polarity into their philosophy, which led Coleridge, like Emerson, to
imagine the unfolding of life as a cycle of individuation from unity through various stages
toward the human (Walls 135). Walls notes the comparison between Emerson’s quotation of
Coleridge, “All things strive to ascend & ascend in their striving” “as the steps in a ladder” and
Emerson’s own work in in “Circles,” in which “Step by step we scale this mysterious ladder”
(133). For Emerson, this ladder had ceased to be linear and had become instead a spiral. As
Emerson noted in Representative Men, “Coleridge and Goethe are the only critics who have
expressed our convictions with any adequate fidelity” (202).
As Emerson’s attention to the symbolic import of the sponge indicates, he was inspired
by the complex process of classification in natural history, which until Darwin, was dominated
by the theory of types drawn from natural theology. After the example of the sponge in Nature,
Emerson theorizes, “Not only resemblances exist in things whose analogy is obvious, as when
we detect the type of the human hand in the flipper of the fossil saurus, but also in objects
wherein there is great superficial unlikeness” (42). Emerson likely takes this particular example
of type from his reading of Charles Bell’s The Hand: Its Mechanisms and Endowments as
Evincing Design, in which Bell shows how the bones in the human hand are related to those in
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Emerson read Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria and Aids to Reflections, and referenced them
frequently.
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many different animals, both extant and extinct. Bell’s work was part of the Bridgewater
Treatises “on the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God as Manifested in His Creation.” Bell’s
work on the muscles of the face catalyzed Darwin to refute Bell’s religious claims with material
ones, leading Darwin to develop his M and N notebooks from the 1830s into The Expression of
the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872). Similarly, drawing from biblical typology, Richard
Owen imagined animal “archetypes” as an “image … of the most generalized animal, the ‘type’
that all such creatures were ‘related’ to” (Huxley 259). Owen identified two similarities-structural and functional (homology and analogy respectively)--as the basis for his classifications
in what he called “transcendental anatomy.” Owen was also influenced by Platonic and German
idealism, but sought a new plan that could be reconciled with von Baer’s work in embryology
that was not based on a hierarchical model (Bowler 131-2).24 For Bell, Agassiz, and Owen, the
interconnections among all life forms were signs of a divine plan, rather than evidence for a
purely material form of transmutation.25 Owen, then, was more radical, moving away from any
kind of perfectionism. In this way, his work paved the way for Darwin’s theory of descent
(Ospovat 138): “Darwin made the archetypes into ancestors” (146) as he transformed Owen’s
ideal types into “a real representation [of] … the parent form of the vertebrata” (146).
Darwin’s project then is in part a literalizing of this typological rhetoric in comparative
anatomy from which he then had to eradicate all ideas of design and progression. Darwin
contends,
24

Incidentally, Owen originally rejected Darwin’s work, but gradually came to allow for the
possibility of transmutation of species (much like Linnaeus and Lamarck before him) (Bowler
133), while Darwin expressed confusion over Owen’s work in Origin (Coleman 155 fn21, 205).
25
Pfau notes “The process of disciplinary specialization, as well as institutional and professional
consolidation, correlates with the demise of natural theology or arguments from design after
1800” (6).
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Naturalists frequently speak of the skull as formed from metamorphosed
vertebrae; the jaws of crabs as metamorphosed legs, the stamens and pistils of
flowers as metamorphosed leaves. ... Naturalists, however, use such language
only in a metaphorical sense; they are far from meaning that during the long
course of descent, primordial origins of any kind … have been converted into
skulls and jaws. Yet so strong is the appearance of a modification of this nature
having occurred, that naturalists can hardly avoid employing language having this
plain signification. In my views these terms may be used literally. (438)
Like Percy Shelley, Darwin recognized the deeper relations between the literal and abstract
components of metaphor, which is likely influenced by his reading of the Romantic poets. While
Darwin literalized the rhetoric of metaphor, Emerson amplified it.26 Emerson uses the
comparison of the hand to the flipper to make even broader connections in a stunning list in
which he compares architecture, music, religion, anatomy, animals, plants, sounds, colors, rivers,
air, light, current, and heat to conclude that “Each creature is only a modification of the other. …
A rule of one art, or a law of one organization, holds true” (Nature 42). Notably, here, Emerson
deftly interweaves both science and the arts into his philosophy of nature—a feat throughout
Nature in which he links “motion, poetry, physical and intellectual science, and religion” (48).
As Robert Belknap explains, Emerson’s listing “forces the reader down a circuitous and
unpredictable path” in an often “whirling, exponential acceleration” (39-40). For Emerson, any
analogy is a sign of a deeper interconnection, leading to seemingly infinite possibilities since the
same principle undergirds all of nature.
Robert Richardson eloquently describes that for Emerson “the undersong of science” is
“the ‘concurrent text’ running along side the book of nature” (154). Indeed, to Emerson in
Nature, “All science has one aim, namely to find a theory of nature” (27). Science informs
26

Joan Richardson argues that Emerson’s work anticipates the evolutionary process outlined by
Darwin and cites Oliver Wendell Holmes as the first to note this, followed by the scholarly work
of Joseph Warren Beach, William Rossi, Lawrence Buell, and Laura Dassow Walls who make
similar claims (J. Richardson 63fn5, 269).
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Emerson’s typology as he searches for the correspondence of all patterns: “I cannot greatly honor
minuteness in details, so long as there is no hint to explain the relation of things and thoughts; no
ray upon the metaphysics of conchology, of botany, of the arts, to show the relation of the forms
of flowers, shells, animals, architecture, to the mind, and build science upon ideas” (51). Here,
Emerson’s rhetoric shares in typology’s emphasis on imagery and correspondence through the
use of “hint,” “relation,” and “metaphysics.”27 What is salient in this list is Emerson’s underlying
interest in form. He links plants, mollusks and their shells, and animals to elements of human
culture: the arts, architecture, and science in ways reminiscent of Erasmus Darwin’s and Percy
Shelley’s poetry on the metamorphosis of bodies into expression. Here, Emerson eschews a
linear or hierarchical order. This intermixing of natural and human forms of expression redefines
the cultural as natural in recognition of humanity’s shared formation not only with animals, but
also even with plants, as Percy Shelley suggests in “The Sensitive Plant.” This intermixture
loosens the traditional “Chain of Being,” with its teleological hierarchy culminating in humanity;
rather, humanity becomes analogous to all of nature, part of a broader ecological world, or what
Emerson would call Universal Being.
Emerson’s next set of examples in Nature functions similarly to the sponge (“a leaf, a
drop, a crystal”) as a microcosm, the smallest unit of a broader system of nature that it then
comes to represent (42). Emerson likely drew on the developing science of embryology in these
images. The original scientific meaning of “evolution” was the maturation from embryo to adult
(Coleman 142; Bowler 9). Embryology was closely tied to theories of transmutation as it was
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Many critics have explored Emerson’s dominant metaphor of sight and seeing as knowledge,
which corresponds to the fact that in typology the type is an image of Christ that reveals him to
believers when properly viewed/understood. See, for example, Christopher Windolph’s
Emerson’s Nonlinear Nature.
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hypothesized by several scientists (including von Baer and Haeckel) that the successive stages of
embryonic development correspond to the increasing complexity in classes of animals, as we
saw in Agassiz’s Essay on Classification. In this respect, Haeckel’s work was particularly
controversial, particularly his illustrations of comparative embryology, and his claim that
“ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny,” the idea that the evolution of species is evident in the stages
of embryonic development. Emerson avowed theories of embryology in which “organic
succession was mirrored by fetal development” as per Oken, Stallo, Chambers, etc. (Walls 172).
Even Agassiz, who was staunchly opposed to evolutionary theory, believed that embryo
development corresponded to changes from the “lower” to “higher” forms within each animal
type (Essay on Classification 119). Embryology became linked to paleontology as the fossil
record suggested that different groups of animals had been dominant during succeeding
geological eras. Agassiz believed that there was a “[p]arallelism between the geological
succession of animals and the embryonic growth of their living representative,” leading him to
conclude that “The changes which animals undergo during their embryonic growth coincide also
with the order of succession of the fossils of the same types in past ages” (112-116). While not
yet Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution, this sense of the development of different species
through different geological eras and the embryonic connections between species moved closer
to the idea of descent.
Emerson’s study of five major figures as “types” (the philosopher, the mystic, etc.),
Representative Men,28 participates in the tradition of Biblical typology in which people come to
stand in for ideas. Emerson draws on this definition of type throughout his works, particularly in
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his analogies to the sciences. In “Fate,” Emerson links great mathematicians and scientists and
their work as types of divine law, following his concept in Nature “[t]hat law, when in the mind,
is an idea” (47).29 This example uses a form of typology similar to that of the previous examples
of “representative men” such as Dante, Columbus, Socrates, etc.
No one can read the history of astronomy, without perceiving that Copernicus,
Newton, Laplace, are not new men, or a new kind of men, but that Thales,
Anaximenes, Hipparchus, Empedocles, Aristarchus, Pythagoras, Oenopides, had
anticipated them; each had the same tense geometrical brain, apt for the same
vigorous computation and logic, a mind parallel to the movement of the world.
(267)
This last phrase typifies Emerson’s sense of the relation between the mind and nature as forms of
motion, a motif repeated throughout his works, while the use of “anticipated” and “parallel”
characterizes them as on the same trajectory. Emerson states this same idea poetically in
Representative Men: “The perception of these laws is a kind of metre of the mind” (23). Emerson
views the scientific quest to discover the laws of the universe as parallel to his own to discover
Universal Being. To Emerson, science is yet another method of analogy: “Science is nothing but
the finding of analogy, identity, in the most remote parts.” (“The American Scholar” 58). Charles
Darwin, too, defined science by its powers of connection: “All Science is reason acting /
systematizing / on principles” (M Notebook 73).
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Emerson may have drawn this idea directly from Coleridge’s Essay on Method which he
includes in his review of Coleridge’s works (Early Lectures I 379). For more on the influence of
Coleridge’s work on Emerson, see Samantha C. Harvey’s Transatlantic Transcendentalism,
Chapter 4 “The Landing Place: ‘Distinguishing without Dividing” and Coleridge’s Method” (5475).
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This conception of science led Emerson to cast it as a type of a greater form of divinity:
in describing the scientist at work in determining classifications and laws, Emerson writes that he
will come “to see that the natural philosophy that now is, is only the first gropings of its gigantic
hand, he shall look forward to an ever expanding knowledge as to a becoming creator” (58).
Rather than only study creation, humans will recognize the divinely creative principle within
themselves. Emerson continues this Baconian theme of unlocking nature’s mysteries through his
idealized view of science’s continued progress in Nature, “In physics, when this is attained, the
memory disburthens itself of its cumbrous catalogues of particulars, and carries centuries of
observation into a single formula” (47). These comparisons illustrate Emerson’s core belief in
the fundamental commonality that links all life, which he drew in part from the science of his
time; while Emerson conceived of this connection as divine, his work points toward ecological
thinking in his close study of nature through science, which led him to imagine a more material
form of divinity in which spirit and matter intermix.
Emerson’s sense of the importance of science and a more ecological understanding of
nature crystallized in 1833 in Paris at the Jardin des Plantes, the botanical garden that adjoins
the Musée National d'Histoire naturelle (National Museum of Natural History). Emerson was
fascinated by the ways in which the plants were organized according to Jussieu’s classification
(R. Richardson 173).30 Jussieu rejected the Linnaean system from Linnaeus’s Systema Naturae
(1735) in which plants were classified by their reproductive parts. Linnaeus inspired Erasmus
Darwin’s work on plants and sexual reproduction, leading Erasmus Darwin closer to
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After his resignation as a Unitarian minister, Emerson traveled extensively in Europe, where
he had his fateful revelation about natural history in the Jardin des Plantes. The same trip
afforded Emerson the opportunity in England to meet with Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Carlyle
(R. Richardson 146–150).
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understanding the transmutation of species that his grandson Charles would later substantiate
through natural and sexual selection. In contrast to the Linnaean system, Jussieu’s classification
was based on the “principle of continuity” from simplest to most complex, thereby reflecting a
divine progression (Huxley 260). Robert Richardson speculates that Emerson’s primary interest
in the garden stemmed from its arrangement: “classification implies connection … Emerson was
fascinated by the web of relation and analogy, the very stuff of classifications, which … cross
and intersect one another … in every possible way, and have for their very aim to interweave all
the objects of nature together in a close and compact web of mutual relations and dependence”
(R. Richardson 149). The garden, then, in its physical arrangement of classification, may have
suggested an ecological web. At the same time, Emerson discovered the striking organization of
animal life from simple to complex forms in the cabinets of the museum of natural history during
this same visit (Brown 62). In the museum, Emerson, like William Lawrence at the Hunterian
Museum in London, witnessed a stunning visual representation of the progression of life from its
origins and to its variations.31
The organization of nature, made evident in the Musée National d'Histoire Naturelle, led
Emerson to declare famously in his journal: “An occult relation between the very scorpions and
man. I feel the centipede in me—cayman, carp, eagle, and fox. I am moved by strange
sympathies. I say continually ‘I will be a naturalist’” (Journals III 163). Here, Emerson
demonstrates an understanding of biological progressive development, recognizing the shared
structures between himself and other animals, just as in the shared structures of types in Bell’s
treatise. Emerson’s rhetoric of “I feel … in me” reflects a growing sense of the material world as
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no longer outside of him, but as a part of his biological being. The focus on materiality and the
study of science is underscored by his desire to become a naturalist (just as Percy Shelley had
once planned to become a physician). Later, in Nature, Emerson repeats this profound sense of
connection within nature from the Jardin des Plantes, reworking his journal notes into the
phrases “the suggestion of an occult relation between man and the vegetable” (Nature 29) and
more directly, “In a cabinet of natural history, we become sensible of a certain occult recognition
and sympathy in regard to the most unwieldy and eccentric forms of beast, fish, and insect” (51).
Emerson concentrates on shared forms, recognizing humans’ interconnections to all other forms
of life in his own version of ecological selves. Emerson repeats this concept again later in his
journal: “I read my commission in every cipher of nature … a detector & delineator of occult
harmonies” (567). Emerson’s repetition of “occult” throughout his various phrases corresponds
to his sense of nature as “a cipher” that must be read and translated (37). Occult signifies not
only hidden, but also secretive and mysterious. This sense of strangeness reflects Emerson’s
recognition of something shared, what he calls “sympathy,” even with creatures such as fish,
insects, and mollusks that bear little physical resemblance to humans. Emerson here uses
“sympathy” in its now obscure form to mean “[a] (real or supposed) affinity between certain
things, by virtue of which they are similarly or correspondingly affected by the same influence,
affect or influence one another (esp. in some occult way), or attract or tend towards each other”
(“sympathy”). Hence, “sympathy” corresponds to his use of “occult.” Like Percy Shelley,
Emerson views these connections as kind of mystery—one that led Darwin to try to find a theory
of how all life could be related.
Emerson’s fascination with biological forms corresponds to his interest in the role of
form in writing, language, and literature. As Lee Rust Brown explains, “Emerson wished for a
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way of seeing his work that would bring out ‘natural affinities,’ which until then had lain buried.
… He needed to master a working framework in which principle and technique were bound up
within the other” (62). Emerson found these patterns in natural history, which had begun to
organize nature into classifications that were supposedly inherent, revealing a divine plan and
organization (65). Typology likewise affirmed this belief, making it a powerful rhetorical tool for
Emerson’s re-visioned philosophy.32 As Laura Dassow Walls explains, “Emerson became
interested in science ... as a discourse, … a way of thinking, seeing, and talking” (12). Though he
would not become a professional naturalist, he spent his life illuminating the principles of natural
history in his writing.
In concert with the Jardin des Plantes, Goethe’s Metamorphosis of Plants (1790) had a
significant impact on Emerson and on developments in comparative anatomy that culminated in
Darwin’s work. As Gordon L. Miller has argued, “Goethe’s botany contributed directly to
Emerson’s sense of the unity and progressive dynamism of nature, to his ideal image of science
… and thus to his vision of a morality grounded in nature” (xxv). Goethe’s treatise on plants “is
considered to be the beginning of speculative morphology,” which would lead directly to
Darwin’s claims about literalizing the rhetoric of descent in comparative anatomy and botany
(Cole 469). Goethe discovered the intermaxillary bone in humans in 1784, which provided direct
evidence for the descent of humans from other animals. Darwin recognized Goethe’s
contributions to the theory of transmutation in his introduction to Origin of Species (xvi).33
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David Robinson traces the many stages of Emerson’s development from religious to cultural
prophecy. Robinson argues that “Circles” marks Emerson’s replacement of sermons with essays
and his transition from optimism to skepticism.
33
In his controversial work, Robert J. Richards traces the influence of Goethe on Darwin,
arguing that “evolutionary theory was Goethean morphology running on geologic time” (quoted
in Miller xxiv).
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Similarly, Ernst Haeckel, known for his work in morphology and embryology, felt the need to
“credit Goethe with a share of the triumph of evolution, and regard him as a forerunner of
Darwin” (Cole 469). Haeckel was an influential proponent of Darwin’s theory of evolution in
Europe and coined the term “ecology” in 1866 as “the conditions of existence” for all organisms
in relation to their environment.
Goethe objected to the Linnaean system of classification, though he did not reject
classification by function or form altogether (Pfau 22). Goethe’s use of types in morphology led
him to search for an archetypal plant (Urpflanze) from which all other plants would be modified
types. This realization came to Goethe in the botanical garden in Padua in 1786, just as
Emerson’s moment of ecological insight came to him in the Jardin des Plantes. Goethe
hypothesized, “There is a hidden relationship among various external parts of the plant that
develop one after the other and, as it were, one out of the other” (6). Further, his statement,
“Each living creature is a complex, not a unit; even when it appears to be an individual, it
nevertheless remains an aggregation of living and independent parts” may provide the basis for
Emerson’s recognition of the shared history and biology of himself with other creatures. In the
previous passage, Goethe describes the plant within the framework of a typological unfolding,
reiterating a sense of “occult” relation in form through his use of “hidden.” For Goethe and
Emerson, it was the work of the naturalist to try to understand these “hidden” processes of
nature; thus, “[k]nowledge is for Goethe above all a sharing in the structure of appearance by
way of sustained observation—the latter being understood as a differential progression that
mirrors the dynamic, self-organizing structure of the organic phenomenon under investigation”
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(Pfau 8). For Goethe, this unfolding happens materially both in the plant and in the mind of the
observer (8).
Goethe’s theory of the metamorphosis of plants, “one out of the other,” was drawn from
his previous work in osteology.34 Applying the principles of osteology to botany, Goethe
theorized how every part of a plant develops from changes in the original structure of the leaf.
Goethe’s work, though it predates the discovery of genetics, implies the process of growth
through cell division and reproduction through pollination. Owen would later name Goethe’s
recognition of the shared structures of plants and animals homology in his own work on animal
archetypes (Huxley 259). This interchange demonstrates the metamorphosis of “type” as an idea,
from the religious to the scientific sense, in a way that reflects the interweaving of science and
religion in the nineteenth century. As people and events from the Hebrew scriptures were
thought to be images of Christ that shared common attributes, so too did the development of
plants and animals come to be seen in natural history as similar to that of humans, casting them
as types and images of each other.
It is telling that Emerson saved Goethe for the last section of Representative Men,
labeling Goethe as “The Writer.”35 Goethe combined nature, science, and language in the ways
that Emerson himself aspired to. In Representative Men, Emerson notes Goethe’s contributions
to science:

34

Pfau argues that Goethe draws his concept of metamorphosis in part from Ovid’s
Metamorphoses, in which “In their apparitional singularity, discrete things (or organic beings)
reveal their connection to that One through an inscrutable and unrelenting propensity to alter
their shape” (Pfau 12).
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For further discussion of this use of “type,” in which individuals serve as representatives of
larger categories, see Max Weber, “Ideal Types and Theory Construction” (496-507).
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Thus Goethe suggested the leading idea of modern botany, that a leaf, or the eye
of a leaf, is the unit of botany. … In like manner, in osteology, he assumed that
one vertebra of the spine might be considered the unit of the skeleton; the head
was only the uppermost vertebra transformed. … Men and the higher animals are
built up through the vertebrae. (171)
Here, we find a partial source for Emerson’s “occult harmonies” among all life, as well as the
history from which Darwin began to theorize how these kinds of transformations might take
place literally over time. This historical development of evolutionary ideas helps to explain how
Emerson’s initial reaction to Darwin’s Origin when he read it in 1860, viewing it as yet another
theory of transmutation already familiar to him from his knowledge of botany and comparative
anatomy (Walls 167). His only comment in his journal in 1860 on Darwin is “Darwin’s ‘Origin
of Species’ was published in 1859, but Stallo, in 1849, writes ‘Animals are but the foetal forms
of man,’ &c.” (JMN 16:298). For Emerson, Darwin was yet another transmutationist following
from the Naturphilosophie tradition already familiar to him. Emerson had already embraced the
transmutation of species as a theory despite the resistance of both Agassiz and Owen (Walls
175). Emerson here is referencing John Stallo’s 1848 General Principles of the Philosophy of
Nature: with an Outline of Some of its Recent Developments among the Germans, Embracing the
Philosophical Systems of Schelling and Hegel, and Oken’s System of Nature. Stallo then was an
important source for Emerson’s engagement with German Naturphilosophie. The line that
Emerson paraphrases from Stallo is from the section “Evolutions” in which he writes “Oken
some-where defines animals as foetal men” (121). Stallo likewise summarizes theories of
evolution earlier in the section that were influential on Emerson: “Goethe, Oken, Carus, and
others, have brought to light many analogies, shown the re-evolution of systems, &c.;-- Goethe’s
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theory of the correspondence of the cranium to the vertebral forms, Oken’s identification of them
with the further extension into ribs, limbs, &c., are all well known” (109). Here, we see the ways
in which Darwin’s work emerged out of a much longer tradition that was already familiar to
many, including Emerson.
Emerson shared with Goethe in particular a deep interest in the geometric patterns found
in nature. For both, these repeated forms were evidence of the unity, or what Goethe calls the
continuity, of nature. In analyzing Emerson’s statement that “everything seems architectural,”
Christopher Windolph concludes, “To say that everything seems architectural is to ask questions
not only about origins, but also about futures; just as an architect’s draft prefigures the building,
the bud anticipates the leaf. Everything is modeled in something else” (3-4). This modeling is the
very structure of typology that “prefigures” and “anticipates” the next type, as is evident in the
metaphor of the leaf found throughout Emerson’s writing that is taken directly from Goethe’s
morphology.

Part III. The Language of Typology
In his section of Goethe as “The Writer” in Representative Men, Emerson employs the
vocabulary of typology to link nature and writing:
Nature will be reported. All things are engaged in writing their history. The planet, the
pebble, goes attended by its shadow. The rolling rock leaves its scratches on the
mountain; the river, its channel in the soil; the animal, its bones in the stratum; the fern
and leaf their modest epitaph in the coal. The falling drop makes its sculpture in the sand
or the stone. Not a foot steps into the snow, or along the ground, but prints in characters
more or less lasting, a map of its march. Every act of the man inscribes itself in the
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memories of his fellows, and in his own manners and face. The air is full of sounds; the
sky, of tokens; the ground is all memoranda and signatures; and every object covered
over with hints, which speak to the intelligent. (257)
In this poetic passage, Emerson underscores the original definition of “type” as “that effected by
a blow”; hence, an impression is made. He then traces these kinds of interactions across the
natural world as he leads toward the idea this same process applies to relations between people
and between nature and the divine. He concludes with his sense that nature is vast system of
signs (“tokens” “memoranda” “signatures” “hints”) like language itself.
Like Percy Shelley and Charles Darwin, then, Emerson's fascination with visible nature
and the nature of the universe found in science is evident in his study and use of language.
Emerson treats both science and language as types of divinity in his theological philosophy
because to him they are the means of divine creativity and expression. As Northrop Frye explains
of typology, “the function of the Bible, for the Church, came to be not to teach doctrine, but to
prove or illustrate it” which led to “the adaptation of typology” as “metonymic language”
(104).36 Emerson, like the early Church, sought new forms of language to illustrate the principles
of Transcendentalism. For Emerson, though this new language was more analogical than
metonymic in its limitless combination of the rhetoric of poetry, theology, philosophy, and
science. As William James's deep reading of Emerson reveals in The Varieties of Religious
Experience, Emerson's philosophy is bound up in his poetic tendencies (40).37 To Emerson,

36

Here Frye also cites Milton (of whom Emerson, the Shelleys, and Charles Darwin were all
deep readers) as an example of the recognition that with any theological reformation must come
new forms of descriptive language.
37
James writes, “Such is the Emersonian religion. The universe has a divine soul of order, which
soul is moral, being also the soul within the soul of man. But whether this soul of the universe be
a mere quality like the eye's brilliancy or the skin's softness, or whether it be a self-conscious life
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unsurprisingly, “good writing and brilliant discourse are perpetual analogies. … It is the blending
of experience with the present action of the mind” (Nature 37). To Emerson, “analogies” and
“blending” are the processes of the mind that create the “occult relations” that lead us to a more
ecologically-interconnected understanding of ourselves in relation to the world around us.
Emerson's unique writing style is energized by his creative uses of types.38 In Nature, the
“Language” chapter alone teems with typological vocabulary, including “image,” “picture,”
“illustration,” “symbol,” “analogy” “emblem,” “appearance/s.” Emerson likewise employs
“type/s,” “sign/s,” “allegories,” and “metaphors” repeatedly, as well as a host of individually
synonymous terms: “vehicle,” “vestment,” “garment,” “cipher,” “riddle,” “parable,” “proverb,”
and “fables.” Often the terms are used interchangeably, as when Emerson notes, “What is true of
proverbs, is true of all fables, parables, and allegories” (38). In the two explicit uses of “type” in
“Language,” however, each refers directly to power: the first reflects the same idea from
Emerson's later essay “Circles” in which ripples on water are a type for divine influence in the
world, as in his section on impressions on Goethe in Representative Men in which “All things are
engaged in writing their history.” As with Percy Shelley’s Defence, Emerson opens his chapter
“Language” with a study of the origins of language, specifically etymology, and frames the
origins of language in poetry (36). In this chapter in particular, Emerson’s word choices are
precise even when interrelated; hence, he uses “type” to describe the power of an effect, like the
original meaning of “that effected by a blow.” Effect is key to Emerson's revolutionary
aesthetics, as he seeks new forms of language that will have an impact on his audience. He
like the eye's seeing or the skin's feeling, is a decision that never unmistakably appears in
Emerson's pages. It quivers on the boundary of these things, sometimes leaning one way,
sometimes the other, to suit the literary rather than the philosophic need” (37).
38
In his chapter “A Breakthrough into Spaciousness,” David Porter analyzes Emerson's rhetoric
from its roots in nature and theology to his employment of poetic devices in prose (147).

204
claims, the “cold and pedantic” writing of the past must give way to new forms that are “bloodwarm” (67), which echoes both Edwards’ and Percy Shelley’s writing about language. The
contrast here between cold and warm highlights the very physicality underneath language that
Emerson most values. Emerson's experiments in language are best defined by his belief in the
exponential possibilities of analogy, which allows him to forge unexpected links among all the
materials before him. In particular, his listing style that leads the reader between a center and its
relations both literally and metaphorically prompts the reader to search for a pattern—an
enactment of the principle to which Emerson is calling the reader: “When the mind is braced by
labor and invention, the page of whatever book we read becomes luminous with manifold
allusion. Every sentence is doubly significant” (60). Hence, many of Emerson’s sentences radiate
outward in concentric circles, forming a web in his own version of “poetic ecology.”
Emerson's interest in the structure of language, especially his focus on nouns, draws from
linguistic typology, in which languages are classified by their syntax. For Emerson, the original
correspondence between nature and language illustrates their shared character as types of
divinity; humans must learn to “read” the divinity in nature and in themselves. Emerson
illustrates this correlation in a typological framework in the second major use of “type” in
“Language”: “The immediate dependence of language upon nature, this conversion of an
outward phenomenon into a type somewhat in human life, never loses its power to affect us”
(36). Here, the typological relationship between nature and human is diffuse (“somewhat”) but
reflects a similar process of “conversion.” Emerson's understanding of the function of language
amid both nature and the mind anticipates many debates in linguistics, as when he traces words
back to their original material existence in nature (as Brumm does with “type”). For Emerson,
this original correspondence between nature and language illustrates their shared character as
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types of divinity. Language is the human form of expression, just as nature is the language of
divinity. In this way, human expressions of nature, in science, agriculture and art are analogous
to divine natural expression. This intermixture of the cultural, natural, and divine reveals to
Emerson that man must learn to “read” the divinity in nature and in himself: “By degrees we
may come to know the primitive sense of the permanent objects of nature, so that the world shall
become to us an open book, and every form significant of its hidden life and final cause” (39).
Emerson illustrates this correlation between words, thoughts, things, and actions in “The Poet,”
noting that in art both nature and science assume their truest emblematic form: “The poet alone
knows astronomy, chemistry, vegetation, and animation, for he does not stop at these facts, but
employs them as signs. He knows why the plain, or meadow of space, was strown with these
flowers we call suns, and moons, and stars; why the deep is adorned with animals, with men, and
gods; for, in every word he speaks he rides on them as the horses of thought” (190).39 “Facts”
employed as “signs” reinforces the typology found in most of Emerson's lists, but here the
imagery is not only linked, but fully merged, which is characteristic of Emerson's more mystical
and figurative style when writing on poetry. Set free in nearly pure imagery, the items in the list
intermix in metaphor. The land (“plain”), sky (“meadow of space”), and the sea (“deep”)
combine just as Emerson highlights that what distinguishes botany and astronomy is the
classification of language, “flowers we call suns.” The last image is likewise metaphorical in

39

This passage likely draws from Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism, as well as from
the Romantic poets themselves: Coleridge (in Biographia Literaria), Wordsworth (in the 1802
Preface to Lyrical Ballads), and Percy Shelley (in the Defence), all of whom theorize the role of
the poet, particularly in relation to nature and science. Emerson read Shelley’s Defence at the
urging of Margaret Fuller, but was dismissive of Shelley’s formal style (May 27 or 29, 1840)
(Letters II 299). In the Defence, however, Emerson must have found many ideas in line with his
own thinking and engagement with the Romantic poets even as he sought to distance himself
from them to create a new American tradition.
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linking the speaker expressing his thoughts to the rider driving his horse. The metaphorical
connection of language to nature is signified by the literal physical connection of the man atop
the horse. The emphasis on “rides” indicates the relation between man and nature in its
hierarchical form, but also connotes the shared sense of rhythm in language and motion. As
Emerson notes, “Words are also actions, and actions are a kind of words” (“The Poet” 185).
These intermixtures are Emerson at the height of his expanded typology with its “perpetual
analogy” and “occult harmonies” in which items listed alongside each other now become one
another.
Emerson's sense of the divine imprint that connects both nature and language in his own
writings derives in part from the French priest and Swedenborgian Guillaume Oegger. Emerson,
was influenced by Oegger's 1842 The True Messiah; or The Old and New Testaments, Examined
According to the Principles of Language and Nature (R. Richardson 199). Oegger postulates an
original connection between nature and language that gradually becomes more abstract. He
believes that the intermediate stage, the “mixed” language of both nature and abstraction, creates
the Bible's prophecy in which words become emblematic and hence in need of interpretation
(Kern 50). This hermeneutic clearly corresponds to typology's own methodology of deciphering
an “original” Christological meaning in preceding forms. As Robert Richardson points out,
figurative language is linked to theological belief if “the world itself is symbolic” (199) and to
Emerson, language, nature, and scripture all share the same symbolic character (Makarushka 51).
Indeed, language itself is spiritual to Emerson, as for Coleridge.40 As Irena Makarushka
observes, both religion and language reflect “an individual's desire to inscribe the world with
40

Indeed, Emerson and Coleridge develop similar concepts of language following Coleridge’s
desire “to destroy the old antithesis of Words and Things, elevating, as it were, Words into
Things, & living Things too” (Coleridge Letters I 625-6).
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meaning” (50). Yet Emerson also recognized that language can be used as much to obscure
truth as to reveal it. Consequently, the mission of the poet must be that of the prophet, namely
truth, the same claim Shelley makes in the Defence.

Conclusion
Emerson likely was attracted to the cyclical nature of typology, in which one is always
looped through the types back to the original in a way that seems to follow the conception of a
“natural” cycle that progresses from a beginning to an end that is, in fact, a return to the
beginning. This concept is manifest repeatedly in both Platonic and Christian terms, especially in
the characterization of God and Christ.42 For Emerson, these types of circles/cycles were also
found throughout science, poetry, and language itself. For Emerson, these connections are
“occult relations,” because of their shared structure. In “Circles,” he posits that “around every
circle another can be drawn; that there is no end in nature, but every end is a beginning” (174). In
the essay, Emerson refers to circles as cycles in reference to the sun and moon as symbols of day
and night. Emerson’s famous description of himself as a “transparent eyeball” in Nature (29) is
likewise resonant with “Circles” where he writes, “The eye is the first circle; the horizon which it
41

As Thomas Gustafson notes, Emerson conflates religious and political speech in his reference
in “Circles” to Pentecost in which the gift of divine speech is given to humans. In the passage,
Emerson's typological progression again leads from what seems divine to the intrinsic divinity
within man through language: “Conversation is a game of circles. In conversation we pluck up
the termini which bound the common of silence on every side. The parties are not to be judged
by the spirit they partake and even express under this Pentecost. […] Yet let us enjoy the cloven
flame whilst it glows on our walls. When each new speaker strikes a new light, emancipates us
from the oppression of the last speaker” (177).
42
An example of this circular pattern can be found in John 1:1–3 NIV: “In the beginning was the
Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was with God in the beginning.
Through him all things were made; without him nothing was made that has been made.”
Makarushka points out the importance of this Biblical verse for Emerson in refashioning Christ
from savior to “sayer.”
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forms is the second; and throughout nature this primary figure is repeated without end” (174).
Here, Emerson traces a direct relationship between the eye and the horizon, not only as
themselves curvilinear, but proceeding from the body to its sensory perception. Emerson’s
recognition of infinite circles responds to the recursive nature of typology. As noted earlier, in
Emerson’s Nonlinear Nature, Windolph studies Emerson’s interest in the shared patterns
between architecture and nature. He notes how these resemblances are part of Emerson’s
attempts to connect matter and spirit, science and poetry, and materiality and metaphysics (2). In
a vein similar to Windolph’s analysis of Emerson’s interest in shared natural and architectural
patterns, Eric Wilson explores Emerson’s use of the crystal and crystallization as metaphorical
for the divine laws found in both nature and the human mind (76). Wilson claims, “As Emerson
realized, the crystal is apocalyptic. Bending (turning, troping) unseen, amorphous energies into
vivid, cogent figures, it synecdochally reveals the unbounded whole and its relation to its finite
parts” (91). Synecdoche, like other forms of figurative language, shares in typology’s
reconfiguration of parts (types) as emblems of the whole (antitype). Wilson posits Emerson’s
transparent eyeball as itself a form of synecdoche in which Emerson is “part or particle of God”
(91). This essential pattern of cyclical connection between parts and whole, types and antitype, is
key to the multivalence of Emerson’s philosophy, theology, and writing.43
Darwin’s recognition of the parallels between the cycles of biological and geological
evolution was critical to the development of his theory, which allowed him to unite biological
divergence and geological stratification. Emerson was familiar with both sciences before Darwin
and used the principles of typology to illustrate what he saw as their interconnections:
43

Pfau defines “Romantic organicisim” as the unification of part and whole, difference and unity
(30) and Emerson’s work is often identified within this paradigm; see, for example, Lee Rust
Brown’s The Emerson Museum: Practical Romanticism and the Pursuit of the Whole.
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The book of Nature is the book of Fate. She turns the gigantic pages—leaf after
leaf,—never returning one. One leaf she lays down, a floor of granite; then a
thousand ages, and a bed of slate; a thousand ages, and a measure of coal; a
thousand ages, and a layer of marl and mud: vegetable forms appear; her first
misshapen animals, zoophyte, trilobium, fish; then, saurians,—rude forms, in
which she has only blocked her future statue, concealing under these unwieldy
monsters the fine type of her coming king. (266)
Using a typological framework, Emerson replaces Christ with humanity as the “coming king” in
a patriarchal lineage that begins with the Genesis creation story in which “God created mankind
in his own image” and culminates in the Messianic prophecy (Genesis 1:27). Emerson adapts
this rhetoric into a form of biological progression from simpler animals to humanity, using
“type” in both the theological and morphological senses. In this lineage, he moves from
“simpler” life forms (animals thought to resemble plants and extinct marine arthropods) to fish
and reptiles. While this may seem like a purely teleological progression, Emerson is nonetheless
rewriting a religious heritage with a biological and environmental one, moving, like the
nineteenth-century scientists deeply engaged in natural theology, a step closer toward Darwin’s
theories. In this passage, Emerson applies a double meaning to “leaf” to reinforce the metaphor
of “the book of Nature,” figuring nature as a text inscribed with meaning, much like a cipher.44
Emerson’s phrase “leaf after leaf” also recalls Goethe’s metamorphosis of plants as Emerson
traces the development of all forms of life along Goethe’s morphology in this passage. Each
“leaf” is a layer of geological strata that ascends through geologic time. The use of “future” and
“coming” calls attention the sense of future promise and progression in typology, while “statue”
connotes an image that stands in as a representative, further reinforcing the importance of

44

The idea of “reading” nature as a book has a long theological history; it later was adopted by
the developing sciences beginning in the Renaissance and remained popular in works that
connected natural history to theology in the nineteenth century. See, for example, William
Paley’s Natural Theology.
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typology in Emerson’s rhetoric. This passage echoes the list of natural objects that make
impressions (“stratum” “epitaph” “sculpture”) in the passage in which “[a]ll things are engaged
in writing their history.”
Emerson’s unifications through typology present an astounding catalogue of what he
believed were the deepest commonalities that link the world together. Emerson freely used the
principles of natural theology without adhering to any religious dogma or doctrine, while Darwin
used the evidence amassed in service of natural theology to bolster his own theory of evolution,
one ultimately freed from direction and design. Emerson’s belief in the shared structure of
organic life in both nature and language moves toward Darwin’s “web of complex relations” that
is the basis of ecology. Emerson’s close study of science drew him to a more ecological
sensibility in which he understood humanity to be in “occult harmony” and “perpetual analogy”
with both the material as the divine.
Emerson’s faith in the harmony between humans and nature, however, was shaken by the
loss of his infant son in 1842. In “Experience,” he mourns the death of his child: “I take this
evanescence and lubricity of all objects … to be the most unhandsome part of our condition.
Nature does not like to be observed, and likes that we should be her fools and playmates … Our
relations to each other are oblique and casual” (200).45 It is notable that this reversal of some of
Emerson’s earlier positions directly arose from his experience with death as a part of nature. In
response to Margaret Fuller’s death in 1850 by shipwreck and drowning, he wrote in “Fate,”
“But Nature is no sentimentalist,--does not cosset or pamper us. We must see that the world in
rough and surly, and will not mind drowning a man or a woman; but swallows your ship like a

45

For further discussion of this moment in Emerson’s writing and life, see, for example, Sharon
Cameron’s “Representing Grief: Emerson’s ‘Experience.’”
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grain of dust” (263). The idea that “Nature is no sentimentalist” is one that Mary Shelley and
Emily Dickinson explored more deeply throughout their work as they also confronted the deaths
of loved ones and had to reconcile these losses with their understanding of nature.
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Chapter 5. “Of Toads and Men”: Emily Dickinson’s Materialist Poetics
“Ecological awareness is dark, insofar as its essence is unspeakable. It is dark, in so far as
illumination leads to a greater sense of entrapment. It is dark, because it compels us to recognize
the melancholic wounds that make us up” (Timothy Morton, Dark Ecology 110).
Part I. Materialist Poetics
This chapter examines how Emily Dickinson's knowledge of science, evident in her
carefully crafted herbarium and scientific coursework at Amherst Academy and Mount Holyoke
Female Seminary, influenced her poetry in both form and content. Dickinson’s knowledge of
science led her to be skeptical of its claims to mastery, particularly in the form of human
exceptionalism. For Dickinson, both humanity and science are subject to, rather than subjugate,
nonhuman nature; thus, her poems frequently link humans to the rest of the natural world through
shared physical vulnerability. This decentering of the human revolves around her primary poetic
subjects of nature and death, which become the ecological grounds by which to explore the
shared materiality of bodies (both human and nonhuman) to their environments. Through the
unusual pairing of Emily Dickinson with Charles Darwin, I offer new readings of Dickinson’s
poems about nature and death centered around scientific metaphors and animal figures, including
insects, that posit a shared ecological basis for all life. Though much attention has been given to
the influence of Darwin on Victorian novelists, there are very few studies of Darwin’s impact on
Dickinson’s poetry.1 Yet Dickinson and Darwin share several sensibilities that led them toward
their own forms of ecology, recognizing connection and kinship in the material world. This
interconnection, however, has a dark side (as Timothy Morton reminds us) of shared
vulnerability, often in the forms of sickness and death that both poet and scientist acknowledged.
1

See Robin Peel’s chapter “Dickinson and Darwin” in Emily Dickinson and The Hill of Science.
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Dickinson’s oeuvre is defined by the subjects of nature and death, yet often the two are
not considered as inextricably connected in her work. It is tempting to separate them as
Dickinson’s early editors did in the 1890 collection, categorizing poems from the celebration of
the beauty of nature in Book III. “Nature” to the fear, pain and uncertainty associated with dying
included in Book IV. “Time and Eternity.” Yet for Dickinson, like Darwin, death was a part of
nature and central to her understanding of it. In a late letter to the Norcross cousins, Dickinson
includes a short poem that begins “Each that we lose takes part of us; / A crescent still abides,”
(lines 1-2). She continues “. . . I work to drive the awe away, yet awe impels the work” (L891,
March 1884). Dickinson's’ poetic project then was impelled by the experience of death as everpresent in life, figured here as what is left after death’s curved scythe. In another letter,
Dickinson concludes “Life is death we’re lengthy at, death the hinge to life” (L281). Death, for
Dickinson, is the defining characteristic of being alive.2 Dickinson directly links death to nature
in an 1871 letter to the Mr. and Mrs. E. J. Loomis: “My acquaintance with the Irreparable dates
from the Death Bed of a young Flower to which I was deeply attached” (L945). Here, Dickinson
turns the adjective “Irreparable” into a proper noun with a definite article in order to heighten its
concrete reality, while the capitalization of “Flower” reads like a proper name. Dickinson’s
flower bed becomes a death bed. That Dickinson’s first experience of death came from her deep
relationship to her garden corresponds to the myriad ways her poetry mourns not just human loss,
but also that of nonhuman nature. For Dickinson, all animate life was deeply interconnected
whether human, animal, plant or element; hence, the losses could be felt almost equally.

2

For further study of Dickinson’s relation to death, see Jane Donahue Eberwein’s “Messages of
Condolence: ‘more Peace than Pang’” and the chapter “‘Dying in Drama’: Death as
Circumference” in Dickinson: Strategies of Limitation.
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Dickinson repeats this sentiment about the death of flowers in a poem (J116, F101A),
figuring death as God’s bailiff in a property dispute over her garden:
I had some things that I called mine And God, that he called his Till, recently a rival Claim
Disturbed these amities.
The property, my garden,
Which having sown with care He claims the pretty acre And sends a Bailiff there.

Here, Dickinson figures the death of her flowers as a legal dispute with God. As Shira Wolosky
observes of other Dickinson poems, “Representing divine things in economic terms is a rhetoric
that reaches back, in America, to the Puritan fathers. This rhetoric was, perhaps, always unstable.
Instead of subordinating material things to sacred ones, it risks doing the obverse” (Wolosky in
Martin 137). Dickinson is playing with this ambiguity here as she replaces the Garden of Eden,
defined by original sin, with her own garden, rendered innocent. In Emily Dickinson's Approving
God: Divine Design and the Problem of Suffering, Patrick Keane argues that in the poem
“Apparently with no surprise” (J1624, F1668A) “By making the symbolic ‘victim’ of violence
floral rather than human, Dickinson anticipates and prescinds from two of the standard ‘answers’
to the Problem of Suffering: pain as justified punishment for wickedness, or pain as attributable
to the assertion of free will” (28). Dickinson’s focus on the nonhuman thus undoes religious
notions of agency and morality. For Dickinson, this “victimization” is literal rather than
symbolic; the flower is equally subject to death biologically and materially just as humans are.
3

Dickinson’s poems are cited by number in both the Johnson and Franklin editions, abbreviated
as J and Fr per scholarly convention. Titles and lines are given in the form of the more recent
Franklin edition. Letters are cited by number and abbreviated L from the Johnson edition. The
envelope poems are cited according to Werner and Bervin’s edition using the abbreviation A and
the page number.
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These same questions haunted Charles Darwin who makes a similar shift in Origin to focus on
nonhuman subjects. This is in part to avoid the same kind of religious moralizing that
Dickinson’s poem circumvents and simultaneously to try to stave off religious backlash as he,
like Dickinson, builds the case for the commonality of all life.
Both Dickinson and Darwin acknowledge death as an ecological process. Like Darwin,
Dickinson turned away from religious orthodoxy and she, like Ralph Waldo Emerson, found
instead a kind of spirituality in nature, succinctly stating “Some - keep the Sabbath - going to
church - / I - keep it - staying at Home - / With a Bobolink - for a Chorister - / And an Orchard for a Dome -” (J324, Fr236, lines 1-4). For Dickinson, though, nature was not representative of
the order, beneficence or progress that Emerson translated from his ministerial training into early
writings like Nature. As Wolosky observes in her study of Dickinson’s war poetry, “Her poetry
repeatedly and painfully attests to misgivings that prevent her from reading her world as signs
for any redemptive meaning whatsoever. It traces her resistance to making experiences types for
each other in a chain of transferred meanings that point ultimately to some redemptive realm”
(117). In this same vein, Betsy Erkkila argues that Dickinson satirizes all forms of progress
“religious, political and scientific” (145). This same resistance to progress applies to Dickinson’s
relationship to nature, putting her at odds with most natural theology and natural history of her
time which classified nature in a teleological progression culminating in man. Likewise,
Darwin’s project is defined by attempting to move away from this kind of teleological concept of
nature. Darwin observes in his N notebook, “Man's intellect is not become superior to that of the
Greeks (which seems opposed to progressive development) on account of dark ages. […] Man's
intellect might well deteriorate.--((effects of external circumstances)) ((In my theory there is no
absolute tendency to progression, excepting from favorable circumstances))” (Notebooks 79).
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Dickinson follows Darwin in the movement away from teleology and orthodoxy. This shift is
4

evident in her unique poetic style which is an attempt to match form to content by breaking
traditional patterns of language and meaning. Dickinson allows her poetry to mirror that of
evolutionary change as poems progress, regress, rise, fall, and stall with no unidirectional
process.
Gillian Beer has observed that “Evolutionary theory is first a form of imaginative history
… it is closer to narrative than to drama” (6). This chapter explores how Darwin’s evolutionary
theory is related to poetry rather than to narrative, specifically in the work of Dickinson. As
observed early on in this study, Darwin’s grandfather, Erasmus, wrote scientific-poetic texts and
Charles himself saw science and art as intertwined: “All Science is reason acting / systematizing
/ on principles, which even animals practically know ((art precedes science—art is experience &
observation))” (Darwin N notebook 73). As previously discussed, Darwin was equally interested
in language, which like science, is a system organized on principles and drawn from observation
and experience. In this vein, Darwin views language as a process of “Association”: “Probably,
language commenced in some necessary connexion between things & voice … at earliest times
there must have been intimate connection between sounds & language” (Darwin N notebook 74,
76). Darwin here is after connections, particularly those that are fundamental to language (things,
sounds) and therefore also to poetry. Darwin is not far here in his speculations from the
Modernist poetic mantra “No ideas but in things.” Language, and poetic language in particular,
because it is unmoored from traditional notions of meaning, can function like genes, combining
and recombining into new and wondrous forms. The meshing together of new forms creates what
4

For more on the entanglements and controversies surrounding Darwin and religion, see Paul
Carter’s The Spiritual Crisis of the Gilded Age, especially Chapter Two” The Ape in the Tree of
Knowledge” (21-42).
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Darwin calls a “web of complex relations,” which can be biological or linguistic. What is poetry
then but an ecology of language?5 Influence and allusion are versions of descent and kinship,
intimately relating poets, poems and words across vast scales of time and space. Through her
own experience and suffusion of Darwin’s work, Dickinson explores the relations between
material forms and linguistic ones; in response, she attempts in her poetry to create a new species
of language.
This new species is what I call evolutionary poetics, a term I will situate within current
theories of ecopoetics. Ecopoetics tends to privilege poems about material reality with scientific
attention and detail to the natural world (as in Scott Bryson’s 2002 Ecopoetry). More recent
developments, such as Scott Knickerbocker’s 2012 Ecopoetics, however, claim that language can
never reproduce materiality “faithfully” (Knickerbocker 9) following the turn in ecocriticism
toward post-structuralism.6 Instead then, ecopoetics is defined by what we cannot know about the
natural world – a poetics of estrangement. Timothy Morton attempts to reconcile these issues in
his idea of “ambient poetics” in which the dualisms of subject-object and inside-outside collapse
in ways that (at least temporarily) make us feel more interconnected with the natural world (52).
Dickinson’s poetry likewise combines these seemingly opposed strains, giving us what Marianne
Moore calls “imaginary gardens with real toads in them” (“Poetry” line 33). Dickinson attempts
to record her observations of nature in detail in her poetry, but she consistently acknowledges the
human inability to know or represent nature fully in any form, including language. Many of her
best poems hover in this uncertainty, imagining material existence from the mundane to sublime,
but letting the rest fall back into and slip off the blank space of the page. This kind of hovering in
5

This line echoes Emerson’s phrase “What is a farm but a mute gospel?” (Nature 41).
Knickerbocker offers a brief study of the poetry of Dickinson (9-13) and Hopkins in the
introduction to Ecopoetics which is otherwise focused on Modernist poetics.
6
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Dickinson’s poetry can produce a sense of vertigo for the reader. Much of Morton’s work
examines a similar experience, the difficulty of acknowledging and comprehending scales
beyond human limits. In Dickinson, this struggle leads to perspectival instability as seemingly
stable vantage points, particularly those of science, religion and the category of the human more
broadly, are dismantled. In her chapter “Emily Dickinson Thinking: Rearranging Seriality”
Helen Vendler claims that Dickinson’s style is characterized by “cryptic ellipses, its
compression, its enigmatic subjects, its absent centers, and its abstraction” (64). Vendler’s central
claim is that these elements of Dickinson’s poetics disrupt “‘normal’ temporal organization” (65)
and therefore any stable sense of identity and meaning.7 In this way, Dickinson’s poetic project
mirrors Charles Darwin’s scientific one. Darwin, too, was grappling with the immense shifts in
scale in Charles Lyell’s revolutionary work in geology that led to his own lifelong project to
demonstrate the vast tree of descent that links all organic life throughout time.
In defining Dickinson’s evolutionary poetics, we find strange and relevant insights from
Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Dickinson’s editor and friend. While there is no doubt that
Higginson misunderstood Dickinson in many ways, what he gets right comes from his
experiences as a writer and naturalist.8 Higginson calls Dickinson’s poems “skeleton leaves, so
pretty but too delicate” (qtd. in Farr 14) and describes her handwriting as like “the famous fossil
bird-tracks in the museum of that college town” in reference to the dinosaur tracks on display at
Amherst College in the Cabinet (Higginson “Letters” 444). In these analogies, Higginson
characterizes Dickinson’s writing as material, natural, and scientific, yet elusive or elliptical.
Higginson deeply admired Emerson and may have had in mind that the leaf was Emerson’s
7

For a full-length study of Dickinson and time, see Sharon Cameron’s Lyric Time (1979).
For an in-depth study of the complex relationship between Dickinson and Higginson, see
Brenda Wineapple’s joint biography White Heat and Midori Asahina on their correspondence.
8
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metaphor, as for Thoreau (taken from Goethe), for the basis of life. Higginson’s image is
arresting in imagining Dickinson’s poems as the transparent vascular system of a leaf, the green
connective tissue removed. In both descriptions, he alludes to fossils, indirectly in the first,
perhaps again thinking of Emerson and his claim that “Language is fossil poetry” (“The Poet”).
This idea of poetry as a fossilized leaf also recalls Coleridge’s Sibylline Leaves, refigured in the
opening narrative of Mary Shelley’s The Last Man, containing nature’s secrets or prophecies.
Like the skeleton of the leaf, animal fossils are what remains when time has worn away the flesh,
organs and muscles, by which we might identify the creature. What is left is structure, the frame
on which the rest of being was hung. It is notable that Higginson uses fossil imagery, associated
with death and loss, for Dickinson. When Dickinson first wrote to Higginson in 1862, she asked
“if my poems are alive?” (L260). In this sense, she is asking if the poems breathe, beat, digest, if
they have connective systems. In them, he sees bones. But he sees these bones as George Cuvier
might, as a paleontologist, relishing in each discovery, each bone opening up new mysteries of
nature and time.
It is possible that Dickinson too thought of poems as leaves, perhaps similar to the ones
she pressed into her herbarium. Carefully crafted when she was a teenager, Dickinson’s
herbarium had a significant impact in forming her scientific and aesthetic sense. Brenda
Wineapple goes so far as to suggest that “Perhaps we should consider this her first book” (52),
though most critics dismiss the herbarium as a fashionable trend of the time, especially for young
women. To create her herbarium, Dickinson had to learn Linnaean classification, which is based
around repetition and variation in genus and species. Linnaean taxonomy showed how language
could reflect biological interrelations that would become the basis of ecology to connect a vast
9

For more on the metaphor of the leaf in Goethe, see Pfau.
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array of forms. But Linnaean taxonomy was too rigid, too sure of itself for Dickinson to
maintain; the relation of language and nature would not be as simple for the poet. Dickinson’s
herbarium specimens seem like found poems, affixed to the page with small pieces of tape that
resemble her short dashes. Dickinson continued the practice formed from her herbarium of
including pressed flowers (and sometimes dead insects including a bee and a cricket) with her
poems in her letters. This may suggest a kind of equality between plant, insect and poem for
Dickinson, as if each were an equal gift.
In the herbarium, Dickinson responded to the spatiality and materiality of the page. This
same sensitivity is most evident in her envelope poems, where she bends poetic form within the
material constraints of the medium, finding not restriction but innovation in the irregular shapes.
There is strong correlation between her artistic sense in her herbarium and the envelope poems in
which she consciously uses the medium to collage words like the protrusions of stems, leaves
and blossoms. In both, she is playing with space and arrangement, or perhaps we might even say
habitat and fit to form an ecology of language. Indeed, the envelope shapes sometimes resemble
leaves, particularly the maple leaf (pointed top, wide middle, tapered end), which appears in
Dickinson’s herbarium in sequence 23 (Acer, spicatum. 8-1 known as “Mountain Maple”). In the
envelope poem “‘Twas later when / the summer went” (A499, 146), Dickinson turns the pointed
top of the envelope to the left so that it sits at a diagonal, giving her more width in the middle.
The poem itself is about time, like many of the envelope poems. Dickinson keeps time by the
creatures of the seasons, in this poem by the cricket, compared to the “Clock” that “Keeps /
Esoteric / Time/ e.” Dickinson’s turning of the envelope may represent a clock turned askance
with the tip of the envelope pointing to eleven rather than the traditional twelve in order to
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represent physically the poem’s questions about time. The poem’s form seems to extend time, as
do the syllabics of the repeated “e” in “Time” at the end of the poem.
Dickinson’s focus on time in the envelope poems lends itself to questions of human
limitation. On a tiny tip of an envelope fragment, Dickinson fits the aphorism “In this short Life /
that only lasts an hour / merely / How much - how / little - is / within our / power” (A252, 62).
Dickinson uses the smallness of the space to echo the sentiment that human life and power are
likewise constrained. Dickinson employs this same strategy on another tiny triangular fragment
on which she writes, “One note from / One Bird / Is better than / a million words” (A320, 82).
Again, the tiny space represents the small-scale of the repeated “One” where Dickinson, in just a
few short lines, contrasts nature’s sounds with human language (as the cricket with the clock),
privileging the former rather than the latter.
Dickinson’s envelope poems about the shortness of life often figure death explicitly. The
poem “Pompless / no Life / can pass / away -” claims “How cordial / is the / Mystery / The Hos / pitable / Pall - / ” and concludes “Each oc / cupant an / Earl” (A332, 88). As in “Because I
could not / stop for Death” (J712, F479) death here is figured indirectly as a gentlemen who
honors his subjects, one who is both “cordial” and “hospitable.” Dickinson, however, divides the
words “hospitable” and “occupant” unnecessarily on the envelope (not due to space constraints)
in order to break their syllables apart. Dickinson may be playing with “pitiable” in the
breakdown of “hospitable” to show a form of suffering underneath the more positive term.10 The
poet then functions like the poem’s figure of death, dividing words from meaning, or sound from
sense (as in the end of “I felt a Funeral, in my Brain” when “a Plank in Reason, broke” (line 17)).
The two words broken here represent a sense of belonging that then is shattered.
10

See Jacques Derrida’s Of Hospitality on the dual nature of the term.
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Dickinson’s interest in space, and particularly in small space, evident in the envelope
poems, is central to her poetic form. Yet Dickinson’s critics have focused more on her
constructions of nature as sublime, which privileges large-scale phenomena. For biographer
Richard Sewall, it is her volcano poems, for Joanne Diehl, poems of the wind. But for Dickinson,
the sublime is equally found in an insect or a flower, elements traditionally consigned to Edmund
Burke’s category of the beautiful. As part of her evolutionary poetics, Dickinson’s work enacts
what I want to call a miniature sublime. In his full-length study The Dickinson Sublime, Gary
Lee Stonum qualifies that Dickinson “accepts and even enthusiastically endorses the sublime up
to the point at which the self appropriates the power of alterity and thereby proclaims its own
glorious or heroic mastery” (130). In other words, Dickinson resists the Romantic transference of
nature’s power to the poet – or to the human altogether.11 For Dickinson, there is no doubt that
gender is central to this reversal as she finds elements of the sublime in the daily, domestic
figures of nature.12 Dickinson’s radical shift in scale in recognizing the sublimity of plants, small
animals and insects demonstrates that the sublime need not be vast in size in order to produce the
vertigo of feeling the human dwarfed by the natural. This shift was, of course, influenced by the
microscope, which Dickinson refers to as “prudent in an Emergency,” but also through the kind
of scientific method behind the microscope: Dickinson’s close observation of small, everyday
natural phenomena and creatures—a trait she shared with Darwin who was fascinated by the
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Diehl compares “At Half past Three, a single Bird” (J1084, Fr1099) to Keats’s “Ode to a
Nightingale” and Shelley’s “To a Skylark” to argue that the figure of the poet is absent in
Dickinson’s poem (132). Dickinson’s unwillingness to assign connection or closure in the figure
of the poet may be akin to Anne Bradstreet’s modification of the sonnet form by omitting the
concluding couplet.
12
For more on Dickinson and gender, see “Performances of gender in Emily Dickinson’s poetry”
in Martin 107-128 and Vivian Pollack’s Dickinson: The Anxiety of Gender.
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earthworms in his garden. In Dickinson’s miniature sublime, there is no comforting reassurance
that the human is a position different from minute creatures or will not likewise perish.
Dickinson’s evolutionary poetics can be called posthuman as they call into question the
very idea of the “human” as a construct. Many of Dickinson’s “definition” poems put a
commonly accepted term in quotation marks in order to deconstruct its supposed meaning. Most
of Dickinson’s terms in question are abstract nouns: “Faith” “Hope” “Heaven,” etc. What is most
relevant for the purposes of this study is Dickinson’s use of “Nature” in the poem “‘Nature’ is
what we see -” (J688, Fr721). Dickinson’s choice to put “Nature” in quotes makes a similar
rhetorical choice to Morton’s in Ecology without Nature, in which Morton suggests that the idea
of “Nature” (with a capital N) as an abstract other impedes ecological thinking and action
because it distances its subject. Dickinson is a nature poet and her choice to question “Nature” as
a construction suggests her awareness of the distance between human ideas about nature and its
material existence. The poem is an exercise in deconstruction as the speaker posits various
definitions based on the human senses of sight and sound only to reject them. The poem’s final
set insists “Nature is what we know - / Yet have no art to say - / So impotent Our Wisdom is / To
her Simplicity” (lines 9-12). In the poem “know” is connected to “see” and “hear” but the verb
functions on both the literal and symbolic levels. Here, knowing is both a sensory process and
one based in an unconscious intuition. Dickinson’s repeated use of “impotence” with a feminized
nature calls into question human (and particularly patriarchal) claims to define or control nature
as the poem contrasts nature with the human to value the former.
Dickinson shares with Emerson and Darwin the stylistic use of lists of numerous
examples in a row. In the section on sight, Dickinson lists five representations: “The Hill - the
Afternoon - / Squirrel - Eclipse - the Bumble bee -” (lines 2-3). These are important subjects in
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Dickinson’s nature poetry that often figure symbolically and span the terrestrial to the celestial,
from the animal and insect to the more abstract notions of light and time. The “sound” section of
the poem similarly jumps from more concrete to more abstract: “The Bobolink - the Sea - /
Thunder - the Cricket -” (lines 6-7) where again land and sky, animal and insect are represented.
While Dickinson’s examples are not intended to be exhaustive, they are seemingly representative
and the elements named feature prominently throughout her oeuvre. This poem then is in part a
lesson the poet who attempts to put nature into words (“art to say”). While this may seem to
distance language from materiality, Dickinson’s recognition of the gap is an important step in the
evolution of her own attempts to bring together linguistic and material forms.
At the Crossroads of Science and Religion
Susan Howe observes that Dickinson “built a new poetic form from her fractured sense of
being eternally on intellectual borders” (Howe 21). Part of this experience for Dickinson was
standing outside of religious orthodoxy at a time torn between religious revival and Darwinian
doubt. As Emerson presciently declared in his journal on March 4, 1831: “The Religion that is
afraid of science dishonours God and commits suicide” (Journals 75) but Darwin’s
groundbreaking publication of On the Origin of Species in 1859 called into question the long
tradition of natural theology that saw in nature evidence of an intelligent designer. While at
Cambridge, Darwin studied William Paley’s Evidences of Christianity (1794) and Natural
Theology (1802) in which Paley makes his famous analogy of God as watchmaker in which
“There cannot be design without a designer” (12). Dickinson was familiar with this tradition
through her education and family magazine subscriptions, but particularly through Amherst
President and professor, and close family friend, Edward Hitchcock. Hitchcock’s 1851 The
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Religion of Geology, which was part of the Dickinson family library, inveighs against
materialism as pantheism in “chameleon forms” (xi) and the transmutation theories of Lamarck,
Geoffroy St. Hilaire, Bory St. Vincent and the anonymous author of Vestiges of Natural Creation
(1844) (later revealed to be Robert Chambers) as atheistic (Hitchcock 286). He shows concerns
about geology’s implications for religion in the second paragraph of his preface, well before
Origin would pose a threat: “Geology is usually regarded as having only an unfavorable bearing
on revealed religion” (1), likely in response to Charles Lyell’s groundbreaking Principles of
Geology. The controversies in science, by Lyell and Darwin especially, formed at least part of
Dickinson’s doubts about religious belief.
Dickinson was caught between the idea of immortality and her own lived experience;
many of her best poems undulate along this uncertain axis as in “Behind Me - dips Eternity - /
Before Me - Immortality - / Myself - the Term between -” (J721, F743). We find this sense of the
in-between in the poem “Nature and God - I / neither knew” (J835, Fr803B), which turns to
astronomy as a metaphor for secret identity.14 Sometimes in this balancing act between the
spiritual and the material, Dickinson tips the scale, as in the short poem: “‘Faith’ is a fine
invention / For Gentlemen who see - / But Microscopes are prudent / In an Emergency.” (J185,
F202C). Dickinson’s claim that “Faith” is an “invention” is repeated formally by her use of
quotation marks, as with “Nature,” while the underline of “see” functions similarly. In this poem,
13

Edward Hitchcock was a close family friend of the Dickinsons, Professor and President of
Amherst College where he made science the focus (Uno 169). At Amherst, Dickinson likely
heard Hitchcock lecture and he influenced the curriculum as a geologist, astronomer, botanist,
minister and poet (Sewall Herbarium 21). Dickinson also would have used his textbook
Elementary Geology in her coursework and Dickinson directly references her use of his book
Catalogue of Plants growing without Cultivation in the Vicinity of Amherst College (Farr 20).
14
For more on this connection, see Renée Bergland’s “Urania's Inversion: Emily Dickinson,
Herman Melville, and the Strange History of Women Scientists in Nineteenth-Century
America.”
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the in-between hinges on the “But” that claims the need for science. In this context, Dickinson’s
breaks in the syllabics of Protestant hymns need to be read in conversation with the tension
between religion and science over definitions of nature. In breaking traditional religious meters,
Dickinson not only sought new forms of language, but also to express the fracturing of the
beliefs the hymns themselves expressed. The old teleological order could be sustained neither on
the level of belief nor on the level of language.
Dickinson then stands outside of the space of religious belief and certainty. Death as a
part of nature in particular led her to question the traditional religious belief in salvation and
immortality. In the poem “Promise This, When you be Dying,” (J648, F762) Dickinson
concludes “Christ - omitted - Me” (line 28). Frequently she refers to this “omission” from
salvation. In a long letter from late 1850 to her childhood friend Abiah Root, who had recently
become part of the Congregationalist revival sweeping the Northeast at the time, Dickinson
writes, “Christ Jesus will love you more. I’m afraid he don’t love me any! …” (L39). Dickinson
reiterates this sentiment again a few years later to Sue Dickinson in a letter about death and loss
in 1854: “I shall remain alone, and though in that last day, the Jesus Christ you love remark he
does not know me – there is a darker spirit will not disown its child” (L173).15 This darker spirit
in Dickinson is figured often as nature, as Dickinson, like Emerson, turns away from organized
religion and its promises of salvation.
In rejecting traditional Christianity, Dickinson and Darwin likewise move away from
natural theology. In understanding how Dickinson contends with natural theology, Susan Howe
15

Fittingly, darkness is both a place of danger and of pleasure in Dickinson’s poetry. In the
poem “I see thee better - in the Dark -” (J611, Fr442C), Dickinson imagines love as transcending
the spectrum of light in a prism, “Excelling Violet” (line 4). Instead, she finds “And in the
Grave, I see thee best” (line 10) where even in death her lover is illumined by her adoration. For
Dickinson, death can provide a clearer perspective on life, but at the highest cost.
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points to the influence of Jonathan Edwards. Claiming Edwards as Dickinson’s “intellectual
forebearer” Howe sees Dickinson’s poetry as able to explore ideas of nature and divinity
“without the locks of custom” (74), just as Perry Miller sees Emerson as a liberated Edwards. In
Dickinson’s poetry, Howe finds the influence of Puritan theology, which “at its best would
tirelessly search God’s secrecy, explore Nature’s hidden meaning” (46). Notably, Howe adopts a
typological framework similar to Puritan theology reimagined in Emerson in which “The Puritan
consciousness of Jonathan Edwards shadows and prefigures that of Emily Dickinson” (47).
Howe is a deep reader of both writers and recognizes that “Edward’s negativity [...] presaged
hers” (49). Here, we find a sense of Dickinson’s “darker spirit.” In the poem “Four trees - opon a
solitary / Acre -” (J742, F778A), Dickinson questions the role of design and the concept of
“General Nature.” The trees are “Without Design / Or Order, or Apparent Action - / Maintain -”
(lines 2-4). The immediate sense is that these trees are without human intervention, but the poem
also questions whether there is any order at all, even divine. The fourth and last stanza takes up
these questions but does not answer them: “What Deed is Theirs unto the General Nature - /
What Plan / They severally - retard - or / further - / Unknown -” (lines 13-16). The form of the
lines mirrors the poem’s ambivalence as Dickinson alternates long lines of questions with short
responses. Dickinson likewise links related concrete terms (Design/Order/Action, Deed/Plan)
only to conclude with the elusive and abstract “Unknown” stretched out by the series of dashes.
Dickinson’s focus on trees and design is reminiscent of Darwin’s “One general law” of nature.
In his major work, Natural Supernaturalism (1971) M.H. Abrams argues that
Romanticism is defined by the ways that Romantic poets reinterpreted and humanized traditional
religious themes into their views of nature. Dickinson goes a step further than this, approaching
Darwin, when she recognizes that “I was thinking today - as I noticed, that the ‘Supernatural’
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was only the Natural, disclosed -” (L280). While there are Emersonian and Transcendental
resonances here, Dickinson also may be suggesting that natural processes in themselves are
powerful and agential regardless of whether there is another (divine) force behind them. Darwin
makes this claim throughout Origin as natural selection acts upon individuals and species, driven
by chance rather than design.

Part II. The Science of Human Exceptionalism
Prior to Darwin, science had become a powerful means by which to claim human
exceptionalism; heavily influenced by natural theology, much scientific writing, such as the
Bridgewater treatises (1833-36), heralded humans as the pinnacle of a progressive nature,
endowed with unparalleled mental and moral capacities despite shared physical characteristics
with other animals. Darwin, however, began to question this received wisdom in the 1830s,
speculating in the M and N notebooks that eventually would become The Expression of the
Emotions in Man and Animals (1872). Darwin’s work refuted Charles Bell's in natural theology
that suggested human and animal expression were biologically different. Darwin’s book included
copious illustrations that emphasized development from animals to humans and frequently
focused on emotional expression in domestic and therefore easily observable animals like the cat
and dog. Darwin objected to what he perceived as the “arrogance” of science in perceiving
humans as the center of nature (D Transmutation notebook 49; qtd. in Beer 45). Darwin’s
notebook is full of speculations about the connections between humans and animals, “Seeing a
dog & horse & man yawn, makes me feel how <much> all animals <are>built on one structure”
(Darwin Notebooks 21). But Darwin goes further to connect to even the worm, as we saw earlier
in the chapter on Percy Shelley: “Even the worm when trod upon turneth […] now this is the
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oldest inherited & therefore remains” (Darwin Notebooks 15). Here, Darwin recognizes that the
sensation of pain is shared across life forms and may be the first feeling.
Like Darwin, Dickinson questioned human claims to superiority over other creatures.
And she, like Mary Shelley, was particularly attuned to the hubris of scientific rhetoric, with
Baconian claims to master a feminized nature16; thus, “Dickinson’s objection was not to science,
but to what she perceived as the arrogance of science” (Peel 16). In a similar vein to Robin Peel,
Nina Baym has argued that “A small number of poems do seem, at first, to offer a critique of
science; but ultimately they do not deliver on the threat” (Baym 150). If to deliver on the threat is
to reject science altogether, then Baym’s claim is apt, but Dickinson’s poems do offer
meaningful critiques of science in so far as science functions as a means for human
exceptionalism. This distinction is important as Dickinson’s critique of science needs to be read
as part of a broader social critique, evident in many of her poems, that undermines traditionally
human (and patriarchal) systems of class, wealth, and politics, in which Dickinson recognizes
science as enmeshed. Darwin was likewise deeply critical of both anthropocentric and scientific
arrogance. In his C transmutation notebook from 1838, he uses the term “arrogance” three times,
each in reference to the desire of humans to distance themselves from our animals. He states
directly “Man in his arrogance thinks himself a great work worthy the interposition of a deity,
more humble & I believe truer to consider him created from animals” (196-7) and asks the
related question in section on materialism, “Why is thought being a secretion of brain, more
wonderful than gravity a property of matter? It is our arrogance, it our admiration of ourselves”
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In developing an empirical scientific method, Bacon writes of torturing nature in order to
obtain her secrets: “for as in ordinary life every person’s disposition, and the concealed feelings
of the mind and passions are most drawn out when they are disturbed—so the secrets of nature
betray themselves more readily when tormented by art than when left to their own course” (363).
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(166). As Beer notes, Darwin finds a kind of “vertiginous freedom” (247) in the notebooks
where he can make radical speculations without the pressures of publication and public response;
in this way, the notebooks provide important insights into his thought processes and beliefs.
Throughout Origin, Darwin points to what science does yet know, interpreting even the major
discovery of the relationship between birds and dinosaurs as evidence for the work that still
needs to be done: “Hardly any recent discovery shows more forcibly than this how little we as
yet know of the former inhabitants of the world” (1866, 4th ed., 367). Likewise, in Origin, “[t]he
sense of incongruity - of the insufficiency of man’s reason as an instrument for understanding the
material universe - was always with Darwin” (Beer 46). For Dickinson, as well, this skepticism
led her to question both science and politics, as well as the relationship between the two.
In her satirical poem “Sic transit gloria mundi” (Latin for “thus passes the glory of the
world”), (J3, F2) Dickinson lampoons scientists, explorers and politicians, linking their activities
as nationalist and colonialist enterprises undergirded by the same flawed principles. The poem
alludes to Daniel Boon, Columbus, as well as to Peter Parley (whose children’s book on
geography was well known at the time) and the unnamed “gentlemen / Who first observed the
moon!” (lines 11-12). Amid the poem’s critiques, a full stanza is devoted to science: “I climb the
‘Hill of Science,’ / I ‘view the landscape o'er;’ / Such transcendental prospect, / I ne'er beheld
before! (lines 21-24).17 Here, Dickinson merges the explorer and the scientist, as they look down
on and over nature, transformed into “landscape” and “prospect,” into aesthetic and economic
vision respectively. Dickinson likely plays on several meanings of “transcendental” here,
including “Surpassing; preeminent; excellent; transforming; experiential; existential;
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Robin Peel traces the quotations in the poem to Anna Laetitia Barbauld’s essay “The Hill of
Science: A Vision” (c. 1773).
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supernatural; metaphysical; philosophical, as in the ideas of Aristotle, Kant, and Emerson;
[figurative] boundless; timeless; eternal” (Emily Dickinson Lexicon). When this stanza is read in
light of the earlier Latin phrase in the poem, "Oh veni vidi vici!" (“I came, I saw, I conquered)
(line 5), it is clear that Dickinson’s critique of science runs deeply as it connects the “hill of
science” to the project of empire.18 Dickinson even spoofs the sing-song rhythm of the Latin
phrase as childlike, as with the reference to Peter Parley. While the speaker in the poem attempts
to distance himself from any “memento mori” (line 7) through all the accomplishments open to
men in science and politics in the first half of the poem, the second half of the poem finds the
speaker confronted with death in the Civil War. Even the poem’s title is itself a memento mori in
its insistence on the transience of the social and material world. Thus, we see how Dickinson
employs examples of patriarchal arrogance, particularly in the forms of science and war, in order
to undercut them through the figure of death, the finitude that humans share with all animate life.
This poem is far more than a critique of science alone; it is a critique of the ways that science is
interwoven into colonialism and war.
In the short poem “Banish Air from Air -” (J854, Fr963), Dickinson continues her
critique of the hubris of science based on dangerous forms of experimentation, primarily in
chemistry:
Banish Air from Air Divide Light if you dare They'll meet
While Cubes in a Drop
Or Pellets of Shape
Fit Films cannot annul
Odors return whole
18

There are interesting parallels between this Dickinson poem and Keats’s “On first looking into
Chapman’s Homer” in which Keats describes the Spanish Conquistador Hernán Cortés.
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Force Flame
And with a Blonde push
Over your impotence
Flits Steam.
The poem suggests that no scientific experiment, including the next line “Divide light if you
dare” can elevate the human over the natural. Any attempt to divide nature is impossible, as it
reunites in different forms throughout the poem. The poem’s form reinforces this critique in
which the third line of each tercet abruptly disrupts the meter of the longer preceding lines. In the
poem’s final line, “Over your impotence / flits steam” where steam as liquid to gas represents
nature’s indivisibility. “Impotence” is a weighted term here for the human (as in the poem
“‘Nature’ is what we see -”) rendering it powerless, while the verb “flits” gives a powerful but
playful agency to nature. “Flits” follows the more aggressive verbs of “force” and “push” as
nature reclaims itself from human intervention. As Daneen Wardrop points out, Dickinson’s turn
to the second person (here “your”) is often critical in tone (“Fascicle” 146). Dickinson’s poem
reflects her awareness of the potential dangers in the relationship between science and nature, as
well as the relationship between science, industry, and war. Her choice of “steam” likely alludes
to the steam engine, which was powering the industrial revolution. The imagined conflagration at
the end of the poem, “Blonde push,” then can be read as subtly apocalyptic, nature’s revenge for
its manipulation in science and industry. “Blonde” recurs in several of Dickinson’s poems; here
it is linked to the color of a flame, but it can also refer to frost and blight (Emily Dickinson
Lexicon). Nature potentially is feminized in the birth imagery of “push,” reiterating Dickinson’s
critique of patriarchal systems that rely on science. The poem’s end implies that as the chemical
elements of nature are forced into “unnatural” states by science, they become more dangerous,
both to nonhuman nature and to humans. Mary Shelley takes up this question more directly with
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the concept of lightning and electricity in both Frankenstein and The Last Man. In the latter, the
narrator asks a similar question to Dickinson’s poetic speaker. In recalling a fire, Lionel asks
“Could we take integral parts of this power, and not be subject to its operation?” (184).
Dickinson, like Shelley, suggests that the answer is a resounding no.
Even as she critiques scientific hubris, Dickinson remains interested in the methods of
science, particularly observation and deduction. Both impulses are evident in the poem “A
science - so the Savans say” (J100, F147A). Dickinson’s use of the variant “savans” for
“savants” may be a form of mocking those who do not comprehend the new science they are
discussing, treating it as a fashionable new trend, but this is not to be confused as a critique of the
science of comparative anatomy itself. Rather, Dickinson sees this science as intimately
connected to her own experience as a poet of nature. The first stanza recounts Cuvier’s famous
claim to be able to identify a deceased creature from only one bone, while the second shows how
this same principle functions in poetry:
A science - so the Savans say
"Comparative Anatomy"－
By which a single bone－
Is made a secret to unfold
Of some rare tenant of the mold－
Else perished in the stone－
So to the eye prospective led,
This meekest flower of the mead
Opon a winter's day,
Stands representative in gold
Of Rose and Lily, manifold,
And countless Butterfly!
Dickinson’s second stanza shows the application of the scientific method from the first stanza to
a form aesthetics likewise grounded in careful observation of nature. In Dickinson’s poetry,
flowers are often symbolic of poetic rhetoric. In the poem’s form, Dickinson shows the relation
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of this “new” science to the traditional literary device of symbolism in which an object stands in
for a broader concept, where here the flower stands in for the coming spring. Dickinson shows
that both science and poetry employ the same strategy, hinged by the “So” of line 7. The bone of
the first stanza is interchangeable with the blossom in the second at both the literal and symbolic
levels, showing both life and death as part of nature.
Though science pervades Dickinson’s work, there is a relative paucity of scholarship in
this area to date, which is surprising given the attention to science in the works of Dickinson’s
contemporaries likewise focused on nature in their writings, such as Emerson and Thoreau. This
is in part because Dickinson is a woman and a poet, both subject positions that have been read
historically as disconnected from science. But as Kimberley Tolley, Renée Bergland, and Nina
Baym, among others, have shown, women were deeply engaged in the sciences in the nineteenth
century. The two major book-length studies of Dickinson and science catalogue her relationship
to specific branches. Hiroko Uno focuses on the microscope, telescope and geology, while Robin
Peel organizes his chapters around paleontology, geology, geography, biology, astronomy and
psychology. Peel’s argument goes beyond Uno’s to claim that we can view Dickinson’s poems
as “not only deriving some of their qualities from the influence of the exciting new scientific
culture, but also as having scientific intentions and making scientific claims” (14). This is a
substantially bolder claim; most critics primarily characterize Dickinson as having employed a
scientific vocabulary in individual chapters on Dickinson and science (Patterson 218; Baym
134), but not necessarily with scientific aims.19 As Baym notes, more than 270 poems (15%) use
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Richard Sewall in his biography of Dickinson concludes, “Her poems show a knowledge of
chemical processes, of botanic and especially geologic lore far beyond the usual nature poet’s
stock in trade” (345), which is similar to claims made by Fred White in “‘Sweet Skepticism of
the Heart’: Science in the Poetry of Emily Dickinson” and Daniel Orsini in his article “Emily
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“scientific language” (Baym 134) spanning the fields of botany, chemistry, astronomy,
electricity, arithmetic, and physiology (Baym 134), while Patterson catalogues nearly fifty terms
that form Dickinson’s scientific vocabulary, of which “Over half of these words are rare or
nonexistent in her poetic models” (Patterson 218). What is missing from current science studies
approaches to Dickinson such as these is attention to the burgeoning idea of ecology in
Dickinson’s time, particularly in relation to Charles Darwin. Additionally, further consider of the
interrelation of ecology and aesthetics in Dickinson’s work is needed. Reading Dickinson’s
poetry alongside science is not just a question of vocabulary or even Peel’s expanded sense of
“aim,” but rather about the inseparability of poetic content and form.
Several critics are interested in the tension between science and religion in Dickinson’s
work, but rarely is this discussed in terms of how this frames Dickinson’s nascent sense of
ecology or aesthetics. Baym attempts to place Dickinson in cultural context: “At the least, her
scientific facility testifies to the ubiquitous presence of scientific information in the general
culture. At most, she deploys her scientific lexicon to draw strikingly different conclusions about
science and religion from those prevailing in this same culture” (Baym 133). The latter claim
here requires further study: how Dickinson manipulates scientific language to make new claims.
The scope of such a project would be immense; for now, I attempt in this chapter to sketch out
the specific claim of how Dickinson uses metaphors drawn from science as part of her
decentering of the human.

Dickinson and the Romantic Use of Science” that focuses on the poem “A light exists in spring.”
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Notably, both Daniel Orsini, and Richard Sewall in his biography of Dickinson, link her
knowledge of science, particularly geology, to her Romanticism.20 Many critics have argued for
Dickinson as a Romantic by tracing the influences of fellow Romantics including Emerson,
Wordsworth, Keats, and Byron in particular.21 Higginson compares her to Blake in his 1890
preface to her poems: “It is believed that the thoughtful reader will find in these pages a quality
more suggestive of the poetry of William Blake than of anything to be elsewhere found,—flashes
of wholly original and profound insight into nature and life” (“Preface” v). Joanne Diehl in
Dickinson and the Romantic Imagination, however, argues against Dickinson as a Romantic,
claiming that Dickinson shares in the Romantic celebration of imagination, but not of nature,
(following René Wellek’s classic definition of Romanticism as focused on imagination, nature,
myth, and symbol). Such debates, of course, hinge on the definition of “Romantic,” which
remains heavily debated within the field.22 Diehl, however, goes too far in her claims for
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Dickinson has been categorized variously as a Romantic, Victorian, and even Modernist and
Postmodernist (Wardrop 151). Patterson terms Dickinson, perhaps most accurately, a “belated
Romantic” (115).
21
Patterson suggests that Dickinson may have learned the term “phosphorus” from Keats’s
“Lamia” (117) and that “Among the Romantic poets, she once named Keats as her master
(L261), but his influence is not especially marked. Her real model seemed to be Byron, as he was
also that of Charlotte Brontë, Elizabeth Browning, indeed every Victorian woman who felt
herself disadvantaged; on his side Byron came at least halfway toward his preponderantly
feminine audience by urging them to treat him “as a favorite and somewhat forward sister”
(Patterson 163). Indeed, Dickinson had volumes of Byron from her father and Sue Dickinson
(Patterson 164). Dickinson is often considered in relation to a wide range of canonical authors. In
one study “The fourteen poets selected for comparison were Shakespeare, Milton, Pope,
Wordsworth, Byron, Shelley, Keats, Tennyson, the two Brownings, Emerson, Bryant, Poe and
Longfellow. Although Emily Dickinson never mentioned Shelley, a copy of his Poetical Words
inscribed ‘Susan H. Gilbert. Geneva. 1854’ is preserved among the Dickinson books at the
Houghton Library, and it is inconceivable that Emily failed to read it. For all the others, she has
left written record of her admiration” (Patterson 217).
22
See, for example, Nicholas Halmi’s “Romanticism, the Temporalization of History, and the
Historicization of Form,” Jerome McGann’s “Rethinking Romanticism,” and David Collings’s
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Dickinson’s relationship with nature as an “intrusive, hostile enemy” (41) that Dickinson battles
with through Romantic solipsism. She claims that Dickinson “will either appropriate the
landscape by internalizing it, or obversely, deny the boundaries between self and nature by
describing the landscape in the anatomical language of arteries and veins, impressing herself
upon the land. Either strategy expresses aggression, the need to win dominance from a
competing, potentially destructive province located in the land” which Diehl contrasts with
Wordsworth’s more reciprocal relationship to nature (35).23 Rather than insist that Dickinson is
at war with nature, this chapter demonstrates how Dickinson is in line with Darwin’s thinking as
he too struggles to acknowledge the pain and suffering attendant in nature – that nature is itself a
war; however, both Dickinson and Darwin attempt to reconcile this into a more ecological
perspective that is no longer human-centered. This attempt at reconciliation is evident in the
poetic closing to Origin: “Thus, from the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted
object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals,
directly follows. There is grandeur in this view of life” (490). The definition of Romanticism I
am using here is one that includes an awareness of a complex and often fraught relationship to
nature.24 In this way, Dickinson is closely is aligned in this project, perhaps surprisingly, with
Mary Shelley, as she offers a second-generation Romantic and feminist critique of science, as
well as of earlier Romantic and Transcendental conceptions of nature. As Nina Baym points out
in her study of Dickinson, there were very few critiques of science except from religion in the
rereading of Wordsworth and Romanticism in Wordsworthian Errancies: A Poetics of Cultural
Dismemberment.
23
This study is heavily influenced by its critical moment (1981) and the work of Harold Bloom
(who is thanked first in the acknowledgements though the study claims departure from his work).
24
As Alan Bewell notes, the human conception of “Nature” often is treated as static and passive,
subordinated to culture and history (Bewell Natures 9-10) but nature in the colonial context is
one of “intense political, social, discursive, and material struggle” (7).
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time period and especially none from women (Baym 14). This makes Dickinson an even more
important figure in relation to Mary Shelley who has received recognition through the cultural
evolution of Frankenstein as a major figure in the origins of science/speculative fiction.
Dickinson’s critique of science, particularly because of the medium of poetry and her poetic
style, has not yet been recognized as offering a feminist critique of science related to Mary
Shelley’s.
In naming Dickinson as a Romantic, there is no doubt as to the significant influence of
Ralph Waldo Emerson. His work corresponds to Dickinson’s in numerous ways that deserve
further attention for the purposes of this study, particularly in the connections between science,
nature, and writing. Dickinson received a copy of Emerson’s Poems (1858) when she was 19 as a
gift from friend Ben Newton (L30). She sent a copy of Representative Men (1850) to Higginson's
ailing wife, calling it “a little Granite Book you can lean upon” (L481, Christmas 1876). We also
know that all of Emerson’s essay collections (Misc. Essays (1860), Essays First Series (1861)
and Essays Second Series (1862)) were in the Dickinson family library. Of particular interest to
Dickinson may have been Emerson’s early essays Nature and “The Poet,” both of which explore
the relationship of nature to language and writing. In a letter to Otis P. Lord on 30 April 1882
Dickinson wrote about the death of Emerson: “the Ralph Waldo Emerson--whose name my
Father’s Law Student taught me, as touched the secret Spring. Which Earth are we in?” (L750).
Dickinson’s vivid language here conjures the image in which just hearing Emerson’s name was
like an incantation that allowed her access to another world, a “second sight” to the point that the
world itself is changed by his absence. Dickinson’s choices of “secret Spring” and “Earth”
suggest the importance of Emerson’s Transcendentalist nature. This is not to claim that
Dickinson accepted Emerson’s Transcendentalist vision of nature in full, but she would have
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responded strongly to Emerson’s work to reconcile spirit and matter. Emerson, like Dickinson,
had to confront the controversy surrounding Darwin’s work later in his life. This led Emerson to
struggle with a darker view of nature in rarer moments: Emerson concluded that “Nature is no
sentimentalist” (“Fate” 263). Dickinson makes the similar claim in a letter from around 1875 to
Mrs. J.G. Holland: “Nature cannot enact a friend -” (L439). Fellow Transcendentalist Henry
David Thoreau, whose views of nature also changed significantly in response to his reading of
Darwin, barely conceals his horror at the violence of nature in a passage reminiscent of Darwin
in the “Struggle for Existence” chapter of Origin: “I love to see that Nature is so rife with life
that myriads can be afforded to be sacrificed and suffered to prey on one another; that tender
organizations can be so serenely squashed out of existence like pulp,--tadpoles, which herons
gobble up, and tortoises and toads run over on the road; and that sometime it has rained flesh and
blood!” (qtd. in Fuller 141). Thoreau’s writing echoes the sentiment of the cruelty of nature in
Alfred Lord Tennyson’s 1850 “In Memoriam,” particularly section LVI in which “Nature, red in
tooth and claw / With ravine, shriek'd against his [Man’s] --” (LVI, line 15). When reading
Dickinson as a Romantic, Dickinson’s understanding of nature needs to be considered within this
Darwinian context where nature is no longer solely a source of comfort or moral improvement.

Part III. Gothic Ecology
For Dickinson, then, like Darwin, nature was not only a place of beauty and order, but
also full of sickness, loss, decay and death. The idea of nature as “haunted” appears in
Dickinson’s poetry and letters and is influenced by her reception of the Gothic25 particularly the
works of the Brontës. In their introduction to the edited collection Ecogothic (2013), editors
25

See Daneen Wardrop, Goblin with a Gauge.
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Andrew Smith and William Hughes suggest that “The Romantic Gothic” “does the ecological in
a different way to the Romantics, but its presumptive dystopianism (certainly in Mary Shelley’s
case) illustrates how nature becomes constituted in the Gothic as a space of crisis which
conceptually creates a point of contact with the ecological” (3). Dickinson, like Mary Shelley,
participates in this redefinition of Romantic nature through the tropes of the Gothic.26 What is
most relevant for the purposes of this study is the turn from the haunted house to nature itself as
haunted. In a late letter to Higginson (summer 1875), Dickinson sends a one-line note: “Nature is
a Haunted House--but Art--a House that tries to be haunted” (L459A). It is possible that this note
was included with a longer letter to Higginson (L459) that contains the poem “The long sigh / of
the Frog” (J1359, Fr1394B). Dickinson may have Emerson’s Nature in mind for her aphorism in
thinking of nature as both spiritual and symbolic, full of meaningful apparitions, and art as an
analogue to nature’s own expression. But “haunted” here connotes a darkness and danger not
present in Emerson’s early essay. On the surface, Dickinson’s frog poem seems far from
haunted, either about nature or art, but there is a characteristic strangeness, a subtle hint of
something darker, that haunts particularly the ends of Dickinson’s poems:
The long sigh
of the Frog
Opon a Summer’s
Day
Enacts intoxication
Opon the Revery –
But his receding
Swell
Substantiates a Peace
That makes the
Ear inordinate
26

This differs from the kind of haunting that Dickinson explores in the poem “One need not be a
chamber to be haunted,” (J670, Fr407) where the mind is far more terrifying than any external
threat: “Ourself - behind Ourself - Concealed - / Should startle - most -” (lines 13-14).
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For corporal
release –
In the first half of the poem, the frog’s own bodily motion and sound seem in harmony with its
natural environment, but by the end of the poem the experience is haunted. The poem hinges on
the “But” of the fourth line in which the reverie is characterized as a form of death with the
diction of “receding,” “Peace” and “corporal / release -.” Only later in the poem is it evident that
the reverie also maybe be that of an implied human listener, indicated by the metonymy of “Ear,”
and not solely the frog’s own. The human thus haunts the poem in its absence as Dickinson
suggests that the “release” from embodied experience cannot come through the senses. The
frog’s sound becomes a potential gateway between life and death, which creates a tension
between the physical world and any unknown beyond.
Dickinson more explicitly connects nature’s haunting to death in the poem “What
mystery pervades a well!” (J1400, Fr1433) where the well and the “floorless” sea (line 15) are
paired as an unknown “abyss” (line 8). These images are repeated in the poem “Of Death I try /
to think like / this,” (J1558, Fr1558) heightening the already present sense in the former poem
that the well and the sea as deep bodies of water are representative of death. The final two
stanzas of “What mystery pervades a well!” turn to nature, subtly connecting it to death through
the two halves of the poem (lines 17-24):
But nature is a stranger yet;
The ones that cite her most
Have never passed her haunted house,
Nor simplified her ghost.
To pity those that know her not
Is helped by the regret
That those who know her, know her less
The nearer her they get.
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Dickinson may have in mind here a critique of the Romantic vision of nature that exhorts people
to connect to nature and laments the effects of estrangement from it, as in Wordsworth, Emerson
and Thoreau. In the poem, Dickinson’s alternating syllabics (between 8 and 6 per line) enact the
series of juxtapositions between nature and humans that merge in the last line with the inverted
syntax of “her” and “they.” Dickinson’s point is that nature is itself “a stranger yet” that recedes
from knowability. In this way, Dickinson shares with Darwin the sense that nature is far stranger
in its chance mutations than natural theology could allow. Nature is haunted and ghostly not
simply because it is unknowable, but also because it is also a site of death.
Dickinson figures Darwin in her letters much the same way she figures death in her
poems: as a thief who robs one of belief. In a letter to Otis Lord in April 1882, Dickinson alludes
to the controversy surrounding Darwin and religion of which she would have been aware by this
late date, particularly from articles in The Atlantic including Asa Gray’s reviews of Origin that
attempted to reconcile the theory with natural theology. In response to someone mentioning “The
Redeemer,” Dickinson wryly comments “We thought Darwin had thrown ‘the Redeemer’ away”
(L750). Indeed, several of Dickinson’s poems imagine God as either injured or dead.27 Of
particular interest in relation to Darwin is the poem “This is a Blossom of the Brain -” (J945,
F1112A, 1865) which is followed by the line “A small - italic Seed Lodged by Design or
Happening” (line 2). The poem plays on the opening line, where the “This” remains undefined,
but is connected to the related idea/phrase “the Flower of the Soul” (line 5). Dickinson’s poem
operates on two levels, one material, the other more religious through its central nouns:
Blossom/Flower, Brain/Soul, Happening/Design. Dickinson’s willingness to interweave these
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Eberwein analyzes Fr1581 on god’s amputated hand, Fr795 “lifeless deity” and Dickinson’s
childhood fear of god and immortality in L503 to Higginson.
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strands suggests an awareness of their possible connection, that the idea of the “soul” may be
only a manifestation of the biological brain, similar to the “invention” of “Faith.” By the end of
the poem, Dickinson seems to grapple with the potential effects of such ideas imagining “The
Funeral of God,” (line 11) in which flower and soul become transferable terms in the concluding
lines “Upon his Breast, a / closing Soul / The Flower of our Lord -” (lines 12-13). While the
flower is highly metaphoric of the soul in this poem, Dickinson’s opening and closing lines serve
to undermine the stability of the traditional religious imagery. Whether Dickinson has Darwin in
mind during this poem is impossible to know, but the vocabulary of the poem, particularly the
tension over the word “Design” corresponds to the sentiment in her letters about Darwin
dismantling the idea of God.
Dickinson’s other direct reference to Darwin in her letters describes him in a similar
way, as an agent of loss in a letter to Mrs. J.G. Holland (with characteristic wit): “Why the Thief
ingredient accompanies all Sweetness Darwin does not tell us / Each expiring Secret leaves an
Heir, distracting still” (L359). In both instances in her letters, Dickinson gets at the core of the
struggle with Darwin’s theory. There is no redemption from the “Thief” ingredient of death in
nature. In the letters then Darwin is almost figured as Death, himself become the “Thief” who
robs and takes away as we saw in the poem “I had some things that I called mine -” where Death
is God’s “Bailiff” and likewise in the poem “Of nearness to her sundered” (J607, Fr337A) which
concludes that “The Grave yields back her / Robberies -” (lines 16-17). In the second letter,
Dickinson seems to lament the state of nature as both beautiful (“Sweetness”) and violent
(“Thief”). Dickinson figures this sentiment in the poetic image of desire for a life free from pain
and uncertainty, what she calls “No Goblin--on the Bloom” (line 14) in the poem “I think to Live
- May be a / Bliss” (J646, Fr757A). While there are clear gothic undertones to Dickinson’s use of
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“Goblin,” as Daneen Wardrop argues in Goblin with a Gauge, the goblin here may be a figure of
an insect, suggesting the natural cycle of predation and decay. Indeed, Dickinson figures death as
an insect explicitly in the late poem “Death is like the insect / Menacing the tree,” (J1716,
Fr1783) in which the tree, like the human, is subject to “the vermin’s will” (line 12).
In another letter to Mrs. Holland (from Sept. 1873) about railroad closures, Dickinson, in
half-joking tone, alludes to controversies surrounding extinction, science and a belief in the
afterlife: “Possibly she perished? / Extinction is eligible. / Science will not trust us with another
World. / Guess I and the Bible will have to move to some old fashioned spot where we will feel
at home” (L395). Written with the line breaks of a poem, Dickinson swiftly displays her
knowledge of the crisis of faith surrounding Darwin’s work, which by 1873 included Darwin’s
more controversial The Descent of Man (1871). Though Dickinson seems to side here with
traditional religion through the metonym of the Bible, her poems suggest otherwise.

Part IV. Darwin and the Animals
Darwin himself was deeply haunted by the role of suffering, death and extinction in
nature. Often, he tries to gloss over these issues in Origin in order to focus on the general
beneficence of nature (likely influenced by William Paley’s natural theology). Darwin claims
“man selects only for his own good: Nature only for that of the being which she tends” and
“Natural selection is daily and hourly scrutinising throughout the world […] silently and
insensibly working” (Origin 87). As Gillian Beer notes, Origin “retains the idea of natura
naturans, or The Great Mother, in its figuring of Nature” (7). This same concept of a distant yet
maternal nature is evident in Dickinson’s poem “Nature - the gentlest mother is,” (J790, Fr741)
which concludes “With infinite affection - / An infiniter care - / Her golden finger on her lip - /
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Wills silence everywhere -” (lines 21-24). While it is possible to read Dickinson’s poem as
sentimentalism in which nature is the perfect mother for whom new superlatives must be
invented, Dickinson’s mother, like Darwin’s figure of natural selection is one of distance and
silence despite the imagined “affection” and “care.”
In his letters to the American botanist Asa Gray, Darwin explains how he came to give up
his religious views of nature. Darwin was particularly disturbed by the randomness of death as he
wrote to Gray about the Christian worldview of design: “--An innocent & good man stands under
a tree & is killed by flash of lightning. Do you believe (& I really shd like to hear) that God
designedly killed this man? Many or most persons do believe this; I can’t & I don’t--” (qtd. in
Fuller 211; Correspondence 8:496). He continues, “Do you believe that when a swallow snaps
up a gnat that God designed that particular swallow shd snap up that particular gnat in that
particular instant?” He goes on, “I believe that the man and the gnat are in the same predicament.
--If the death of neither man or gnat are designed, I see no good reason to believe that their first
birth or production shd be necessarily designed” (qtd. in Fuller 212, Correspondence 8:275). For
Darwin, death suggests chance not design, therefore design cannot be the foundation of nature
nor can nature be evidence of an intelligent and caring creator. Darwin continues to cite death
and its attendant pain and suffering as the main cause for his disillusionment with the idea of a
beneficent nature/creator: “I cannot persuade myself that a beneficent & omnipotent God would
have designedly created the Ichneumonidae [parasitic wasp] with the express intention of their
feeding within the living bodies of caterpillars, or that a cat should play with mice” (qtd in Fuller
226; Correspondence 8:224).
In this passage from his letter, Darwin turns to birds, insects and mice as primary
examples of the role of chance in suffering and death, and places man and gnat in the same

246
condition. For Dickinson, too these creatures, including the sparrow and the rodent, were often
vulnerable figures of plight. While Darwin uses the example of the swallow, Dickinson often
figures the sparrow as sufferer because of its Biblical allusion. In Psalm 84:3 both the sparrow
and the swallow find homes among God’s altars (RSV). But in the gospels, the sparrow is
trapped, plucked, killed, bound and traded as a commodity. In Matthew 10:29, Christ asks “Are
not two sparrows sold for a penny? And not one of them will fall to the ground without your
Father’s will.” This sentiment is expanded in Luke 12:6-7 (RSV): “Are not five sparrows sold for
two pennies? And not one of them is forgotten before God. Why, even the hairs of your head are
all numbered. Fear not; you are of more value than many sparrows.28 This is the question that
both Darwin and Dickinson take up: How alike are the positions of human and bird? Are humans
as subject to the same forces of nature as all other creatures, no matter how small or different?
These questions, of course, are related to those of ecology, in which all life is interdependent.
Dickinson identifies herself as like a bird in relation to God not to illustrate his care, but rather
his indifference in the poem “Of course - I prayed” (376): “And did God care? / He cared as
much as on the Air / A Bird - had stamped her foot - /And cried “Give me”” Dickinson expands
on this same idea in the poem “Victory comes late -” (J690, Fr195A) about death to include
Darwin’s sense of competition between bird species for food while at the same time echoing the
language of commerce from the gospels. The poem is at once physical and metaphysical. It also
likely is influenced by the Civil War, first appearing in a letter to Samuel Bowles in late 1861. In
the 1863 fascicle copy, Dickinson darkens the poem dramatically by changing “dazzles” to
“strangles.”

28

These Biblical lines are the inspiration for the popular hymn from 1905 “His eye is on the
sparrow.”

247
Victory comes late,
And is held low to
freezing lips
Too rapt with frost
To mind it!
How sweet it would
have tasted!
Just a drop!
Was God so economical?
His table's spread
too high
Except we dine on tiptoe!
Crumbs fit such
little mouths Cherries - suit Robins The Eagle's golden
breakfast dazzles [strangles] them!
God keep his vow [Oath]
to "Sparrows"
Who of little love Know how to starve!
The first half of the poem agonizes over the denial of “victory,” doubly allusive to war and to
religious salvation, to “freezing lips” which underscores the corporeality of the death. The
second half turns to the ability of the birds to survive on small quantities of food, likening them
to the small mouths which recalls the earlier image of the frozen lips. Despite God’s “vow” the
sparrows suffer just the same as the corpse of the first stanza. But here the robin is also a figure
of suffering, no longer simply jealous of the eagle but consumed by it. While these lines have
been read as a critique of war with the eagle representing America or a king, Dickinson is also
describing here an ecological process similar to that which Darwin recounts of predator-prey
cycles in which the robins eat cherries and the eagles eat the robins. Birds are often poetic
symbols, but in this poem Dickinson also acknowledges the creatures at a physical and biological
level and likens their suffering to that of humans, undercutting the Romantic tendency to view
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birds as symbolic in and of poetry. Instead, birds become vulnerable bodies, unable to meet the
symbolic need of the poet, as in Keats’s “Ode to a Nightingale.” Dickinson’s change of “vow” to
“Oath” creates a slant rhyme with “mouth” to underscore the physicality in the poem.
Dickinson reiterates the sentiments of her poem in a late letter (summer 1875) to her
Norcross cousins, one year after the death of her father when her mother has become paralyzed:
The birds that father rescued are trifling in his trees. How flippant are the saved!
They were even frolicking at his grave, when Vinnie went there yesterday. Nature must
be too young to feel, or many years too old.
Now children, when you are cutting the loaf, a crumb, peradventure a crust, of
love for the sparrow’s table (L442)
Dickinson recognizes here that nature is unfeeling, indifferent to her dead father, her own
suffering and the birds alike. Even as Dickinson resents the birds’ survival after her father’s
death, she insists that the sparrows be given a share of the food in order to survive.
Dickinson extends her comparisons between humans and other animal even to creatures
far less commonly associated with humans than birds, such as amphibians and insects, including
the gnat that Darwin mentions in the food chain with the swallow. Indeed, the gnat is a central
symbol for Dickinson in the critique of human exceptionalism. Even more than a small bird like
a sparrow or a robin, a gnat is seemingly infinitesimal in size and far on any hierarchy of
“animacies” from the human29. In the poem “A Toad, can die of Light -” (J583, Fr419A). The
first stanza reads:
A Toad, can die of Light Death is the Common Right
29

“Gnat” was a common term in Dickinson’s time for several small insects, including mites,
flies and mosquitoes (Emily Dickinson Lexicon).

249
Of Toads and Men Of Earl and Midge
The privilege Why swagger, then?
The Gnat’s supremacy is large as Thine –
Here, Dickinson deftly undermines the language of economic and cultural capital: right,
privilege, swagger, supremacy – a theme likewise reflected in the poem “Color - caste denomination” (J970, F836) in which death undoes all forms of classification. Notably in that
poem, Dickinson turns to a more familiar entomological metaphor of the metamorphosis of the
caterpillar to butterfly: “Chrysalis of Blonde - or Umber - / Equal Butterfly - They emerge from
His Obscuring – ” (lines 13-15) to reflect Death’s indiscriminatory nature; light or dark, it does
not matter. In the toad poem, the line “Of Toads and Men” alludes to the poem “To a Mouse” by
Robert Burns subtitled “On Turning up in Her Nest with the Plough, November, 1785.” Well
before John Steinbeck popularized Burns’ line “The best laid schemes o’ Mice an’ Men” (line
39), Dickinson responded to Burns’ conclusion that both these “schemes” end in grief and pain.
Burns’ speaker identifies himself as the mouse’s “earth-born companion, / An’ fellow-mortal!”
(lines 11-12) connecting them in their shared physical vulnerability. Dickinson picks up this
theme in her poem, deconstructing not only markers of class, but of species, reducing the human
to the same level as the gnat, just as in Darwin’s letters. This idea is central to Jacques Derrida’s
claim in his groundbreaking work in Animal Studies The Animal that Therefore I am that
humans and animals share their own finitude as a form of suffering that we must acknowledge.
Death and its attendant suffering are the fundamental principles that unite the animal kingdom.
For Dickinson and for Derrida, suffering is a shared incapacitation between humans and other
animals that moves away from the rhetoric of human exceptionalism. This vulnerability is shared
not only with animals similar to us, but also beings seemingly as different as amphibians and
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insects in Dickinson’s poem. In this way, her choice of the toad and gnat rather than Burns’
mouse is significant. By choosing non-mammalian creatures, Dickinson eliminates some of the
“natural” affinity that Burns finds with the female mouse that attempts to make a home.
Dickinson establishes the vulnerability of the toad in the poem’s opening line, which
describes a surprising form of death that highlights its unexpectedness. While light is generally
considered conducive to life and often figured classically as a metaphor for knowledge in
Dickinson’s work, here light becomes a form of death, enacting a similar reversal to that of man
and gnat’s expected status. The opening line relies on Dickinson’s scientific knowledge of how
amphibians’ skin can dehydrate from too much heat. Numerous scientific experiments were
conducted on frogs, of which toads are a colloquial type, in the nineteenth century as they were
valued as research subjects because of their highly porous skin. In one such study, described in
Harper’s Weekly in Jan. 1857, frogs’ deaths were timed when immersed in strychnine and
nicotine (43). Frogs’ skin was also known to change colors like chameleons and phototropism
experiments were conducted on frogs beginning in 1852. Dickinson was likely aware of these
experiments through Harper’s Weekly and The Atlantic. She expresses her objections to the
common practice of dissection and vivisection in her poem “Split the lark - and you’ll find the
music” (Fr904) which casts the scientist as a doubting Thomas who needs blood for proof,
following William Wordsworth’s objection to those who “murder to dissect” (“The Tables
Turned” line 28). In his book on birds Scarlet Experiment, Jeff Karnicky contrasts the Lark poem
with “‘Hope’ is the thing with / feathers -” (J254, Fr314) tracing the often violent interactions
between humans and birds (xvi). Indeed, Dickinson likely used the 1829 edition of the popular
guide, Familiar Lectures on Botany, for her herbarium which addressed the issues with
comparative anatomy and botany in its introduction: “Animals, though affording the most
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striking marks of designing wisdom, cannot be dissected and examined without painful
emotions. The vegetable world offers a boundless field of inquiry, which may be explored with
the most pure and delightful emotions” (11).
Darwin was fascinated by insects (mentioned over twenty times in the B notebook, 18378) noting that “People like to talk of the wonderful event of intellectual man appearing -- the
appearance of insects with other senses is more wonderful” (Notebook B 207). Darwin
understands that insects are integral to all form of life, including the human. In The Voyage of the
Beagle (1839), he acknowledges the difficulty and need of attending to insects,
The often repeated description of the stately palm and other noble tropical plants, then
birds, and lastly man, taking possession of the coral islets as soon as formed, in the
Pacific, is probably not correct; I fear it destroys the poetry of this story, that feather and
dirt-feeding parasitic insects and spiders should be the first inhabitants” (16).
Darwin here hints at the fact that poetry and narrative are primarily anthropocentric, but
Dickinson shares a sensibility with Darwin in recognizing the poetic in different life forms,
including the wonder of insects. As Beer observes, “Lyell, and later Darwin, demonstrated in
their major narratives of geological and natural history that it was possible to have plot without
man - both plot previous to man and plot even now regardless of him” (17). For Darwin, much of
this plot is populated by creatures very different than humans.
Dickinson, like Darwin, turns to insects to dismantle human exceptionalism, using the
figure of the gnat from “A Toad, can die of Light -” in another poem heavily influenced by
science (J422, Fr415):
More Life - went out - when
He went
Than Ordinary Breath -
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Lit with a finer Phosphor Requiring in the Quench A Power of Renowned Cold,
The Climate of the Grave
A Temperature just adequate
So Anthracite, to live For some - an Ampler Zero A Frost more needle keen
Is necessary, to reduce
The Ethiop within.
Others - extinguish easier A Gnat's minutest Fan
Sufficient to obliterate
A Tract of Citizen Whose Peat lift - amply
vivid Ignores the solemn News
That Popocatepetl exists Or Etna's Scarlets, Choose –
This poem relies heavily on Dickinson’s knowledge of several branches of science, particularly
chemistry and geography. Here the traditional vital spirit or soul of the deceased is figured in
scientific terms as phosphorescent and the conventional image of the frozen corpse is reimagined
with precise scientific measurements of “Climate” and “Temperature.” While the latter half of
the poem seems to contrast the virile deceased beloved and “Some” with less robust “Others,”
the poem turns to the vulnerability of all life to natural processes like the potential eruptions of
the two volcanoes in the last two lines. The poem’s last word “Choose” should belong to “Etna’s
Scarlets” for parallelism, but the comma and capitalization instead shift agency to the reader to
make a decision about whether he or she will remain ignorant of nature’s power as embodied by
the volcanoes. Dickinson sets up lines 14 and 16 as shocking parallels in both form and content
in which something as minute as a gnat could destroy the powerful democratic figure of the
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citizen. More than even the gnat, or its wings, its “minutest motion” is figured as powerful here
in contrast to a whole group of citizens with “tract” doubly meaningful as an extension of
space/land, as well as a religious or political document. Indeed, enacting the very process
Dickinson is describing, the abstract “tract” becomes the physical “peat” in the shared structure
of the lines as it covers over the dead bodies beneath it. The peat that contains the dead would
have been burned for fuel, which here pales in comparison to the volcanic eruptions that created
it. In this same vein of privileging the natural over the human, the gnat in this poem undoes some
of the most powerful markers of human exceptionalism including rhetoric and politics just as
Dickinson uses the gnat to rob the power of the socio-economic vocabulary in “A Toad, can die
of Light -”. In this way, Dickinson pivots from the traditional Romantic sublime of the volcano
in which humanity is miniaturized by the mountain to the miniature sublime of the “minutest”
gnat.30
In the letter to Abiah Root in which Dickinson positions herself outside of religious
belief, she likens human life to insect life: “I think we grow still smaller - this tiny, insect life the
portal to another; it seems strange - strange indeed” (late 1850, L39). Dickinson recognizes a
fundamental similarity between the insect and the human in relation to nature in that both are
insignificant, figured as smallness, in the vast interconnections that form ecology. Dickinson
enacts the sentiment from this letter and the two gnat poems in the poem “I heard a Fly buzz –
when / I died” (J465, Fr591) in which the fly becomes a portal of strangeness. In this poem,
Dickinson more famously signals death through a fly rather than a gnat. That both insects are
considered “pests” reflects Dickinson’s characterization of death as a figure that is unwelcome,

30

There are numerous studies of Dickinson’s volcanoes, most notably by Adrienne Rich, and
this poem is likely influenced by Dickinson’s awareness of the ruins of Pompeii.
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yet inevitable. In a letter to her cousin Louise Norcross, Dickinson writes more playfully of flies
in April 1859: “I enjoy much with a precious fly, during sister’s absence, not one of your blue
monsters, but a timid creature, that hops from pane to pane of her white house, so very
cheerfully, and hums and thrums, a sort of speck piano. Tell Vinnie I’ll kill him the day she
comes, for I sha’n’t need him any more, and she don’t mind flies!” (L 206). In this letter,
Dickinson shows her close observation of a creature, Darwinian in its attention to detail even in
its humor. Dickinson takes the fly as her companion, but abides by the social codes represented
by her sister in which the fly is an unacceptable companion.
In the poem “I heard a Fly buzz – when / I died” the fly may be one of those “blue
monsters”: “There interposed a Fly - / With Blue - uncertain - stumbling Buzz - / Between the
light - and me -” (lines 14-16). Here we see the clear parallel to the previous poem concluding
with the figure of the gnat in which the insect’s wings again signal a type of unexpected
death/destruction. As Robin Peel points out, Dickinson may have read the article on the house fly
in Harper’s from Nov 1862 in which the author claims that “The incontrovertible laws of Nature,
upon which all alike depend,--the Man as well as the Fly” (qtd. in Peel 322). Many readings of
this poem call attention to the figure of the fly as symbolic, as when Helen Vendler suggests that
the fly replaces an absent king figure. For her, the fly has the power “to insist on his gross
material finality of color and sound” (Vendler 90). For Dickinson, this materiality is not only
present in death but in all life. The fly represents the materiality of existence in all its uncertainty
and precariousness. It is a figure of decay and digestion, of the cycle between life and death.
Death is the most direct confrontation with material vulnerability, but Dickinson uses her poetry
to remind us of the constancy of this state. For her, to imagine otherwise is an arrogant fantasy
built on empty rhetoric. The human capacity for seeing and knowing ceases in this poem in
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relation to the fly’s buzz as it does in relation to sound in “I felt a Funeral, in my Brain,” (J289,
Fr340). In that poem, it is significant that Dickinson chooses the more biological term “brain”
over “mind” in the title in order to emphasize the bodily experience of death. Notably,
Dickinson’s original word choice repeated “brain” in place of “Soul” in the line “And creak
across my Soul” (Wardrop in Martin 148). While Wardrop reads this interchangeability of brain
and soul as a “thinking in God, or prayer in cognition,” (148), Dickinson may be closer to
Darwin here in recognizing a material basis for something as abstract as the soul, as
aforementioned in the poem “This is a Blossom of the Brain - .” Dickinson’s interchange
between terms may reflect a similar questioning to that of Darwin when he makes notes to
himself to downplay his materialism (Notebooks 9) and speculates “May not idea of God arise
from our confused idea of 'ought,' joined with necessary notion of 'causation'” (Notebooks 35).
While Dickinson may not go this far, her poems are equally skeptical about received
abstractions, particularly religious ones. Darwin is likewise interested in what he calls “the
relation of mind and brain” in both humans and animals (Notebooks 78). Darwin recognizes the
biological interconnection of mind and body, or the mind as embodied in the brain: “Experience
shows the problem of the mind cannot be solved by attacking the citadel itself.--the mind is
function of body” (Notebooks 71). Dickinson’s poem foregrounds the brain in the title,
suggesting more intimate connections between brain/body and mind/soul as Darwin speculates.
The speaker of the poem is not simply imagining her own funeral, but rather the poem attempts
to enact in language the materiality of dying. In this way, the poem is grounded in the material as
sound replaces sight as the dominant sense before the end of sensory experience. This then is the
end of knowing, as the poem’s final line states. Similarly, in the poem “I died for Beauty” (J449,
Fr448) speech and naming cease and are replaced by moss. As in Dickinson’s other death poems,

256
the sensory is eliminated by a figure of nature, like the fly. Though this poem is allegorical with
the figures of “Truth” and “Beauty” likely drawn from Keats’s “Ode on a Grecian Urn,” the final
haunting image of defacement by nature in the form of moss in death is enacted at the material
level. Just as in “I felt a Funeral, in my Brain” and “I heard a Fly buzz – when / I died,” death is
defined materially by the end of the senses. The covering of names further represents death as a
figure that erases human identity and social markers, as in “A Toad, can die of Light -”.

Part V. Posthuman Poetics
Dickinson’s poetic language often applies equally to humans as well as to the nonhuman.
As in “A Toad, can Die of Light -” Dickinson sometimes inverts light’s traditional symbolism to
associate it with death rather than life.31 In a well-known poem she describes the winter light:
“There's a certain Slant of light, / Winter Afternoons - / That oppresses, like the Heft / Of
Cathedral Tunes -” (J258, Fr320, lines 1-4). By the end of the poem, the light is associated
directly with “Death -” as the final word of the poem. Dickinson associates light with being
dangerous to both other creatures and humans in the poem that begins “Before I got my eye / put
out - / I liked as well to see / As other creatures, that / have Eyes / And know no other way”
(J327, Fr336, lines 1-6). The poem ends “So safer - guess - / With just my Soul / Opon the
window pane - / Where other creatures / put their eyes - / Incautious - of the Sun -” (lines 29-34).
That this poem opens and closes with the speaker’s connections to “other creatures” performs a
similar form of leveling between humans and other animals as in “A Toad, can die of Light -”.
The poem’s second line imaginatively projects other creatures’ desires in the speaker’s own
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For a fuller reading of light and dark in Dickinson’s poetry, see Wendy Barker’s “Emily
Dickinson and Poetic Strategy.”
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statement. Here, there is shared biology and drive among creatures, but again the light is
dangerous and the opening image violent. The state of embodiment itself causes danger, a point
Dickinson reiterates in the poem “I am afraid to own / a Body -” (F1050A).32 Like the use of
“eyes,” and “creatures,” Dickinson's use of the word “body” extends to other creatures. She may
draw this expanded sense of “body” from science, which uses the term even for inanimate
matter.33
The center stanzas of “Before I got my eye put out” makes the connected claim that the
ability to possess nature would result in a kind of death. For Dickinson, there is a pleasure in the
possibility of this kind of possession, to “have” nature as “mine,” a term repeated four times in
the poem (lines). But again, the light becomes dangerous, like a lightning bolt when “As much of
Noon / as I could take / Between my finite eyes - / […] / the News would strike / me dead -”
(lines 18-20, 27-8). This line echoes the speaker’s wounded eye at the beginning of the poem. As
the speaker’s prospecting eye garners everything into the mind through sight, she reminds us that
the very possibility of this kind of full possession would be a form of death; this kind of
perspective toward nature is one that wounds and kills. As Fred White observes in his article on
Dickinson’s use of science in her poetry, Dickinson does not share in Emerson’s belief that
“Nature conspires with spirit to emancipate us. [...] Dickinson cannot accept the possibility that
one can be emancipated by nature. Instead, she squarely confronts the gulf, painfully aware that
crossing it, even if it could be done, would constitute death. For Dickinson the essence of life is
its finitude” (123). Michelle Kohler and Daneen Wardrop further read this poem as a rejection of
32

For more on Dickinson’s relationship to the body, see Shira Wolosky’s “Emily Dickinson:
Being in the body.”
33
In An Introduction to Natural Philosophy (Designed as a text-book for the use of students in
college), which Dickinson would have used, the “Preliminary Definitions” section lists “Body is
any collection of matter existing in a separate form” (1).
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Emerson’s Transcendentalism figured in the transparent eyeball. For Dickinson, as Kohler notes,
eyes often figure as sources of anxiety (34). In “I heard a Fly buzz – when / I died” “eyes” are a
metonym for the mourners who are characterized only through the sense of vision that the
speaker of the poem begins to lose. In the envelope poem “Had we our / senses”, Dickinson
concludes “Had we the eyes / within our Head -s-/ prudent / How well that / we are Blind - / We
could not / look opon the / Earth - World / So Utterly Unmoved” (A202, pg 53). Here, Dickinson
laments humans’ lack of connection to the natural world through both physical and moral sense,
but she recognizes the “madness” (line 8) this might produce to realize the full extent of
ecological interconnection. In this way, the poem echoes Darwin’s attempt to show the “web of
infinite relations” so vast in scale. Perhaps in response to Darwin, the narrator claims in
Middlemarch,
That element of tragedy which lies in the very fact of frequency, has not yet wrought
itself into the coarse emotion of mankind; and perhaps our frames could hardly bear
much of it. If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like
hearing the grass grow and the squirrel’s heart beat, and we should die of that roar which
lies on the other side of silence. As it is, the quickest of us walk about well wadded with
stupidity. (70)
George Eliot was one of Dickinson’s favorite writers and Dickinson’s poetry might well be
characterized as “hearing the grass grow and the squirrel’s heart beat” as she attends to the
miniature sublime. In all these poems, Dickinson recognizes the impossibility of the human
containing nature; rather, nature is infinite and the human infinitesimal.
Dickinson’s poetic language often decenters the human, a rhetorical strategy that she
shares with Darwin. As Beer observes in Darwin’s writing, “words that in other contexts have a
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specifically human application, such as ‘inhabitants,’ in his writing apply equally to all species of
animal or vegetable life … Words like ‘parent’ and ‘birthplace’, so often reserved for human
kind, are here set at the service of all living forms” (31, 61). Dickinson uses “creature” and its
variants (creature’s/creatures) throughout her poems (38 times), often in reference to animals, but
also including objects (“You’ve seen Balloons set -” J700, Fr730) and concepts (“The Past is /
such a curious / Creature” J1203, Fr1273) (Concordance 160). This use of terms that can apply
to humans and nonhumans alike also includes “fellow” which likewise often refers to animals in
Dickinson’s work, including a snake, a worm, a bird, etc. Of the “creature” poems, several relate
to suffering or death in some way. In the poem “I had been hungry, all the / Years” (J579, Fr439)
Dickinson likens herself to the birds who dine on crumbs rather than “plenty.” In the final stanza,
she includes “Creatures” as variant for “persons” in imaging those outside the windows. This
change keeps with the connection of the speaker to the birds in identifying hunger as a shared
biological experience between humans and animals as in the aforementioned poem “Victory
comes late,” about sparrows starving. Clearly these poems carry both religious and sexual
symbolic weight on hunger/starvation and plenty/possession, but for Dickinson, the basis for this
symbolism is rooted in biology. This biological basis is evident in many of her poems that have a
clear symbolic register, as in “The Bone that / has no Marrow,” (J1274, Fr1218) which critiques
politics, but the lines “A Bone has / obligations - / A Being has the / same -” (lines 9-12) show
the biology that is the basis of the metaphor in connecting bone and being, or (as we saw before
in the poem “A science - so the Savans say” (J100, F147A) with bone and blossom).
In foregrounding the biological, Dickinson’s poems often take the human as the figure of
the other, identifying more with elements of nature and particularly with animals. The opening
line of the poem “Light is sufficient to / itself -” (J862, Fr506B) attributes agency to light and the
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remainder of the first stanza explains that “Others” (line 3) can see light on window panes during
the day; hence, the light is agential, the observers passive. As in Dickinson’s poems that critique
scientific hubris, light in this poem serves neither symbolic nor industrial purpose. In the second
stanza, Dickinson reiterates light’s autonomy (“But not for compensation -”) (line 7) and
concludes “It holds as large / a Glow / To Squirrel in the / Himmaleh / Precisely, as to you.”
(lines 8-12?). The end of the poem then echoes the sentiment from “A Toad, can die of Light -”
that human and gnat, or here human and squirrel, are in the same position in relation to nature
where nature is a disinterested force. Dickinson’s choices of the squirrel and the Himmaleh
mountains serve as representations of very different beings and climates/locales that nonetheless
have a shared relationship to nature as the speaker. In this way the poem illustrates at least part
of the kind of scale that Darwin attempts to map in Origin.
Indeed, squirrels populate many of Dickinson’s poems as creatures that, like gnats, call
into question anthropocentrism. In “The Tint I cannot take - / is best -” (J627, Fr696), squirrels
seem to know the coming “secret” of winter as they gather food in preparation. Toward the end
of the poem, winter stands in for death as a mysterious force of nature. In characteristic fashion,
Dickinson identifies the squirrels as mocking human arrogance (lines 19-28):
The Pleading of the Summer That other Prank - of Snow [That Covers Mystery with Blonde -] Cushions Mystery with
Tulle,
For fear the Squirrels - know.
Their Graspless manners - mock
us Until the Cheated Eye
Shuts arrogantly - in the Grave Another way - to see –
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While in the penultimate stanza nature is more at play, the final line of that stanza leads into the
next as death becomes the overt subject of the poem. “Blonde” here may refer, as in previous
poems, to either frost or blight, but given the variation of “tulle,” Dickinson may also be
referring to “blonde lace” which was a style of silk mesh (“blond, blonde”). Dickinson’s use of
modifiers in the poem again signals the contrast between humans’ perceptions of nature and its
own material realities. The squirrels going about their instinctual (“Graspless”) behaviors
“mock” the human who pretends that death is not the final reality of all life. Dickinson explicitly
calls this “arrogant” and recognizes that the human, figured metonymically by the eye, feels
“cheated” by this reality. Yet, from this perspective, Dickinson identifies the importance of
seeing ourselves in and with other creatures, particularly as all are subject to the same fate of
natural death. This different “way - to see -” is influenced by death (framed by the dashes as in
the previous line “- in the Grave -”) to become an ecological way of seeing, one that shares in
Darwin’s perspective that all are subject to the “struggle for existence.”
Dickinson shares with Darwin the recognition that death as a part of nature often involves
violence, though both writers grapple with the fact. In her article on “Public and Private in
Dickinson’s War Poetry,” Shira Wolosky notes the “indirect imagery” of war in which “Nature
is represented in battle imagery” (110). Susan Howe likewise makes the claim that in
Dickinson’s poetry, “Nature is no soothing mother, Nature is annihilation brooding over” (Howe
21). This sense of nature as potentially destructive is similar to the way Darwin initially
describes “a war of nature, of famine and death” (Origin 528).34 In the “Struggle for Existence”
section of Origin, Darwin reminds readers that “we do not see, or we forget, that the birds which
34

Darwin pulls the term “war of nature” from Hobbes and changes war to “struggle” (Beer 52).
He also changes “preservation of the favoured races” to “survival” (Beer 59) and he
varies “struggle for existence” with “struggle for life” and “the great battle for life” (Origin 127).
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are idly signing round us mostly live on insects or seeds, are constantly destroying life” (62).
Dickinson comes closest to Darwin’s style of observation about the struggle for existence in the
poem that begins “A Bird came down / the Walk - / He did not know I / saw - / He bit an
Angleworm / in halves / And ate the fellow, raw,” (lines 1-7, J328, Fr359B). The subsequent
four stanzas of the poem continue to describe the bird’s behavior in detail.35 Throughout the
poem Dickinson oscillates between specificity and figural language, fusing the two, as the worm
is named both by species and as a “fellow.” This poem continues Dickinson’s pairings of birds
with feeding, but here the predator-prey relationship is described as a fact of nature without
symbolic register as “raw.” In a more symbolic poem, which ends as a “dream,” Dickinson
begins with a realist scene: “In Winter in my Room / I came upon a Worm / Pink, lank and
warm” (lines 1-3, J1670, Fr1742) which the first stanza goes on to describe in detail. By the
middle of the poem, however, the worm turns into a snake that she must flee from across towns.
The sexual and religious symbolism of the snake is impossible to miss, but there is also a way of
reading this poem in which the worm represents a more domesticated or harmless nature,
whereas the snake becomes a figure of wild(er)ness: “In feature as the worm before / But ringed
with power” (lines 16-17). The intrusion of the outside creature then drives the human away
from civilization and into the role of prey. Here, the snake functions similarly to Mary Shelley’s
Creature, which Victor associates with a snake, an insect and worms, all of which are creatures
that are dissimilar to mammals as a class.
Jane Bennett calls attention to Darwin’s interest in worms, noting that he calls them
“small agencies” (7) and feels that “archaeologists ought to be grateful to worms” (qtd. in
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Knickerbocker chooses this poem as an example of ecopoetics because of its enactment of “the
relationship between natural observation, figuration, and ethical response” (10).
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Bennett 7, 96). She cites George Levine’s claim that “Darwin's extraordinary curiosity about the
talents of worms has to do with his inveterate anthropomorphism' which was 'absolutely central
to his larger theoretical project'" (qtd. in Bennett 99). Levine, however, sees in Darwin a form of
anthropomorphism that is not anthropocentric: "Darwin anthropomorphized his worms: he saw
in them an intelligence and willfulness that he recognized as related to his own. But the
narcissism of his gaze backfired for it also prompted Darwin to pay close attention to the
mundane activities of worms, and what came to the fore through paying attention was their own,
distinctive, material complexity" (qtd. in Bennett 99). The same could be said of Dickinson,
though her interest (and Darwin’s) in the miniature sublime seems less a kind of narcissism and
more a deep desire and curiosity to experience another creature. Dickinson’s poems often
employ personification in ways that bring into question traditional ideas of “the human.” In his
study of science in Dickinson, Robin Peel claims “Dickinson was not reluctant to speak of her
garden flowers as friends or children rather than specimens, employing the sentimental style that
was in vogue” (Peel 174). Recent ecocritical theory, however, has begun to reclaim
personification as a powerful rhetorical device for connecting humans and nonhuman nature in
ways that are not simply “sentimental” but biological. Graham Harman, Timothy Morton, and
Heather Keenleyside have all suggested that anthropomorphism can be a powerful tool in
recognizing shared characteristics between life forms that are not solely functions of rhetoric. As
Scott Knickerbocker argues in Ecopoetics “narrative devices as personification and apostrophe
should not be dismissed as anthropocentric pathetic fallacies with which we merely project the
human onto the nonhuman” (5). Building from the aforementioned commentary on worms, Jane
Bennet makes a similar claim for what she calls “strategic anthropomorphism”:
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In a vital materialism, an anthropomorphic element in perception can uncover a whole
world of resonances and resemblances--sounds and sights that echo and bounce far more
than would be possible were the universe to have a hierarchical structure. We at first may
see only a world in our own image, but what appears next is a swarm of 'talented' and
vibrant materialities (including the seeing self). A touch of anthropomorphism then can
catalyze a sensibility that finds a world filled not with ontologically distinct categories of
being, subjects and objects but with variously composed materialities that form
confederation. (99)
Darwin himself faced criticism, including from Alfred Russel Wallace, for anthropomorphizing
evolution (Kenyon-Jones 200). This begs the question of whether the terms “anthropomorphism”
and “personification” should still be in use as they belie anthropocentric logic in their linguistic
constructions. If the traits normally ascribed only to humans become democratized to other life
forms, then they are no longer figurative applications of the human to the nonhuman but rather
based on shared biology and affect. We might instead reverse the hierarchy with the obverse
term “biomorphism,” drawn from the visual arts, in which art corresponds to natural forms, or
perhaps more broadly “panmorphism” (to echo pantheism and panpsychism) to signal the shared
relations between bodies.
In Natures in Translation Alan Bewell observes “In moving toward a model in which
human beings were much closer to animals than might otherwise have been thought, Darwin was
also moving toward seeing nature as being much more like human life than had been realized”
(311). For both Dickinson and Darwin, this fact needed to be expressed in new forms of
language. Darwin, like Dickinson, struggled with finding a language that does not privilege the
human position as center or actor. Gillian Beer has given significant consideration to this subject,
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particularly the intentionality she sees as inherent in all languages (20) but that is particularly
pronounced in English. Like Darwin, Dickinson attempted to subvert these principles in English
when she wanted to include the nonhuman world in a sense of agency and feeling. Dickinson,
(with substantially more freedom in experimenting with language in private poetry than Darwin)
rendered the nonhuman world as vibrantly active in her poetic form at both the literal and
figurative levels. Both Dickinson and Darwin thus move away from human exceptionalism as
they find new forms of language to express growing ecological awareness.
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Conclusion: Romanticism in the Era of Climate Change
How is it that nineteenth-century ecology, in both science and literature, can remain
relevant around 200 years later when the environmental crises we face today have grown (and
continue to grow) exponentially? Many of the dominant tropes in contemporary ecocriticism and
writing about climate change more generally have evolved from the ecological thinking of
nineteenth-century writers and scientists, yet parts of this lineage have been elided or obscured.
The preceding chapters are an attempt to recover these traces and to show how these historical
works can prepare us to grapple with the central questions of environmentalism today as we
explore the perils and possibilities of different ecological epistemologies. In particular, I aimed
to demonstrate how developments in evolution and ecology shifted the understanding of the
“human” in the nineteenth century in ways that the twenty-first century has only begun to
examine, including the idea of the posthuman and new forms of selfhood that move away from
anthropocentrism.
In the nineteenth century, literature and science were far less divided as fields, thus most
nineteenth-century literature was deeply engaged with the cutting-edge science of its time and
vice versa; in tandem, science and literature began to fundamentally shift beliefs and values
following Darwin’s revolutionary work. There are valuable lessons to be taken today from the
literature of the time when the Anthropocene began. Though the start date of the Anthropocene
remains debated, the originator of the term, chemist Paul J. Crutzen, suggests that it began in the
late 1700s coinciding with the rise of the steam ship (Chakrabarty 209). Tropes from nineteenthcentury literature that continue in the discourse of climate change include the sublime, the
uncanny, the role of the imagination, and new metaphors for the relationship between humanity
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and nature. Many of these tropes are evident in the recent controversial article “The
Uninhabitable Earth” in The New York Times Magazine (9 July 2017) that claims “no matter how
well-informed you are, you are surely not alarmed enough.” The article details seven horrific
ways that people will die from climate change-related events in the future including being boiled
alive from heat and “A rolling death smog that suffocates millions.” While this may sound like
science fiction, the author has published an annotated version to substantiate the claims in
response to a barrage of criticism at such graphic alarmism. The article is gothic in its terror as it
follows Malthusian-like checks to the human population. Some feel it is a long overdue clarion
call, while others are pushed further into denial and skepticism. If this article is any example, the
nineteenth century is still very much with us in more ways than one; if we are to survive as a
species, we must reconcile what began over 200 years ago at the start of the Anthropocene. Like
Victor Frankenstein’s creature, climate change is the unintended product of misguided beliefs.
We need only look at how Frankenstein ends, “He was soon borne away by the waves, and lost
in darkness and distance” (161), to know our fate if we refuse to acknowledge “this thing of
darkness” as our own.
In his influential article “The Climate of History: Four Theses” (2009) historian Dipesh
Chakrabarty takes up the myriad ways in which climate change challenges traditional Western
beliefs and ideas about history, culture, freedom, justice and identity. Chakrabarty makes the
claim repeatedly that in response to a problem as complex and multifaceted as climate change
the academic disciplines must work together (201, 213, 215, 219). He begins with the thought
experiment that opens journalist Alan Weisman’s The World without Us (2007) in which
Weisman tries to imagine the world sans humans to illustrate the difficulty that climate change
poses for “futures we cannot visualize” (Chakrabarty 211). In this same vein, Chakrabarty
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concludes his article with the problems that result from the human inability to experience
ourselves as concepts and thereby to conceive of ourselves as a species (211, 220-1). The need
for new forms of imaginative narrative and experience is part of the domain of literature; thus,
literary scholarship has a vital role to play alongside other disciplines, particularly in addressing
the conceptual and imaginative challenges posed by climate change. Novelist Amitav Ghosh
devotes his recent nonfiction book The Great Derangement: Climate Change and the
Unthinkable (2016) to this very premise: “What fiction--and by this I mean not only the novel
but also epic and myth--makes possible is to approach the world in the subjunctive mode, to
conceive of it as if it were other than it is: in short, the great, irreplaceable potentiality of fiction
is that it makes possible the imagining of possibilities. And to imagine other forms of human
existence is exactly the challenge that is posed by the climate crisis” (128).
While Ghosh is interested in what contemporary fiction, particularly literary fiction as
distinct from science- or speculative fiction, can do in response to climate change, I am
interested in what multiple genres of literature from the nineteenth century can offer us. There is
growing interest in this question among scholars of the nineteenth century across the disciplines
given that the time period is defined by the rapid industrialization that laid the groundwork for
modern global capitalism. Journalist Naomi Klein begins the first part of her book This Changes
Everything: Capitalism vs The Climate (2014) with quotes from 1840 and 1865, including Victor
Hugo: “How sad to think that nature speaks and mankind doesn’t listen” (Klein 29). There is
consensus that the issues that we face now can be traced back historically and materially to the
industrial revolution in the nineteenth century. What needs to be traced are the parallel
philosophical and scientific theories that supported the rise of industry and the ways that they
continue to function today. One way to understand resistance to environmentally destructive

269
forms of industrialization is to look to the insights of nineteenth-century writers who saw what
this would portend.
In this sense, Romantic literature offers alternative perspectives on nature and self to
those of the Enlightenment, as well as critiques of the science that served rampant
industrialization that harmed both vulnerable humans (especially the poor and working classes
and indigenous groups) and the natural world. Chakrabarty notes with some concern the
contemporary turn to “the language of Enlightenment” in calls for “knowledge and reason” (219)
in response to climate change, yet climate change, as Ghosh recognizes, “challenges and refutes
Enlightenment ideas” (Ghosh 31) about individuality, reason, agency, and freedom. Ghosh,
along with Timothy Morton, sees climate change as fundamentally an experience of the uncanny
(Ghosh 30-21; Morton, Dark Ecology 117, 125).1 The uncanny is that which is both familiar and
unfamiliar; indeed, its strangeness derives from its very nearness to something we already know,
as Sigmund Freud traces etymologically in his famous essay “The Uncanny” (1919). In this way,
climate change also invokes notions of the sublime as something that terrifies and awes in its
superhuman scale. As Heidi Scott claims, in the Anthropocene, “Homo sapiens have gone from
being the observers of sublime chaos in nature to being co-authors of it” (2). One of the central
problems that climate change presents then is fundamentally one of scale. Timothy Clark devotes
much of his work to this, what he calls the “unreadability of scale” (13) in relation to climate
change in the Anthropocene and Morton makes similar claims in Hyperobjects: Philosophy and
Ecology After the End of the World (2013) arguing that climate change is too vast and complex
in scale to be comprehended fully. Klein recognizes this as a challenge of epic proportions that

1

Morton, originally a scholar of Romantic literature, was recently dubbed the “the philosopher
prophet of the Anthropocene” in The Guardian (Blasdel).
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will require all aspects of culture to shift: “The challenge, then, is not simply that we need to
spend a lot of money and change a lot of policies; it’s that we need to think differently, radically
differently, for those changes to be remotely possible … I have also come to understand, over the
course of researching this book, that the shift will require rethinking the very nature of
humanity’s power” (23, 25). This sense of the need to shift radically in response to science
defines both the nineteenth century and our own time period. Klein’s emphasis on rethinking
falls at least in part under the purview of literature since it offers, as Ghosh suggests, a
“subjunctive mood,” much like Weisman’s thought experiment.
Science can cause rapid changes in the ways people perceive themselves and the world
around them. This project follows Donna Haraway’s contention that science, like literature,
relies on narrative tropes. In this vein, Darwin is a useful case study as both a writer and a
scientist who grappled with initiating such a paradigm shift. As we have seen, the relationship
between science and aesthetics was central for Darwin. As Gillian Beer claims in her
groundbreaking study of Darwin’s rhetoric “Darwin adapted from Lyell the metaphor of
etymology as a representation of descent and change. So language for Darwin has a ‘real
affinity’ with his theory. The physical world provides its own language-system” what Lyell
called “ancient memorials of nature … written in a living language” (Beer 39). This leads Beer
to conclude that “Evolutionary theory is first a form of imaginative history” (6). Indeed, for Beer,
Darwin’s willingness to engage in thought experiments is central for his theory (255). A thought
experiment is essentially an imagined narrative. The premise of my project is that reading
literature of the nineteenth century that is engaged with the science of its time and that
imaginatively displaces the human is one way to begin to absorb the fundamental shifts in
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thinking and feeling that will motivate the actions demanded by climate change. This is a diffuse
process, but it is one place where we as literary scholars and educators can begin.
A concrete lesson from the nineteenth century is that of cross-disciplinary work. This
was, of course, far more achievable before the disciplines branched into seemingly separate
species with the increasing specialization of the twentieth century, but the intellectual
interchange of the nineteenth century is needed now more than ever. As Beer puts it, “What is
remarkable about the mid- and late nineteenth century is that instead of ignoring or rebutting
attempts to set scientific writing and literature side by side, as is sometimes the case in our own
time, both novelists and scientists were very much aware of the potentialities released by the
congruities of their methods and ends” (84). Scott takes this argument a step further in claiming
that literature provided useful models and methods for the nascent field of ecology in the
nineteenth century: “The science of ecology is only the most recent method we have developed
to examine nature, and it has inherited methods from many benefactors” (15): as a benefactor,
“literature was involved in formal explorations of realist nature before scientific ecology existed”
(8). Scott further makes the case in ecology for the value of literary models alongside scientific
ones: “Because literary models are dedicated neither to reducing complex systems to their barest
minimum, nor to abstracting them to accommodating millions of variables, they may remain
expansive and fluid, they may preserve historical memories of ecosystems, and, by their
articulate poetic form, they may compel readers to attend, comprehend, and care for the actual
natural space they contain in prosody and imagery” (5). The power of literature for ecology then
is that of imaginative flexibility, historicity and affect. As we have seen, Mary Shelley’s
apocalyptic novel The Last Man (1826) is particularly relevant in that it offers a critique of
Enlightenment perfectibility as it imagines a global climate crisis. It renders the instrument of
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climate change as an uncanny plague that is both related to historical realities, but nonetheless
unknown in its origin or cause. Shelley conducts her own thought experiment, similar to
Weisman’s, in imagining the end of humans as a species, oscillating in the narrative between the
perspectives of the global and the individual, the planetary and the personal. The speculative
quality of Shelley’s novel, set in 2099, offers us one such imaginative space to examine the dire
consequences of the human desire to “master” nature. We will recall that the narrator of the
novel presciently observes of fire, “Could we take integral parts of this power, and not be subject
to its operation?” (184). Literature provides a vital space for play and critique of such concepts
and their ethical consequences, as in Shelley’s more famous novel Frankenstein, which
dramatizes the very question of what or who is counted as “human,” thereby exposing the
subjective nature of that designation. Consequently, my project focused on the intersection of
science and literature in order to show the significant role that literature can play in providing an
open space to explore the ethics and implications of scientific work through new forms of
aesthetics.
If we have any hope of combating climate change and other ecological disasters and
injustices, we must learn from the nineteenth century’s sprit of collaborative knowledge. With
the increasing levels of specialization in science, particularly in mathematics and modeling, it
has become more distant from language. While many herald this as a turn to increased
objectivity, the discipline also obscures biases and assumptions and simultaneously distances the
public from critical information. It has been left to a small number of scientists who write
publicly accessible works and journalists to interpret science for the public. But what about
literary scholars? Given the long history of the intertwining of science and literature, the only
way to reach a broad public is through the stories we tell about ourselves and our world. This is
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why a work like Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962), with its opening imagined narrative in
which a town full of humans, animals, and plants succumbs to chemical poisoning, catalyzed the
environmentalist movement, combining scientific information into narrative. We need more
works by scientists and writers alike, and ideally in collaboration, if we are to make a compelling
public case for a path to surviving climate change.
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